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Running Report ... 
Displaying Report 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK vs. AARON D KENNARD 
CASE NUMBER 010910255 Property Rights 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - CHASE MANHATTAN BANK 
Represented by: RONALD G RUSSELL 
Defendant - PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION 
Represented by: STEVEN W CALL 
Defendant - AARON D KENNARD 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 310.75 
Amount Paid: 310.75 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Due: 120.00 
Amount Paid: 120.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.7 5 
Amount Paid: 0.75 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
Printed: 03/18/02 11:20:34 Page 1 
"L 
CASE NUMBER 010910255 Property Rights 
11-16-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for Temp Restrain Order 
Judge: STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
Clerk: matellew 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RONALD G RUSSELL 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEVE CALL 
JERALD CONDER 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:38 
matellew 
HEARING 
The above-entitled case comes before the court for a hearing on a 
request for a TRO. Counsel argue the issues to the court. The 
court takes this matter under-advisement. 
11-16-01 Filed: Notice of hearing kathyg 
1 1 - 1 6 -
1 1 - 1 6 -








01 Filed: Memorandum in support of plaintiff's motion for 
temporary restrainging order and preliminary injunction 
01 Case filed by coryr 
01 Judge HENRIOD assigned. 
2001 at 09:30 AM 
•01 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
•01 Fee Account created Total Due: 120.00 
•01 COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC Payment Received: 120.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
•01 TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER scheduled on November 19, 
in Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD. 
-01 Filed: Memo in Opposition to Motino for TRO and Preliminary 
Injunction 
-01 PRELIM INJUNCTION scheduled on December 03, 2001 at 02:00 PM in 
Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD. 
-01 Filed order: Temporary Restraining Order and Notice of hearing 
(TRO faxed to both counsel-prel. injunction hearing 12/3/01 @ 
2pm) 
Judge shenriod 
Signed November 19, 2001 
/ll-20-01 Filed: Amended complaint 
11-26-01 Filed return: Summons (20 day) on return 
Party Served: KENNARD, AARON D 
Service Date: November 21, 2001 
11-26-01 Filed return: Summons (20 day) on return 
Party Served: PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION 
Service Date: November 21, 2001 
11-26-01 Filed: Notice of Pendency of Action (lis pendens) recorded 
w/county recorder 
















Printed: 03/18/02 11:20:35 Page 2 
AL 
CASE NUMBER 010910255 Property Rights 
11-28-01 Filed: Notice of filing of bond kathyg 
11-28-01 Filed: Affidavit of Jeffrey D Stevens devonyag 
11-28-01 Filed: Reply Memo in Support of Pla's Motion for TRO and 
Preliminary Injunction devonyag 
11-30-01 Filed: Affidavit of Ken N. Higley carolh 
12-03-01 Filed: Affidavit of John Clayton matellew 
12-03-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for Prelim Injunction matellew 
Judge: STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
Clerk: matellew 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RONALD G RUSSELL 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEVEN W CALL 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 2:00 
HEARING 
The above-entitled case comes before the court for a hearing on 
preliminary injunction. Counsel argue the issues of this case and 
submit. 
The court takes this matter under-advisement. The TRO is to 
remain in effect until further order of the court. 
12-03-01 Filed: Sur-Reply memorandum in opposition to motion for 
preliminary injunction 
12-03-01 Filed order: Defendant PFC's Ex parte motion for leave to 
submit sur-reply and order 
Judge shenriod 
Signed December 03, 2001 
12-10-01 Filed order: Memorandum decision-(12/3/01 hearing) 
Judge shenriod 
Signed December 10, 2001 
12-10-01 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
12-10-01 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
12-18-01 Filed return: Trial Subpoena 
Party Served: Robert McDonald 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: November 30, 2001 
Filed: Motion to alter and/or amend memorandum decision 
Filed: Memorandum in support of motion to alter and amend 
memorandum decision 




















Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Alter and/or Amend 
Memorandum Decision 
Filed: Objection to proposed declaratory judgment 
Filed: Joint Notice to Submit and Request for Ruling and Entry 







CASE NUMBER 010910255 Property Rights 
01-31-02 Filed order: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law carolh 
Judge shenriod 
Signed January 31, 2002 
01-31-02 Filed order: Final Judgment carolh 
Judge shenriod 
Signed January 31, 2002 
02-07-02 Filed: Notice of Entry of Final Judgment carolh 
03-01-02 Filed: Undertaking for Costs carolh 
03-01-02 Filed: Notice of Appeal coryr 
03-01-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 190.00 coryr 
03-01-02 APPEAL Payment Received: 190.00 coryr 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
03-07-02 Note: Forwarded Cert/Copy of Notice of Appeal with Supreme 
Court sophieo 
03-13-02 Filed: Supreme Court letter to Michael D. Mayfield & Steven W. 
Call (SC # 20020203-SC) - Notice of Appeal receivedby Supreme 
Court kathys 
Exhibit B 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION; ] 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his ) 
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
I RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
I PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 010910255PR 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod \^~ 
Pursuant to Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff Chase 
Manhattan Bank hereby moves the court for a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction restraining and enjoining defendants Principal Funding 
Corporation and Aaron D. Kennard, in his capacity as the Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
during the pendency of this action from conducting a sheriff's sale of the real property at 
issue in this action as more specifically described in the Complaint herein. As grounds 
A QP% 7 
for this motion, plaintiff submits that a preliminary injunction is necessary to preserve the 
status quo pending this court's determination of the parties' interests in the subject 
property. If the sale is not enjoined, plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury in that a sale 
of the subject property in violation of plaintiff's rights will tend to render any judgment 
ultimately entered herein ineffectual. 
A 
DATED this \{Q day of November, 2001. 
PARR WARDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
By: 
RonalcTG. Russell, Esq!* 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Exhibit C 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION; ^ 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his ] 
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff, ] 
Defendants. ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
) FOR TEMPORARY 
I RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
I PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 010910255PR J^ 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 1\V 
}r 
Plaintiff Chase Manhattan Bank respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support 
of its Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed this action seeking, among other things, a decree determining that 
defendant Principal Funding Corporation does not hold a judgment lien against the 
subject property. Defendant refuses to recognize that its judgment lien was extinguished 
ns 
U 
and foreclosed by a Trustee's Deed recorded in favor of plaintiff earlier this year. 
Defendant Principal Funding Corporation has caused the Salt Lake County Sheriff to 
schedule a sheriff's sale of the subject real property for November 20, 2001 at 12:00 
noon. A temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction are necessary in this 
case to enjoin the sheriff's sale to preserve the status quo pending this court's 
determination of the parties' respective interests in the property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff is the owner of certain real property located at 2157 South Lincoln 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, which is more particularly described as follows: 
Lots 1 through 8, inclusive, of Block 3, Geneva Place, 
according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book C of Plats, at 
Page 90 of the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. 
Said property is hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property." 
2. On or about April 18, 1994, a Judgment on a counterclaim was entered 
against Lan C. England in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah in 
an action entitled Lan C. England v. Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No. 930901471CV 
(the "Horbach judgment"). A true and correct copy of the Horbach Judgment is attached 
hereto marked Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
3. An appeal was taken from the Horbach judgment and on October 19, 1995, 
the Utah Court of Appeals filed an Opinion reversing the Horbach Judgment, specifically 
2 
stating "we vacate the trial court's judgment based upon defendant's counterclaim . . . ." 
England v. Horbach, 905 P.2d 301, 303 n.1 (Utah App. 1995). A true and correct copy 
of the Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion is attached hereto marked Exhibit "B." 
4. Horbach petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for certiorari. While that 
petition was pending, Lan England borrowed $500,000 from Option One Mortgage 
Corporation secured by a Deed of Trust recorded against the Subject Property on May 
31, 1996 as Entry No. 6371918, in Book 7412, at Page 2835 of the official records of 
the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder having Lan C England, as trustor, First American 
Title of Utah, as trustee, and Option One Mortgage Corporation, as beneficiary (the 
"Option One Trust Deed"). A true and correct copy of the Option One Trust Deed is 
attached hereto marked Exhibit " C " 
5. On May 30, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion on the 
certiorari petition from the Utah Court of Appeals' decision vacating the Horbach 
Judgment. That decision states, "The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and 
the trial court judgment reinstated." England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 346 (Utah 
1997). A true and correct copy of the Utah Supreme Court's decision is attached hereto 
marked Exhibit "D." 
6. The Option One Trust Deed was foreclosed and on January 10, 2001, a 
Trustee's Deed was recorded at the office of the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder as 
3 
Entry No. 7797085, in Book 8414, at Page 8416 naming plaintiff as grantee. A true and 
correct copy of said Trustee's Deed is attached hereto marked Exhibit "E.M 
7. Because the lien of a judgment depends on the existence of the judgment, 
any lien that arose against the Subject Property by virtue of the Horbach Judgment 
ceased to exist when the Judgment was vacated by the Utah Court of Appeals. When 
the Judgment was subsequently reinstated by the Utah Supreme Court, the lien of the 
Judgment once again came into existence with a priority date as of the date that the 
"Judgment was reinstated. 
8. Any judgment lien arising under the Horbach Judgment as against the 
Subject Property was junior in priority to the Option One Trust Deed and was 
extinguished by the foreclosure of said trust deed and the issuance of a Trustee's Deed to 
plaintiff. 
9. Defendant Principal Funding Corporation asserts that it is the assignee of the 
Horbach judgment and has caused the Salt Lake County Sheriff to schedule an execution 
sale of the Subject Property for November 20, 2001 at the hour of 12:00 noon. 
10. Defendant Principal Funding Corporation has asserted that its claimed 
judgment lien against the Subject Property has priority over the lien of the Option One 
Trust Deed. 
4 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court may issue a 
•preliminary injunction upon the showing by the applicant that: 
(1) The applicant wi l l suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public 
interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant wil l prevail on the 
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits 
which should be the subject of further litigation. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e). As demonstrated below, each of the foregoing elements is 
satisfied in this case. 
A. Plaintiff Wil l Suffer Irreparable Harm if an Injunction Is Not Issued. 
Defendant asserts that it holds a judgment lien against the Subject Property. Plaintiff 
is the owner of the Subject Property pursuant.to a Trustee's Deed which foreclosed 
defendant's claimed lien. If a sheriff's sale is permitted prior to a determination 
regarding the parties' respective rights under these circumstances, there is substantial 
uncertainty as to how plaintiff can protect its rights in the property. Under such 
circumstances, courts have found a preliminary injunction to be appropriate. See 
Hariine v. Campbell. 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1986) (holding that the trial court properly 
exercised its discretion in granting injunctive relief to prevent a trustee's sale where lien 
5 
priorities were in question); see also Boulder Lumber Co. v. Alpine Nederland, 626 P.2d 
724, 726 (Colo. App. 1981) ("The uncertainty as to priorities and amounts, its chilling 
effect on bidding and bidders at a public sale, and the predicament in which it places 
persons trying to decide whether to redeem, justify the injunction. . . . It is far safer and 
more prudent to enlist judicial supervision of a foreclosure process from the beginning, 
rather than to untangle a knotted summary decree at some later date."); East Gadsden 
Bank v. Bagwell 143 So.2d 438 (1962) (holding that a temporary injunction was 
appropriate to preserve the status quo pending a determination of lien priority). Indeed, 
it is black letter law that a court may enter an injunction to prevent a foreclosure sale 
where there are conflicting claims regarding lien validity or priority: 
Where it appears that the property conveyed by a mortgage or deed of trust is 
subject to conflicting liens or rights, the priority of which the priority or validity 
of which is undetermined, equity has jurisdiction to restrain the sale of the 
property under power of sale until the character and validity of the claims or 
encumbrances can be determined. 
55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 617, at 262 (1996). 
B. The Threatened Injury to Plaintiff Outweighs Any Damages to the Party Restrained. 
The only potential harm that may result to defendant if an injunction is issued is the 
minimal cost of re-noticing a sheriffs sale. By contrast, the injury to plaintiff may be 
substantial. Because there is substantial dispute as to whether defendant has a judgment 
lien, it is virtually impossible for plaintiff to be able to bid at a sheriffs sale to protect its 
interest. Consequently, this element is obviously satisfied. 
6 
C. The Injunction Would Not Be Adverse to the Public Interest. 
Because this is a private dispute between the parties over their respective interests in 
the Subject Property, the public interest is not affected. In any event, a determination of 
the parties' interests prior to a sheriff's sale is logical and in the public interest. 
D. There Is a Substantial Likelihood that Plaintiff Will Prevail on the Merits. 
There is a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits. Because the 
Horbach Judgment was vacated by the Utah Court of Appeals, the lien of the judgment 
no longer existed. While there was no judgment lien, the judgment debtor granted the 
Option One Trust Deed. When the Utah Supreme Court later reinstated the Horbach 
Judgment, a judgment lien once again arose, but with a priority as of the reinstatement 
date. 
Utah's judgment lien statute provides as follows: 
Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections (4) and (5), the entry 
of judgment by a district court is a lien upon the real property of the judgment 
debtor, not exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence of 
the judgment, located in the county in which the judgment is entered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(2) (emphasis added). As established by the underlined 
language, the judgment lien applies only to property "owned or acquired during the 
existence of the judgment. . . ." In other words, the lien does not exist independently of 
the judgment and attaches to the debtor's property only so long as the judgment exists. 
Because the lien depends on the existence of the judgment, the lien of the Horbach 
7 
Judgment ceased to exist in the instant case when the judgment was vacated by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
Cases interpreting Utah's judgment lien statute regarding the priority of a renewal 
judgment make it clear that the judgment's priority is determined from the reinstatement 
date. In Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
considered whether the lien of a renewal judgment would relate back to the date of the 
original judgment. Under the judgment lien statute, a judgment continues for eight 
years, although an action can be filed within the eight year period to renew the 
judgment. In concluding that the priority of the renewal judgment does not relate back, 
the Utah Supreme Court provided the following analysis: 
The creation, legal effect, and extent of a judgment are set out in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-22-1. That section provides, "The lien shall continue for eight years 
unless the judgment is previously satisfied. . . ." Although some states may 
provide for the renewal or revival of a judgment lien, . . ., our statutory scheme 
has no provision for an extension of a judgment lien independent of the 
judgment on which it is based. . . . Nor do our statutes authorize the renewal 
of a judgment subject to limitations or restrictions imposed on it. Thus, the 
judgment lien cannot be extended beyond the statutory life of the judgment 
The lien of a renewal judgment attaches only from the date of entry of the 
new judgment and does not relate back to the date of the original judgment or 
extend the prior lien. . . . A renewal of a judgment results in a new judgment 
which, when docketed, creates a new lien "upon all the real property of the 
judgment debtor, . . . owned by him at the time or by him thereafter acquired 
during the existence of said lien." 
jd. at 939 (emphasis added). 
8 
Courts from other states applying judgment lien statutes similar to Utah's have 
.concluded that reinstatement of a vacated judgment does not revive the original priority 
of the judgment. A case specifically on point is Bulmash v. Davis, 157 Cal.Rptr. 66, 597 
P.2d 469 (1979). In that case, a summary judgment was entered by the trial court. Two 
weeks later, the trial court vacated the judgment and an appeal was taken. While the 
appeal was pending, the judgment debtors sold some of their real property to third 
parties. The California Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the summary judgment 
and ordered the vacated judgment to be restored. In describing the issue, the Bulmash 
court stated, "The issue before us is whether a lien pursuant to judgment relates back to 
the original date of recording after reversal of the order vacating the judgment." 597 
P.2d at 470. The court held that the lien is not retroactive unless the appealing party 
obtains a stay to prevent enforcement of the vacating order. The court's analysis is 
instructive: 
A lien therefore cannot exist apart from the judgment upon which it is based. 
Thus, in the ordinary course of events when the judgment is vacated by court 
order the lien wil l also cease to exist, because the effect of a vacating order is 
to eliminate the judgment. . . . Once vacated, the status of the parties that 
existed prior to the judgment is restored and the situation then prevailing is the 
same as though the order or judgment had never been made. 
Because the judgment could not be enforced once it was vacated, the lien 
also became ineffective. Accordingly, the land was not subject to a lien at the 
time of its transfer. 
9 
jd. at 471-72 (emphasis added); accord 46 Am. Jur. 2d judgments § 409, at 708 (1994). 
In reaching its conclusion, the California Supreme Court noted that the judgment creditor 
"had the ability to protect his rights after the vacating order by requesting a stay of that 
order," and that if a stay had been obtained, "he would have been allowed to retain his 
lien by filing an undertaking insuring that he would pay all costs and damages which the 
plaintiffs would sustain by reason of the lien in the event that the order of the court 
below were sustained in favor of plaintiffs." Jd at 472-73. The Utah Supreme Court 
adopted the identical analysis in holding that the reversal of an order releasing a lis 
pendens does not revive the lis pendens as of the date it was originally recorded unless 
there is a stay of the order upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. See Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996). 
Decisions from New York and Colorado also make it clear that the lien of a 
reinstated judgment takes priority as of the date of reinstatement. In Mansfield State 
Bank v. Cohn, 107 Misc.2d 1078, 436 N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. Supp. 1981) aff'd sub nom, 
88 A.D.2d 837, 451 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. A.D. 1982) and 58 N.Y.2d 179, 446 N.E.2d 
768 (N.Y. 1983), the New York court was faced with the issue of determining the 
priority of a Texas judgment filed in New York, subsequently vacated and then reinstated 
by Texas courts. The New York court held that the lien was not in effect during the 
period that the judgment was vacated and the property could be sold to a bona fide 
purchaser, concluding "the vacating of a judgment renders it no longer in existence and 
10 
any liens evolving therefrom are dissolved." 436 N.Y.S.2d at 557. Similarly, in First 
National Bank of Telluride v. Fleisher, 2 P.3d 706 (Colo. 2000), the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that a judgment's priority would not relate back to the entry of an earlier 
default judgment that had been vacated by the trial court Consequently, a trust deed 
granted by the judgment debtor after the default judgment was vacated, but before final 
judgment was subsequently entered, had priority over the judgment lien. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief pending a final determination of 
the rights of the parties in this action. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully 
requests that the court enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the sheriffs sale during 
the pendency of this action. 
DATED this / ( , ~^day of November, 2001. 
PARR WADOOUPS BROWNE-GEE & LOVELESS 
By: 
Ronald p . Russell, Esq 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Exhibit D 
Stephen G» Crockett (1075$) 
Weslay D. Fell* {#6339} 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BEHDI3GER & 
PETERSON 
170 South Hain# #400 
Salt LaJce City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (301) 533-8383 
Staven L. Taylor (13210) 
Of Counsel with 
MURPHY, TOLBOS & XABET. -
124 South 500 East, #100 
Salt Laic* City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8303 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Hi THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAXS COUOT? 
STATS OF UTAH 
LAH C, ENGLAND, 
Plaintiff* 
vs* 
EXXCTK HORBACH, an individual« 
MEDICODS, INCORPORATED, a 




C i v i l Ho. S30901471CV 
Judge J , Dennis Freder ick 
The above-entit led Mttar case on regularly for t r i a l 
before the Honorable J* Dennis Frederick• s i t t i n g without a Jury, 
on May 22, 1994, The Court having considered the oral and 
documentary evidence presented, the Issues having been duly tr iad 
and a decis ion having been duly rendered* I t i s hsrsby 
ORDERED A2ID ADJUDGED as f o l l o w s : 
1. That the Hay 23rd putative agreement between 
P la in t i f f and Defendant was executed under a mutual sUstafce of 
fact and was without consideration and, therefore, is 
unenforceable. 
2. That ail causes of action contained in Plaintiff's 
Complaint are denied end dismissed with prajudlca. 
3, That funds in escrow account no. 30804165 in the 
amount oi $369,140,60, held pursuant to the escrow agreement 
entered into by the Plaintiff, the Defendant and Guardian Stata 
BanJc, Salt Lake City, Utah and all accrued interest, shall be 
Ismiedlataly rvlQaaod and disbursed to the Defendant or to his 
attorneys o< record. 
lat judgment is granted to Defendant against tho 
Plaintiff In-the amount of $169,5Ql-73. 
5/\ That judgment Is awarded to Defendant for interest 
and costs aJ^jnrovided by law, 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this fft^day of 4BWI , 1934. 
2 
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P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , 
Case No. 940695-CA v 
Eugene Horbach, and Medicode 
Incorporated, and Does 
I through V, 
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(For Official Publication) 
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Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: Samuel D. McVey and Randy T. Austin, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Stephen G. Crockett, Steven E. McCowin, Wesley D. 
Felix, and Steven L. Taylor, Salt Lake City, far 
Appellees "' " 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Billings. 
BILLINGS, Judge: i 
Plaintiff, Lan C. England, appeals from the trial court's 
dismissal of his complaint and judgment in favor of defendant, 
Eugene Horbach. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it 
held the parties' accord and satisfaction was unenforceable. We 
agree and therefore reverse and remand.1 
1. Because we conclude che trial court erred, when it found the 
accord and satisfaction was unenforceable, we need not reach 
plaintiff's remaining claims on appeal. Moreover, we vacate the 
crial court's judgment based upon defendant's counterclaim, as 
defendant's right to reimbursement for overpayment was settled 
unde: the acccrd ana satisfaction. 
FACTS 
In lane 198 9 or early 1990, plaintiff and defendant entered 
into a contract whereby defendant agreed to purchase 253,363 
shares of Medicode stock from plaintiff- The parties agreed the 
purchase price would be $2.75 per share, resulting in a total 
purchase price of $710,498.25. At trial, plaintiff testified and 
defendant did not dispute, that the purchase money was to be paid 
within the first .quarter of 1990. Defendant made periodic 
payments on the stock at least through September 1990. 
In May 1991, at defendant's request, the parties met to 
finalize the stock purchase. At this time, plaintiff still 
retained the stock certificates and believed defendant owed 
additional money on the original purchase agreement. Plaintiff 
also believed defendant had breached the original stock purchase 
agreement by failing to pay the entire amount within the agreed 
time. At the May meeting, plaintiff informed defendant that at 
least $25,000 was still owing under the original purchase 
agreement. Defendant did not dispute that amount. The parties 
then reached an agreement whereby defendant agreed to remit to 
plaintiff an additional $25,000 and hold in trusu two percent of 
the Medicode stock for plaintiff. In return, plaintiff agreed to 
immediately transfer to defendant the stock certificates and to 
forego his right to sue for defendant's breach of the original 
agreement. 
At trial, both parties agreed that plaintiff would not have 
transferred the stock certificates- to defendant had the second 
agreement not been entered into. Further, both plaintiff and 
defendant testified that at the May meeting both believed that 
money was still owing under the original contract. 
In December 1992, pursuant to the second agreement, 
plaintiff made a demand for the two percent Medicode stock that 
defendant was purportedly holding in trust for him. Defendant, 
however, refused to produce the stock, contending that the two 
percent agreement was meant only to secure defendant's payment of 
the additional $25,000. Plaintiff therefore sued defendant for 
breach of the two percent agreement. Prior to trial, defendant 
discovered additional business records which defendant claimed 
documented that, before entering into the second agreement, he 
had actually overpaid plaintiff for the purchase of the Medicode 
stock. 
A bench trial was held on March 22, 1994. The court ruled 
that plaintiff could not enforce the second agreement as an 
accord and satisfaction because it was not supported by 
consideration and because it was based upon a mutual mistake that 
defendant owed additional money on the original agreement. The 
trial court therefore dismissed plaintiff's complaint and entered 
judgment: in favor of defendant based upon his "counterclaim" 
alleging that, at the time the second agreement was entered, 
defendant had already overpaid plaintiff for the tMedicode stock. 
ACCORD A2JD SATISFACTION 
It is settled that 
fr[a]n accord and satisfaction arises when the 
parties to a contract mutually agree that a 
performance different than that required by 
the original contract will be made in 
substitution of the performance originally 
agreed upon and that the substituted 
agreement calling for a different performance 
will discharge the obligation created under 
the original agreement.,f 
Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Com, v. Campbell, 824 P. 2d 1133, 
1137 (Utah App. 1392) (quoting Tebbs, Smith & Assocs. v. Brooks, 
735 P,2d 1305, 1307 (Utah 1386)) . Moreover, for an accord and 
satisfaction to have any legal effect, the elements of a 
contract, including consideration, must be present. JEd. at 1137-
38. The elements of an accord and satisfaction include: 
(i) a bona fide dispute [or uncertainty] over 
an unliquidated amount; (ii) a payment 
tendered in full settlement of the entire 
dispute; and (iii) an acceptance of the 
payment. 
Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1332) (citing 
Mart on Remode liner v. Jensen, 70S P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1385)); 
accord Neiderhauser, 824 P.2d at 1197-98. 
A. Consideration2 
In its first claim of error, plaintiff contends the trial 
court erred when it concluded the second agreement did not 
constitute an accord and satisfaction because there was no 
2. Defendant alleges that plaintiff should be precluded from 
raising this issue on appeal because it was not raised at trial. 
A careful review of the record, however, reveals that whether the 
second agreement was predicated on sufficient consideration was, 
in fact, raised by plaintiff at trial. More significantly, 
consideration formed one basis for the trial court's 
determination that the accord and satisfaction was unenforceable. 
considerat ion to support that agreement:. In Utah, i t i s c lear 
that considera t ion for an accord may cons i s t of a compromise of a 
bona fide dispute or uncer ta in ty as to the amount ac tual ly owing. 
See, e .g . , Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 733^ 
(Utah 198 5) (holding suf f ic ien t considerat ion e x i s t s when 
credi tor agrees to accept l esser amount: than i s due where bona 
fide dispute as to amount i s present) ; Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. 
Anderson, 510 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980) ( s t a t ing where 
underlying claim i s uncer ta in , assent to d e f i n i t e payment amounts 
to suf f ic ien t considerat ion) ; accord In re Es ta te of Grimm, 784 
P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah App. 1989), ce r t , denied, 752 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1990) . Moreover, " [i] t i s not necessary for the dispute 
[or uncertainty] to be well-founded so long as i t i s in good 
faith. '1 Golden Key, 699 P.2d ac 733; see a lso Ashton v. Skeen, 
85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1935). 
Thus, i f the p a r t i e s in good fa i th be l i eve there i s a 
disputed or uncer ta in claim, mere set t lement of the amount due 
and acceptance of t ha t amount cons t i tu tes the considerat ion 
necessary to support the contract . Es ta te Landscape, 844 P. 2d at 
326/ accord Golden Key, 699 P.2d at 733; Ashton, 39 P.2d at 1076. 
In the i n s t a n t case , p l a in t i f f received several checks from 
defendant in p a r t i a l s a t i s f ac t i on of the o r i g i n a l agreement over 
a nine month per iod . P l a in t i f f believed defendant s t i l l owed 
between $25,000 and $75,000 on the o r i g i n a l purchase agreement. 
When the p a r t i e s met a t defendant 's request in May 1991, 
p l a in t i f f informed defendant of the amount he bel ieved was then 
due and offered to s e t t l e the or ig inal con t rac t for an addi t ional 
$25,000 and two percent of the Medicode s tock. Defendant did not 
dispute t h i s claim, as he was equally unsure of the amount then 
owing on the o r i g i n a l purchase agreement. Rather, he accepted 
the proposal in the i n t e r e s t of resolving the mat te r . 
At t ha t meeting, defendant was i n t e r e s t e d i n ge t t ing the 
stock c e r t i f i c a t e s and p l a i n t i f f was i n t e r e s t e d in ge t t ing paid 
the full purchase p r i c e . Although unfounded, p l a i n t i f f asserted 
in good f a i t h tha t he believed addi t ional money was- s t i l l owing. 
Defendant: accepted t h i s representat ion without d ispute and 
accepted p l a i n t i f f ' s reso lu t ion proposal. The May 1991 agreement 
re f lec t s the p a r t i e s ' good fa i th bargain regarding an uncertain 
claim. We conclude the t r i a l court: erred when i t determined the 
second agreement was not supported by cons idera t ion and was 
therefore unenforceable.3 
3. Moreover, we note tha t courts have found chat forbearance to 
prosecute a l ega l ly enforceable claim or to perform an act which 
cue i s not otherwise l ega l ly bound co perform provides suff ic ient 
considerat ion. Safety Fed. Say Sc Loan Ass'n v. Thurston, 648 
(cont inued. . . ) 
B. Mutual Mistake 
Plaintiff further claims the trial court erred when it held 
that because neither parry was aware that defendant had already 
paid the original purchase agreement in full, a mutual mistake of 
fact precluded the enforcement of the accord and satisfaction. 
An accord and satisfaction based upon a mutual mistake as to 
a material fact can be rescinded by either party. Deibel v. 
Kreiss, 50 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943); 6 Arthur L. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1292, at 178 (1962). "XA mutual 
mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, 
share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon 
which they based their bargain.'" Desioain v. Desr>ain, 855 P. 2d 
254, 258 (Utah App. 1993) "(quoting Warner v. Sirstins, 83 8 P.2d 
65S, 669 (Utah App. 1992)) . Thus, an accord and satisfaction may 
be rescinded where there is a mutual mistake as to the bargain 
giving rise to the accord. 
Accepting the facts as found by the trial court, at the May 
1991 meeting, the parties were indeed mistaken that additional 
money was owed under the original agreement. However, this 
mistake did not go to the terms of the parties' accord; rather, 
it merely demonstrates their accord was indeed a compromise of a 
bona fide dispute which was not necessarily well-founded, but: was 
made in good faith. See In re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 123 8, 
1244 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
In the instant case, both parties were uncertain as to the 
amount that remained owing on the original contract when they 
entered into their agreement. Although mistaken as to whether 
money was then owing, the parties were clearly not mistaken as to 
the agreement they reached to compromise a good faith, though 
mistaken, claim. The accord and satisfaction accurately reflects 
the intent of the parties at the time it was entered. There was 
3 . (. . .continued) 
P.2d 267, 270 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) / accord Suaarhouse Fin. Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980); Long v. Forbes, 136 
P.2d 242, 246-47 (Wyo. 1943). Thus, ,fvthe giving of further time 
for the payment of an existing debt by a valid agreement, for any 
period however short, . . . is a valuable consideration, and is 
sufficient to support/,f a contract. Farmers & Merchants State 
Bank v. niacins , ~ 89 P. 2d 915, 917 (Kan. 1939) (citation omicted) ; 
accord Suaarhouse Fin., 610 P.2d at 1372. 
In the instant case, although the entire debt was to be paid 
within the first quarter of 1990, plaintiff expended payment 
through 19 91. 
therefore no mistake regarding a basic assumption underlying the 
accord and satisfaction, thus, it is not void.4 
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the 
accord and satisfaction unenforceable for lack of consideration 
and because we conclude the agreement was not founded upon a 
mutual mistake of fact, we reverse and remand for further action 
consistent with this opinion, 
- "*>$&* %s 
'udith M. Bi l l ings , Judge 
WE CONCUR; 
Gregory K^^rmeT^resiaxng judge 
t ._... 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
4. To illustrate the difference between a bona fide uncertainty 
which is compromised by an accord and satisfaction from a mutual 
mistake going to the essence of the accord, the following example 
is helpful. If, in this case, the parties had agreed to exchange 
$25,000 for 253,3 63 shares of stock which both parties believed 
was transferable and it was then discovered the stock was not 
transferable, a mutual mistake as to the essence of the accord 
and satisfaction would be present. Under such a scenario, the 
mistake--that the stock was transferable—goes directly to a 
basic assumption underlying the substitute agreement and 
therefore constitutes a mutual mistake which voids that 
agreement. In the instant case, the parties were mistaken as to 
facts relevant to the original contract--whether money was then 
due and owing--net as to a term underlying the accord and 
satisfaction. 
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DEED OF TRUST 
THIS DEED OF TRUST ("Security Instrument") is made on May 2 4 , 1996 
LAN C. ENGLAND, A MARRIED MAN AS HIS SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY 
. The trustor is 
("Borrower"). 
The trustee is FIRST AMERICAN TITLE OF UTAH 
("Trustee"). The beneficiary is OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 
which is organized and existing under the laws of CALIFORNIA and whose address is 
2 0 2 0 EAST FIRST STREET SUITE 1 0 0 , SANTA ANA, CA 9 2 7 0 5 ("Lender"). 
Borrower owes Lender the principal sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND 
. . . AND NO/looTHs Dollars (U.S. $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ). 
This debt is evidenced by Borrower's note dated the same date as this Security Instrument ("Note"), which provides for monthly 
payments, with die full debt, if not paid earlier, due and payable on June 01 , 2026 . This Security 
Instrument secures to Lender: (a) the repayment of the debt evidenced by the Note, with interest, and all renewals, extensions 
and modifications of the Note; (b) the payment of all other sums, with interest, advanced under paragraph 7 to protect the security 
of this Security Instrument; and (c) the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under tnis Security Instrument and 
the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following 
described property located in S a l t Lake County, Utah: 
LOTS 1 THROUGH 8, INCLUSIVE, OF BLOCK 3 , GENEVA PLACE, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT 
THEREOF, FILED IN BOOK C OF PLATS, AT PAGE 90 OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY 
RECORDER. 
which has the address of 
Utah 84107 
[Zip Code] 
2 I S 7 SOUTH LINCOLN STREET, 
("Property Address"); 
SALT LAKE CITY [Street, City], 
TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, appurtenances, 
and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and additions shall also be covered by this Security 
Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as die "Property." 
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to grant 
and convey the Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record. Borrower warrants and will 
detend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to any encumbrances of record. 
COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: 
1. Payment of Principal and Interest; Prepayment and Late Charges. Borrower shall promptly pay when due the principal 
of and interest on the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment and late charges due under the Note. 
I n i L ^ t ^ f IniL Init. 
Loan Number: 011012S35 Servicing Number. 328275-7 Date: 05 /24 /96 
2. Funds for Taxes and Insurance. Subject to applicable law or to a written waiver by Lender, Borrower shall pay to 
Lender on the day monthly payments are due under the Note, until the Note is paid in full, a sum ("Funds'') for: (a) yearly taxes 
and assessments which may attain priority over this Security Instrument as a hen on die Property; (b) yearly leasehold payments 
or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) yearly hazard or property insurance premiums; (d) yearly flood insurance premiums, 
if any, (e) yearly mortgage insurance premiums, if any, and (f) any sums payable by Borrower to Lender, in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 8, n lieu or the payment of mortgage insurance premiums. These items are called 'Escrow Items ' Lender 
may, at any tune, collect and hold Funds in an amount not to exceed the maximum amount a lender for a federally related mongage 
loan may require for Borrower's escrow account under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 as amended from 
time to time, 12 U S C Section 2601 et seq ("RESPA"), unless another law that applies to the Funds sets a lesser amount If so, 
Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount not to exceed the lesser amount Lender may estimate the amount 
of Funds due on the basis of current data and reasonable estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in 
accordance with applicable law 
The Funds shall be held m an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity 
(including Lender, if Lender is such an institution) or m any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the 
Escrow Items Lender may not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually analyzing die escrow account, or 
verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on die Funds and applicable law permits Lender to make such 
a charge. However, Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for an independent real estate tax reporting service used 
by Lender in connection with this loan unless applicable law provides otherwise Unless an agreement is made or applicable law 
requires interest to be paid, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and 
Lender may agree in writing, however, mat interest shall be paid on the Funds Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, 
an annual accounting of the Funds, showing credits and debits to the Funds and the purpose for which each debit to uie Funds was 
made. The Funds are pledged as additional security for all sums secured by this Security Instrument. 
If the Funds held by Lender exceed the amounts permitted to be held by law, Lender shall account to Borrower for the 
excess Funds in accordance with the requirements of applicable law If the amount of the Funds held by Lender at any time is not 
sutflcient to pay the Escrow Items when due, Lender may so notify Borrower in writing, and, in such case Borrower shall pay to 
Lender the amount necessary to make up the deficiency Borrower shall make up the deficiency m no more than twelve monthly 
payments, at Lender's sole discretion. 
Upon payment m full of ail sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund to Borrower any Funds 
held by Lender If, under paragraph 21, Lender shall acquire or sell the Property, Lender, prior to the acquisition or sale of the 
Property, shall apply any Funds held by Lender at the time of acquisition or sale as a credit against me sums secured by this 
Security Instrument. 
3. Application of Payments. Unless applicable law provides otherwise, all payments received by Lender under paragraohs 
l and 2 shall be applied first, to any prepayment charges due under the Note; second, to amounts payable under paragraph 2, third, 
to interest due, fourth, to principal due; and last, to any late charges due under the Note. 
4 Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines and impositions attributable to the Property 
which may attain priority over this Security Instrument, and leasehold payments or ground rents, if any Borrower shall pay these 
obligations in the manner provided in paragraph 2, or if not paid in that manner, Borrower shall pay them on time directly to the 
person owed payment. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under mis paragraph. If 
Borrower makes Uiese payments directly, Borrower shall prompUy furnish to Lender receipts evidencing the payments 
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless Borrower (a) agrees 
in writing to uie payment of the obligation secured by the hen in a manner acceptable to Lender; (b) contests in good faith the hen 
by, or derends against enforcement of the lien in, legal proceedings which in the Lender's opinion operate to prevent the 
enforcement of the lien, or (c) secures from the holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinating the lien to this 
Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a hen which may attain priority over this 
Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a nonce identifying the Hen. Borrower shall sausfy the hen or take one or more 
of die actions set forth above within 10 days of die giving of notice. 
5. Hazard or Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep die improvements now existmg or hereafter erected on the Property 
insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term 'extended coverage' and any omer hazards, including floods or 
flooding, tor which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods mat Lender 
requires. The insurance earner providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's approval which shall not 
be unreasonably withheld If Borrower fails to maintain coverage described above, Lender may, at Lender's option, obtain coverage 
to protect Lender's rights in die Property in accordance with paragraph 7 
All insurance policies and renewals shall be acceptable to Lender and shall include a standard mortgage clause Lender shall 
have the right to hold the policies and renewals If Lender requires, Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid 
premiums and renewal notices In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender Lender 
may make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, or applicable law otherwise requires, insurance proceeds shall 
be applied first to reimburse Lender for costs and expenses incurred in connection with obtaining any such insurance proceeds, and 
then at discreuon, and regardless of anv impairment of security or lack thereof (l) to the sums secured mav determine tn its sole 
and absolute discretion, and/or (n) to Borrower to pay the costs and expenses of necessary repairs or restoration of the Property 
to a condition satisfactory to Lender If Borrower abandons the Property, or does not answer wiuun 30 days a notice from Lender 
that the insurance carrier has offered to settle a claim, Lender may collect the insurance proceeds Lender may, in its sole and 
absolute discretion, and regardless of any impairment of security or lack thereof, use me proceeds to repair or restore the Property 
or to pay ihe u^ms secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due The 30-day period will begin when the notice is 
given 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, anv application of proceeds to principal snail not extend or 
postDone die due date ot the monthly payments reterred 10 n paragraohs I and 2 or change the amount ot the payments If under 
paragraph 21 the Property is acquired bv Lender Borrower s right to any insurance policies and proceeds resulting from damage 
to the Property prior to the acquisition idiail pass to Lender to (he extent ot the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediateiv 
prior to the acquisition 
Imt -yC,^ Tnu Init__ Inn Imt Inn. 
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ff Borrower obtains earthquajce insurance, any other hazard insurance, or any other insurance on the Property and such 
insurance is not specifically required by Lender, then such insurance shall (i) name Lender as loss payee thereunder, and (li) oe 
subject to the provisions of this paragraph 5 
6. Preservation, Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Borrower's Loan Application; Leaseholds. Borrower shall 
not destroy, damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate, or commit waste on die Property. Borrower shall 
be in default if any forfeiture action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is begun mat in Lender's good faith judgment could 
result in forfeiture of the Propertv or otherwise materially impair the lien created by this Security Instrument or Lender's security 
interest Borrower may cure such a default and reinstate, as provided in paragraph 18, by causing the action or proceeding to be 
dismissed with a ruling mat, in Lender's good faith determination, precludes forfeiture of the Borrower's interest in the Property 
or other material impairment of the hen created by this Security Instrument or Lender's security interest. Borrower shall also be 
in default if Borrower, during die loan application process, gave materially false or uiaccurate information or statements to Lender 
(or failed to provide Lender with any material information) in connection with the loan evidenced by the Note, including, but not 
iimited to, representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the Property as a principal residence. If this Security Instrument 
is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease. If Borrower acquires fee title to the Property, the 
leasehold and the fee title shall not merge unless Lender agrees to the merger in writing. 
Borrower shall, at Borrower's own expense, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the Property 
or any portion thereof or Borrower's tide thereto, die validity or priority of the hen created by this Security instrument, or the rights 
or powers of Lender or Trustee with respect to tins Security Instrument or die Property All causes of action of Borrower, whether 
accrued before or after die date of this Security Instrument, for damage or injury to the Property or any part thereof, or m 
connection with any transaction financed in whole or m part by the proceeds of the Note or any other note secured by mis Security 
Instrument, by Lender, or in connection with or atfecting the Property or any part Uiereof, including causes of action arising m tort 
or contract and causes of action for fraud or concealment of a material fact, are, at Lender's option, assigned to Lender, and the 
proceeds thereof shall be paid direcdy to Lender who, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees, may apply such proceeds to the sums secured by this Security Instrument or to any deficiency under this Security Instrument 
or may release any monies so received by it or any part thereof, as Lender may elect. Lender may, at its option, appear in and 
prosecute in its own name any action or proceeding to enforce any such cause of action and may make any compromise or 
settlement thereof. Borrower agrees to execute such further assignments and any other instruments as from time to time may be 
necessary to effectuate the foregoing provisions and as Lender shall request. 
7. Protection of Lender's Rights m the Property. If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in 
this Security Instrument, or diere is a legal proceeding that may significantly affect Lender's rights in die Property (such as a 
proceeding m bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture or to enforce laws or regulations), then Lender may do and pay 
for whatever is necessary to protect me value of the Property and Lender's rights in die Property, Lender's actions may include 
paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument, appearing m court, paying reasonable attorneys' 
fees and entering on the Property to make repairs. Although Lender may take action under this paragraph 7, Lender does not have 
to do so. 
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this paragraph 7 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security 
Instrument. Unless Borrower and Lender agree to other terms of payment, these amounts shall bear mterest from the date of 
disbursement at me Note rate in effect from time to time and shall be payable, with interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower 
requesung payment. 
8. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required mortgage insurance as a condition of making the loan secured by this Security 
Instrument, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the mortgage insurance m effect. If, for any reason, the mortgage 
insurance coverage required by Lender lapses or ceases to be m effect, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage 
substantially equivalent to the mortgage insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to the cost to Borrower of 
the mortgage insurance previously in effect, from an alternate mortgage insurer approved by Lender. If substantially equivalent 
mortgage insurance coverage is not available, Borrower shall pay to Lender each month a sum equal to one-twelfth of the yearly 
mortgage insurance premium being paid by Borrower when the insurance coverage lapsed or ceased to be in effect. Lender will 
accept, use and retain these payments as a loss reserve in lieu of mortgage insurance* Loss reserve payments may no longer be 
required, at the option ot Lender, if mortgage insurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires) provided 
by an insurer approved by Lender again becomes available and is obtained. Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain 
mortgage insurance in effect, or to provide a loss reserve, until me requirement for mortgage insurance ends m accordance with 
any written agreement between Borrower and Lender or applicable law 
9. Inspection. Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. Lender shall give 
Borrower notice at the time of or prior to an inspection specifying reasonable cause for the inspection. 
10. Condemnation. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or consequential, in connection with any 
condemnation or other taking of any part of the Property, or for conveyance in lieu of condemnation, are hereby assigned and shall 
be paid to Lender Lender may apply, use or release the condemnation proceeds in the same manner as provided in paragraph 5 
hereof with respect to insurance proceeds. 
If the Propertv is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the condemnor offers to make 
an award or settle a claim for damages, Borrower rails to respond to Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender 
is authorized to collect and appiy the proceeds, at its option, either to restoration or repair ot the Property or to the sums secured 
by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree m vritmg, any application of proceeds to principal shall not extend or 
postpone the due date ot the monthly payments referred to in paragrapns 1 and 2 or change the amount of such payments. 
11. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time tor payment or modification of 
amortization ot the sums secured by this Secuntv Instrument granted by Lender to any successor in mterest ot Borrower shall not 
operate io release the liability of the original Borrower or Borrower s successor in interest. Lender shall not be required to 
commence proceedings against any successor in interest or reruse to extend time ror payment or otherwise modify amortization ot 
the sums secured by this Security Instrument bv reason ot any demand made by the original Borrower or Borrower s successors 
in interest \ny torbearance by Lender m exercising any right or remedy shall not be a waiver ot or preclude the exercise or any 
right or remedy 
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12. Successors and Assigns Bound; Joint and Several Liability; Co-signers. The covenants and agreements or this Security 
Instrument shall bind and benefit the successors and assigns ot Lender and Borrower, subject to the provisions of paragraph 17 
Borrower's covenants and agreements shall be joint and several Any Borrower who co-signs this Secunty Instrument but does not 
execute the Note* (a) is co-signing this Secunty Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey that Borrower's interest in the 
ProDerry under rhe terms of this Secunty Instrument; (b) is not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Secunty 
Instrument, and (c) agrees that Lender and any other Borrower may agree to extend, modify, forbear or make any accommodations 
with regard to the terms of this Secunty Instrument or the Note without that Borrower' s consent. 
13. Loan Charges. If the loan secured by this Secunty Instrument is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges, 
and that law is finally interpreted so that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the loan 
exceed the permitted limits, then (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the 
permitted hmit; and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to Borrower 
Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the pnncipai owed under the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower 
If a refund reduces pnncipai, the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment without any preuayment charge under the Note 
14. Notices. Any notice to Borrower provided for m this Secunty Instrument shall be given by delivering it or by mailing 
it by first class mail unless applicable law requires use of another method. The notice shall be directed to the Property Address or 
any odier address Borrower designates by notice to Lender. Any notice to Lender shall be given by first class mail to Lender's 
address stated herein or any other address Lender designates by notice to Borrower. Any notice provided for in this Secunty 
Instrument shall be deemed to have been given to Bonower or Lender when given as provided in this paragraph. 
15. Governing Law; Sevexabriity. This Secunty Instrument shall be governed by federal law and the law of the-junsdiction 
in which the Property is located In the event that any provision or clause of this Secunty Instrument or the Note conflicts with 
applicable law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Secunty Instrument or the Note which can be given effect 
without the conflicnng provision To this end rhe provisions of this Secunty Instrument and the Note are declared to be severable. 
16. Borrower's Copy. Bonower shall be given one conformed copy of the Note and of this Secunty Instrument. 
17. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficiai Interest in Borrower. If all or any part of die Propeny or any interest in it is 
sold or transferred (or if a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred and Borrower is not a natural person) without 
Lender s pnor wntten consent, Lender may, at its option, require immediate payment m full of all sums secured by this Secuntv 
Instrument. However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if exercise is prohibited by federal law as of the date of this 
Secunty Instrument. 
If Lender exercises this option. Lender shall give Bonower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide a penod of not 
less tJian 30 days from the date the nonce is delivered or mailed within which Borrower must pay ail sums secured by this Secunty 
Instrument. If Bonower fails to pay these sums pnor to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted 
by this Secunty Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower. 
18. Borrower's Right to Reinstate. If Borrower meets cenain conditions, Bonower shall have rhe right to have enforcement 
of this Secunty Instrument discontinued at any time pnor to the earlier of. (a) 5 days (or such other penod as applicable law may 
specify for reinstatement) before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in this Secunty Instrument; or (b) 
entry of a judgment enforcing this Secunty Instrument Those conditions are that Borrower- (a) pays Lender all sums which then 
would be due under this Secunty Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any default of any other 
covenants or agreements; (c) pays ail expenses incurred in enforcing this Secunty Instrument, including, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorneys' fees; and (d) takes such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure that the lien of this Secunty 
Instrument, Lender's rights in the Property and Bonower's obhganonto pay the sums secured by this Secunty Instrument shall 
continue unchanged. Upon reinstatement by Bonower, this Security Instrument and the obligations secured hereby shall remain fully 
effective as if no acceleration had occuned. However, dns nght to reinstate shall not apply in the case of acceleration under 
paragraph 17 
19 Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer. The Note or a partial interest m the Note (together with this Secunty 
Instrument) may be sold one or more times without pnor notice to Bonower A sale may result m a change m the entity (known 
as the 'Loan Servicer') that collects monthly payments due under the Note and this Secunty Instrument There also may be one 
or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note. If there is a change of die Loan Servicer, Bonower will be 
given wntten notice of the change in accordance with paragraph 14 abova and applicable law The notice will state the name and 
address of the new Loan Servicer and address to which payments should bcmade. The notice will also contain any other information 
required by applicable law The holder of the Note and this Secunty Instrument shall be deemed to be the Lender hereunder 
20. Hazardous Substances. Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any 
Hazardous Substances on or in the Property Bonower shall not do, nor allow anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property 
that is in violation ot any Environmental Law The preceding two sentences shall not apply to the presence, use, or storage on the 
Property of small quantities of Hazardous Substances that are generally recognized to be appropnate to normal residential uses and 
to maintenance of the Property 
Bonower shall promptly give Lender wntten notice of anv investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit or other action by any 
governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any Hazardous Substance or Environmental Law 
or which Bonower has actual knowledge. If Borrower learns, or is notified by any governmental or regulatory authority, that any 
removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Propeny is necessary, Borrower shall promptly take all 
necessary remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law 
Bonower shall be solelv responsible for, shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Lender, its directors, officers, 
employees, attorneys, agents, and their respective successors and assigns, from and against any and all claims, demands, causes 
ot action, loss, damage cost (including actual attorneys fees and court costs and costs or any required or necessary repair, cleanup 
or detoxification ot the Prooenv and the Dreparation and implementation of any closure, abatement, containment, remedial or other 
required plan), expenses and liability directly or indirectly arising out or or attnbutable to (a) the use generation, storage, release, 
threatened release discharge, disposal, abatement or presence of Hazardous Substances on, under or about the Propeny, (b) the 
transport to or from the Property ot any Hazardous Substances (c) the violation ot any Hazardous Substances law and (d) any 
Hazardous Substances claims 
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As used in (his paragraph 20, "Hazardous Substances" are those substances defined as toxic or hazardous substances by 
Environmental Law and the following substances: gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides 
and herbicides, volatile solvents, materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials. As used in this paragraph 
20, "Environmental Law" means federal laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate to health, safety 
or environmental protection. 
ADDITIONAL COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
21. Acceleration; Remedies. If any installment under the Note or notes secured hereby is not paid when due, or if Borrower 
should be in default under any provision of this Security Instrument, of if Borrower is in default under any other deed of trust or 
other instrument secured by the Property, ail sums secured by this Security Instrument and accrued interest thereon shall at once 
become due and payable at the option of Lender without prior notice, except as otherwise reqoired by applicable law, and regardless 
of any prior forbearance. In such event, Lender, at its option, and subject to applicable law, may then or thereafter invoke the power 
of sale and/or any other remedies or take any other actions permitted by applicable law. Lender will collect ail expenses incurred 
in pursuing the remedies described in this Paragraph 21, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys1 fees and costs of title 
evidence. 
If the power of sale is invoked, Trustee shall execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event of default and of the 
election to cause die Property to be sold and shall record such notice in each county in which any part of die Property is located. 
Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of such notice in the manner prescribed by applicable law to Borrower and to the other persons 
prescribed by applicable law. Trustee shall give public notice of the sale to the persons and in the manner prescribed by applicable 
law. After the time required by applicable law, Trustee, without demand on Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to 
the highest bidder at the time and place and under die terms designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in any order 
Trustee aetermines. Trustee may in accordance with applicable law, postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public 
announcement at the time and place of any previously scheduled sale. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale. 
Trustee shall deliver to die purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without any covenant or warranty, expressed 
or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall 
apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order: (a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable 
Trustee's and attorneys' fees; (b) to all sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally 
entided to it or to the county cleric of the county in which the sale took place. 
22. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request Trustee to reconvey 
the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and ail notes evidencing debt secured by this Security Instrument to 
Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property without warranty and without charge to the person or persons legally entitled to it. 
Such person or persons shall pay any recordation costs. 
23. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its option, may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a successor trustee to any 
Trustee appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all the title, power and 
duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by applicable law. 
24. Request for Notices. Borrower requests that copies of die notices' of default and sale be sent to Borrower's address 
which is the Property Address. 
25. Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure. Borrower has made certain written representation and disclosures in order to 
induce Lender to make die loan evidenced by the Note or notes which Uiis Security Instrument secures, and in the event that 
Borrower has made any material misrepresentation or failed to disclose any material fact, Lender, at its option and without prior 
notice or demand, shall have the right to declare the indebtedness secured by this Security Instrument, irrespective of the maturity 
date specified in the Note or notes secured by uiis Security Instrument, immediately due and payable. To the extent permitted by 
applicable law, Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Lender setting forth facts showing a default by Borrower 
under this paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act diereon hereunder. 
26. Time is of the Essence. Time is of the essence in the performance of each provision of this Security Instrument. 
27. Waiver of Statute of Limitations. The pleading of the statute of limitations as a defense to enforcement of this Security 
Instrument, or any and ail obligations referred to herein or secured hereby, is hereby waived to the fullest extent permitted by 
applicable law. 
28. Modification. This Security Instrument may be modified OF amended only by an agreement in writing signed by 
Borrower and Lender. 
29. Reimbursement. To the extent permitted by applicable law, Borrower shall reimburse Trustee and Lender for any and 
all costs, fees and expenses which either may incur, expend or sustain in the execution of the trust created hereunder or in the 
performance of any act required or permitted hereunder or by law or in equity or otherwise arising out of or in connection with 
this Security Instrument, the Note, any other note secured by this Security Instrument or any other instrument executed by Borrower 
in connection with the Note or Security Instrument. To the extent permitted by applicable law, Borrower shall pay to Trustee and 
Lender their fees in connection with Trustee and Lender providing documents or services arising out of or in connection with this 
Security Instrument, the Note, any other note secured by this Security Instrument or any other instrument executed by Borrower 
in connection with the Note or Security Instrument. 
30. Clerical Error. In the event Lender at any time discovers that the Note, any other note secured by this Security 
Instrument, the Security Instrument, or any other document or instrument executed in connection with the Security Instrument, Note 
or notes contains an error that was caused by a clerical mistake, calculation error, computer malfunction, printing error or similar 
error, Borrower agrees, upon notice from Lender, to reexecute any documents that are necessary to correct any such error(s). 
Borrower further agrees that Lender will not be liable to Borrower for any damages incurred by Borrower that are directly or 
indirectly caused by any such error. 
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31. Lost Stolen, Destroyed or Mutilated Security Instrument and Other Documents. In the event of the loss, theft or 
destruction of the Note, any other note secured by this Secunty Instrument, the Secunty Instrument or any other documents or 
instruments executed in connection with the Secunty Instrument, Note or notes (collectively, the "Loan Documents"), uoon 
Borrower's receipt of an indemnification executed in favor of Borrower by Lender, or, in the event of the mutilation of any ot the 
Loan Documents, upon Lender's surrender to Borrower of the mutilated Loan Document, Borrower shall execute and deliver to 
Lender a Loan Document in form and content identical to, and to serve as a replacement of, the lost, stolen, destroyed, or mutilated 
Loan Document, and such replacement shall have the same force and effect as the lost, stolen, destroyed, or mutilated Loan 
Documents, and may be treated for all purposes as the onginai copy of such Loan Document. 
32. Assignment of Rents. As additional security hereunder, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender the rents of the Property. 
Borrower shall have the nght to collect and retain the rents of the Property as they become due and payable provided Lender has 
not exercised its nghts to require immediate payment in full of the sums secured by this Secunty Instrument and Borrower has not 
abandoned the Property. 
33. Riders to this Security Instrument. If one or more nders are executed by Borrower and recorded together with this 
Secunty Instrument, me covenants and agreements of each such nder shall be incorporated into and shall amend and supplement 
the covenants and agreements of this Secunty Instrument as if the nder(s) were a part of this Secunty Instrument. 
[Check applicable box(es)] 
B Adjustable Rate Rider 
U No Prepayment Penalty Oprion Rider 
• Other(s) (specify) 
Li Condominium Rider 
LJ Planned Unit Development Rider 
D 1-4 Family Rider 
SJ Occupancy Rider 
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this Secunty Instrument and 














STATE OF UTAH, County ss: : CitfUh 
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his duty to disclose material facts to them, 
namely, the fact I hat he had committed mal-
practice, by producing Dr Baughman's depo 
sition in which he states that he did not 
believe and does not believe that he commit-
ted tnalpiactlce 
Jensen and Hipwell, however, ns HIP non 
moving parties, utterly fatled to meet then-
burden of coming forward with evidence to 
contradict Dr Baughman's deposition testi-
mony In their opposition to McKay-Dee's 
motion for summary judgment, JenBen rind 
Hipwell simply reiterate the allegations of 
their complaint and provide no support for 
their claim that Dr Baughman failed to tell 
them that Shelly had been "left to bleed 
Internally for several hours before accurately 
diagnosing her illness " Dr Baughman's de-
position testimony specifically and directly 
challenges Tensen and Hipwell's assertion, 
and they failed to provide any evidence to 
support their claim Thus, the trial court 
correctly ruled that there was insufficient 
evidence to submit the matter to a fury 
Because Jensen and Hipwell's claim of con 
strucKve fraud against McKay-Dee was In 
sufficiently supported by the evidence, such a 
claim cannot be used to toll the statute of 
limitations on their medical malpractice 
claims against McKay-Dee 
We remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion 
Lnn C. ENGLAND, Plaintiff 
and Respondent , 
v. 
Eugene HORRACH, an Individual, Medi-
code, I n c , a Utah corporat ion, and Does 
1 through V, Defendants and Petit ion-
ers. 
No. 950500. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
May 30, 1997 
Rehearing Denied Aug 26, 1997 
Seller of stock sued buyer, seeking to 
enforce accord and satisfaction agreement 
under which buyer was to pay seller $25,000 
as final amount owed for shares The Third 
District Court, Salt Lakp County, J Dennis 
Frederick, J , dismissed complaint on 
grounds that accord and satisfaction lacked 
consideration, and seller appealed The 
Court of Appeals, 905 P 2 d 301, reversed and 
remanded Certiorari was granted The Su-
preme Couit, Durham, J , held that* (1) 
Court of Appeals erred by adcepting trial 
court's fact finding that parties were mutual-
ly mistaken lii concluding that $25,000 was 
owed on contract, and then determining that 
amount due was uncertain, as required for 
accord and satisfaction to apply, and (2) fail-
ure to object at trial precluded challenge to 
trial court's allowance of counterclaim by 
buyer, alleging overpayment of $169,60175. 
Court of Appeals' judgment reversed; 
trial court's judgment l einstated. 
1. Appeal and Er ro r <£=>84Z(2), 1083(1) 
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness, and like-
wise Supreme Court accords no particular 
deference to conclusions of law made by 
Court of Appeals, but reviews such conclu-
sions for correctness 
2 Appeal and Er ror <3=>1008 1(5) 
Court of Appeals may reverse factual 
finding of trial court only if it determines 
that finding is "clearly erroneous," that, is, if 
trial court's ruling contradicts great weight 
of evidence or if court reviewing evidence Is 
left with definite and firm conviction that 
mistake has been madp Rules CivProc, 
Rule 52(a) 
See publication Words and Phrase 
for other Judicial constructions and def-
initions 
3, Appeal and Er ror ®=»1094(1) 
Court of Appeals erred by purporting to 
accept trial court's factual determhiatlon that 
parties to sale of stock mistakenly believed 
that buyer owed seller an additional $25,000, 
and then concluding that parries were uncer-
ENGLAND v. HORBACH 
CUP in 94* Pli l 140 tUbih 1997) 
tain as to amount owing on contract, so as to 
allow buyer's payment of $25,000 to seller to 
operate as accord and satisfaction; Court of 
Appeals was bound by trial court's factual 
determinations unless findings weie "clearly 
erroneous," and no such determination was 
made in present case Rules Civ Proc , Rule 
52(a) 
4. Accord and Satisfaction «=»10(1) 
Absence of uncertainty as to amount due 
under contract'for sale of shares of corpora-
tion precluded determination by court of ap-
peals that payment of $25,000 by buyer to 
seller was an accord and satisfaction; trial 
court found mutual mistake present, under 
which parties concluded with certainty, albeit 
mistakenly, that $25,000 of purchase price 
remained unpaid 
5. Pleading «=»23G(5) 
While trial court has only limltpd discre-
tion to grant amendment of pleadings to 
conform to evidence adduced at trial, as it 
must first find that presentation of merits of 
action will be subserved by amendment and 
that admission of evidence, in question would 
not prejudice adverse party In maintaining 
his action or defense on merits, thereafter 
trial court has full discretion to allow an 
amendment of the pleadings; that fa, it may 
grant or deny parry's morion for amendment 
upon any reasonable basis, and court's deci-
sion can be reversed only if abuse of discre 
Hon appears Rules CivProc, RUIP 15(b) 
6. Pleading «=>411 
Failure to object at trial precluded chal 
lenge to trial court's allowance during trial of 
counterclaim by buyer of stock, alleging he 
had overpaid by $169,501 75, after trial court 
found that agreement under which buyer was 
to pay seller an additional $26,000 wis found 
ed on mutual mistake and was unenforceable 
Samuel D McVey, Randy T Austin, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent 
Steven G Crockett, Steven E McCowin, 
Wesley D. Felix, Steven L Taylor, Salt Lake 
City, for defendants and petitioners. 
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On Certiorari to HIP Utah Court of Appeals 
DURftAM, Justicp-
This case comes to us on a wTJt of CPI Hot a 
ri to the couit of appeals, which bpld that thp 
parties had reached an accord and satisfac 
Hon of their dispute We rp\ erse 
In 1989, defendant Eugene Hot bach omffy 
agreed to buy 258,363 shares of Medieode 
stock from plaintiff Lan England at $2 75 per 
share, for a total purchase price of $710 
498 25 Over the course of the next ten 
months, Horbach made several payments to 
England totaling $859,599 95 Taking into 
account a reimbursement of $4,599 35 For 
certain additional expenses that England had 
incurred on Horbach's behalf, by September 
14, 1990, Horbach had in fact overpaid Eng 
land by $144,501 75. 
Nevertheless, when the part ies met again 
eight months later, on May 23, 1 W , both 
were apparently under the mistaken Imprps 
sion that more monpy was ov?pd on the origi 
nal contract Horbach, bpcausp of prrors lie 
attributes to his accounting department, T\as 
uncertain of thp amount then due England 
testified that he thought Horbach owpd him 
an amount between $2*5,000 and $75,000 
Rut England also testified that he told Hor 
bach that the amount owed Tvas $25,000 
Horbach believed Fngland, and the t m f 
couit found that "at the May 23rd meeting 
both the Plaintiff and the Defendant mMak 
poly believed that $25,000 remained owing 
under the 1Q80 stock purchase agreement 
Consequently, on May 23, lQrU thp pa* Mm 
came to an agreement (the "May ?3 agree 
mpnt") whereby England delivered thp 2^3, 
363 sharps to Hot bach and Horbach gave 
England a post dated check foi $25,000 along 
with a note promising to "hold 2 ^ of Mod? 
code stock in trust for you (England 1 forever 
unless I have different instructions by you on 
disposition of that stock " Pu t when F n p 
land later asked Horbach In reoonvey the 
promised two percent of Medicode stock, 
Horbach refused Horbach argupd at trial 
that he meant to deliver only a -eniri ty 
interest hi the two percent to secure pay 
ment of the post-dated check and Hiat the 
language of the agreement was merely "an 
unfortunate choice of language, ' possibly re 
wiring from the fact that "we had a few 
drinks at lunch " England brought an action, 
in HIP Third District Court to recover the 
proceeds of the shares, which by stipulation 
of the parties had been sold for $369,140 60 
Horbach raised a counterclaim at the trial for 
recovery of $169,fttrf 75, the amount that he 
had ovetpaid on the original contract 
The trial court found that the May 23 
agreement was executed under a mutual mis 
take of fact and was therefore unenforceable 
Becausp Horbach had already overpaid Fng-
land by the rime of the May 23 agreement, 
the court found that England had a preexist-
ing duly to deliver the shates to Horbach 
The court therefore concluded that Hor 
bach's promise to give England an interest in 
two percent of the Medicode stock was with 
out considoration Ihe court also granted 
Horbach's motion fot a counterclaim and 
awarded him a judgment against England in 
thp amount of $169,501 75 for overpayments 
under the original contract 
The court of appeals reversed the trial 
court England v Horbach, 905 P2d 301 
(Utah Ct App 1995) The court of appeals 
found that the May 23 agreement constituted 
an accord and satisfaction and found consid 
eration for the agreement in the bargained 
for settlement of the parties' uncertain 
claims Id at 304 The court stated tha t ' if 
the parties in good faith believe there is a 
disputed or uncertain claim, mere settlement 
of the amount due and acceptance of that 
amount constitutes the consideration necps 
sary to Bupport the contract" Id (citations 
omitted) As for the trial court's finding of 
mutual mistake, the court of appeals recog-
nized that "the parties were indeed mistaken 
that additional money was owed under the 
original agreement Howevei," the court 
continued, ' th is mistake did not go to the 
terms of the parties' accord; rather it merely 
demonstratpg their accord was Indeed a com 
pi omlse of a bona fide dispute which was not 
necessarily well founded, but was in good 
faith ' Id at 305 (cilalions omitted) This 
court gt anted Horbach's pptition for certiora-
ri 913 P 2 d 749 (Utah 1996) 
The petition foi certioiari and the briefs of 
HIP parties Indicate that we must resolve at 
least three ISSUPS We must first decide 
whether the couit of appeals applied the 
correct standard of review and gave proper 
deference to the trial court's findings of fact 
Next we must detennlnp whethpr the May 23 
agreement was a compiomise of an unsettled 
claim constituting an accord and satisfaction 
or merely the conclusion of the original con-
tract based on mistaken assumptions about 
the parties' legal obligations If the May 23 
agrpement did in fact constitute an accord 
and satisfaction, we must also decide whether 
the parries' mutual mistake merely goes to 
the terms of the original agreement or 
whether it invalidates any further "accord" 
the parties may have reached on May 23. 
Finally, we must decide whether the trial 
court erred in granting Horbach's motion to 
amend his pleading to conform to the evi 
dence, thus allowing Hoi bach to comiterclaim 
for overpayments to England in the amount 
of $169,501 75 
I. SrANUAilDS OF REVIEW BEFORE 
THE COURr OF APFEAJLS ANV 
THE SUPREME COURr 
U, 2] The court of appeals reviews the 
trial court's conclusions of law for correct-
ness, and likewise this court "accord[sl no 
particular deference to conclusions of law 
made by the court of appeals, but re-
view!)?) wch conclusions for correctness" 
Landps v Capital City Banlc, 795 P 2d 1127, 
1129 (Utah 1990) The court of appeals may 
reverse a factual finding of the trial court 
only If It determines that the finding is 
"clearly erroneous," Utah R Civ P 52(a), 
that is, if the trial comts "ruling contradicts 
the great weight of evidence or if a court 
reviewing the evidence is left with 'a definite 
and dim conviction that a mistake has been 
m a d e ' " Sevy v Security 1 itte Co, 902 P 2d 
629, 635 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v WaUt 
er, 743 P 2 d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)) This 
court must deteimine m its turn "whether 
the court of appeals correctly decided I hat 
the trial court's ruling on this issue was 
clearly erroneous " ld\ 
[3) Horbach argues that the court of ap 
peals improperly spt aside the trial court's 
finding of fact 11, in which the trial court 
states, "The Court find* that at the May 23rd 
meeting both the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
Cite as 944 P 2d 340 {Utnli 1997) 
mistakenly believed that $25,000 remained ing that "at 
owing under the 1989 stock purchase agree 
ment" In fact, the court of appeals accepted 
the trial court's finding that "at the May 1991 
meeting, the parties were indeed mistaken 
that additional money was owed under HIP 
original agreement" England, 905 P2d at 
305 However, the court of appeals also 
writes that "both parties warp uncertain as ro 
the amount that remained owing on the ongi 
nal contract when they entered into their 
agreement" Id. Ih i s finding of uncertainty 
clearly ignorps or overrides thp trial courts 
finding that the parties were certain, though 
mistaken, that Horbach owed England $25, 
000, and the court of appeals' finding can 
therefore be upheld only if that court coi 
reetly decided that the trial court's finding of 
faijt 11 w&s cleaYly erroneous 
However, the court of appeals never ex 
plicitly assigns error to the factual findings of 
the trial court, but claims to be [accepting 
the facts as found by the" trial court" M 
Likewise, England does not argue that the 
trial court's finding of fact on this issue was 
clearly erroneous or even that the court of 
appeals found it to be clearly erroneous In 
stead he argues that the court of apppals 
ruling is consistent wifh the facts as found by 
the trial court. We disagree If one accepts 
the trial court's finding that botli parties 
believed $25,000 was owing on the original 
agreement, one cannot also accept the court 
of appeals' finding that the parties were un 
certain of the amount owed Thus, while thp 
court of appeals claims to be fajecepting the 
facta as found by the trial court," it has 
instead assumed facts contrary to those 
found by the trial court, implicitly rejecting 
the trial court's findings The court of ap 
peals errs in reversmg a trial court s finding 
of fact Unless such a finding is determined to 
be clearly erroneous Sevy, 902 P 2d at 615 
Hie court of appeals made no such dptermi 
nation, and England has not even aigued, 
much less shown, clear error in the trial 
court's finding that Hoi bach executed the 
tyay 23 agreement under the belief that he 
owed England $25,000 We therefoip con-
clude that the court of appeals erred insofar 
as it relied on the assumption that both 
parties were uncertain of the amount owpd, 
and we explicitly adopt the trial court's find 
the May 23rd moeting \ 
[England] and \ Horbach] mistakenly bph< 
that $25,000 remained owing under thp 
stock purchase agrpprnent 
II WAS THE MAT 2? A O R F r M H 
AN ACf'ORD AMD S A H S F A t I TOr-
[A] We must next dF-trnmne vhHhpr 
cppHng thp facts an found bv thp fun! u 
the couit of appeals c onr r f ly found that 
May 23 agreement constituted m so 
and satisfaction agrppniPiit pnfbicpabFp 
aratel) from the pai t ips original J939 ig 
input According to thp rute cited by 
court of appeals, [t]he elements of an ac < 
and satisfaction include[} (i) a bona 
dispute for uncertainty] ovpr an unliquid 
amount; (li) a paympnt tewjpred in full 
tlpment of the entire dispute, and (ni 
acceptance of thp paympnt rrtolivd 
P2d 3t 303 (change in original) (qiiotmp 
taft> I and^Lnpp <£ ^noiv Itcmm a! ^pcriol 
Inc. v Mountain Wetter 1 rl & 7 *1 C> 
P 2 d 322, 325 (Utah l™?) (citing Ma 
Rpmodelmq v Im~en, 700 F 2 d 60 7 
(Utah 1°S5) Npiderfwver B7nfdffi t? 
Corp v Campbell, 324 P 2d 1193 1197 (U 
C\ App 1992))) In VIPW of it" finding 
thp parties WPIp uncPilam of thp UTH 
owed under the original contract thp coin 
appeals concluded that thpu Mny 23 ag 
mpnt was thp r r su l t of a compionnso 
twppn England and Horbar h—a rip v iu 
ment constituting an accoid \nd "ahsfad 
Id at 304 
H I P court of apppals thpn detprmu p 1 t 
whilp the parties WPTP both under th T 
taken impassion that monpy was still o 
on thp contract Una mistake v P\\\ 'O 
terms of the oifgnnl contract but di 1 
affect the terms of the nev and ^npnr 
agreement—the accoi d and satisfaction 
terpd into by thp parh'ps on Mi) °3 J1 
Id at 30*5 The Ian of mutual mistake m 
state declaiP", A mutual mistil ice 
when both parties, at thp Ifme of < oniric t 
sharp a misconception about a bapu i ^ m 
Hon or vital fact upon whith thpy baspd M 
baigain Wo-nipt v Sintin* W V ?d ( 
009 (Utah Tt App 19«?) (quoting Rol 
Lnnqston Ltd v MrQuamr 711 I 2d f 
557 (Utah Ct App 1987)) H I P ennrf of 
peals writes, "In HIP Instant cage, the patHes 
were mistaken as to facts relevant to the 
original conftacfc—whether money was then 
due and owing—not as to a term underlying 
the accoid and satisfaction" Applaud, 905 
P 2d at 305 n 4 While a mutual mistake doeB 
invalidate only the agreement entered into in 
reliance on the mistaken assumption, we do 
not decide the correctness of the court of 
appeals' Ipgal conclusion that a mistake as to 
the amount owed does not go to the terms of 
an accord In satisfaction of that debt In-
stead, we conclude that the court of appeals 
misapplied this rule of law to the facts of the 
present case 
Taking HIP facts as found by the trial 
court, there could have been no accord and 
satisfaction entered into on May 2% 1991, 
because the first element of accord and satis 
faction—the existence of a bona fide dispute 
or uncertainty over an unliquidated 
amount—was not present The trial court's 
finding that both parties believed Horbacli 
owed England $25,000 precludes the possibil-
ity of a dispute over the amount owing and 
forces us to conclude that any uncertainty 
Horbacli may have had was cleared up, be-
foie he signed the May 23 agreement, by 
England's own statement that Horbacli owed 
him $25,000 Therefore, when Horbach exe-
cuted the agreement he was certain, though 
mistaken, of the amount he owed If there 
was no dispute and no uncertainty, there 
could have been no compromisp and thus no 
accord Accepting thp fads as found by the 
trial coutt, we must conclude that the Miy 23 
agieement represented merely the conclu-
sion of UIP patties ' original contract, not a 
new accotd in satisfaction of an uncertain 
debt 
The court of appeals' ultimate conclusion 
that the pat ties' mistake went to the underly-
ing agreement, not to their May 23, 1991, 
accord and satisfaction, is based on a mis 
chit actenVation of the trial court's findings 
of fact If we accept the facts as actually 
found by the trial couit, there could have 
bppn no accord and satisfaction Tiie parties 
igteed that Horbach would pay England 
$?5,000 baspcl on thpir mutual mistaken be 
Hpf that Hot bach owed England f 25,000, not 
as a compromise to satisfy an uncertain debt 
Tfie trial court therefore correctly concluded 
that "the May 23id agreement was made 
under a mutual mistake of fact illicit went to 
its essence and, thp»refoie, the putative 
agreement is unenforceable " Hot bach's ad-
ditional promise to give England two percent 
of tlip Medicode stock must therefore be 
treated either n§ a gratuitous promise unsup-
ported by consideration or, as Hoi bach sug 
gests, as a promise to hold the stock as 
security for payment on Horbaeh's post dat-
ed $25,000 check In either case, we may 
uphold the trial court's conclusion t h a t ' [ajuy 
•concession extracted from [HorbachJ by 
[EnglandJ in the May 28rd alleged agree 
meat lacks consideration and the agreement, 
therefore, is imenforceable " 
On appeal, England does not argue that 
the trial court's factual finding was in error, 
only that the common mistake of the parties 
constitutes an "uncei tainty" within the 
meaning of the rule of accord and satisfac-
tion. By blurring the distinction between 
mistake and uncertainty, England tries to 
make the trial court's facts fit within the 
court of appeals' theory of the case A mis-
take, however, is clearly different from an 
uncertainty In fact, one might argue that 
making a mistake requires some degree of 
certainty or at least some confidence that 
one's assumptions are correct England's 
argument that the parties' mutual mistake 
shoidd constitute an uncertainty within Hie 
rule of accord and satisfaction would effec 
tfvely eliminate the doctrine of mutual mis-
take from cnntiacb law because any mutual 
mistake could be called merely an uncertain-
ty. Such a broad definition of "uncertainty" 
is unwarranted by logic or precedent and 
would require courts to enforce contracts in 
ways that the parties rould never foresee at 
the time of contracting and that might even 
be contrary to the intent of both parties 
Becausp there was no dispute between the 
parties and no uncertainty in the parties' 
minds at the time of the May 23 agreement, 
that agreement cannot be charaetenVed as an 
"accord and satisfaction" but merely as the 
conclusion of their original 1989 stock sales 
agreement As such, the May 23 agreement 
was premised on a mutual mistake of materi-
al fact and is unenfotceable 'lite court of 
ENGLAND v. HORBAGJJ 
CUe**94* P2t t ^40 (Utnli 1997) 
Utah l j 
appeals' decision to enforce that agreement 
must thprefore bp reversed 
IV DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN 
ALLOWING HORBACH'S COUNTER 
CLAIM FOR O V E R P A Y M E N T 
England argups finally that the trial Judge 
abused his discretion in allowing Horbach to 
amend his pleading to conform to the evi 
dence at trial, thereby permitting Horbaeh's 
counterclaim for overpayments Rule 16(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides: 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may al-
low the pleadings to be amended when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will 
be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice 
him in maintaining his action or defpnRe 
upon the merits 
Utah R Civ P 15(b) 
C5J The decision to permit amendment 
under rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is subject to what we have called 
conditional discretionary review See Langc 
land v Monarch Molm% Jnc, 307 Utah Adv 
Rep 3, 4, Pj>d , (Dec 31, 1996) 
(applying conditional discretionary review to 
Utah R Civ P 36(b)) The trial court's 
discretion to grant amendment of I he plead 
ings is conditioned on the satisfaction of two 
preliminary requirements' a finding that the 
presentation of the merits of the action will 
be subserved by amendment and a finding 
that the admission of such evidence would 
not prejudice the adverse party in maintain 
ing his action or defense on the merits The 
trial coui t has only limited discretion hi mak 
ing these preliminary findings, but oncp 
these prerequisites are met, the trial court 
has full discretion to allow an amendment of 
the pleadings; that is, it may grant or deny a 
party's motion for amendment upon any rea 
sonable basis, and the court's decision c m be 
rpverspd only if abuse of discretion appear* 
C / i A 
161 In this case, England argues convinc 
ingly that he was prejudiced hi maintaining 
his defense against Horbaih 's counterclai 
because of the lateness nf thp amendmet 
In fjangpfand) this court held Hist "the f* 
tors most important to our finding, of pie 
dice include (j) the temporal pjoxhmh 
the amendment to the date of h ie ! and 1 
whether the patty opposing amendment * 
lied on the [pleadings} in «n«h a vrn*, *»s 
detrimentally affect its ability to piepare 
case" Lnvgefand at 8, i t In tf 
rase, Horbach fitsr mentioned his count? 
claim in his I rn! memorandum and rno\ ed f 
permission to amend his pleadings at the ei 
of the presentation of evidence Frejudi 
might be found in the fact that Tngl md h 
no opportunity to ptepatp a response to fl 
countei claim and no time in brief and sip-
legal defenses such as \ \a i \er and estopp 
and also in the fact that England n a u e d f 
right to a jury trial or l ejected "eltleme 
offers in reliance on his underp ,findmp Hi 
no countei claim would bp pursued 
However, the rule requires the fn i ! r ou 
to consider prejudice only 'f?lf cvidpme 
objected to at the b i l l " Ufah R f i 
15(b) As his own brief staler Png lu 
acknowledges that no objection xvaa n r n l 
trial ' Because EngWid failed to nbipft U 
trial court had full discretion to giant < 
deii) Hot bach s motion to amend the p'e* 
ings and can bp reveisod only upon a findir 
of abuse of discretion, that is if ' no )e-ro 
able basis ' for the trial court s rletHon c 
be found Considering tho inn] court s fin 
ing that Horbach had overpaid Fngi md f 
$10n,501 75, the court s derision to alto *~ fin 
bath's claim Tor that amount }«*• res^mah 
and does not constitute *ni abu**e of i\*
 fji 
cretion 
England suggests that the count' r< f in 
for ovetpayments that Horbach introduced 
trial was intentionally kept hidden until th 
day of trial and that allotting Horhaf h t 
amend his pleadings at lhat late d»l° "* i 
encouragf other litigant1* to keep enuntrt 
claims hidden until thp P \ P of t rn i Hove 
er, the trial cotut s decision is not hkelv t 
have the precedential effort Engl md fen 
Fus t , any real advantage a partv might p n 
by such surprise uould constitute pteawdtr 
within the meaning of rule 15(b), md if ol 
jected to at trial the coutt "vmld not h** 
disci etion to allow the amendment. See 
Utah R Glv P 15(b) Second, even In the 
absence of prejudice the trial court's decision 
to permit a rule 15(b) amendment is within 
Hie disci etlon of the trial court and any such 
"secret claims" would be lost If the trial 
judge found any reasonable basis fof denying 
the motion 
Litigants are adequately diecouiaged from 
keeping their claims secret until the eve of 
trial by the fact that the trial judge has full 
discretion to deny late motions to amend for 
any reason and the knowledge that most 
courts look on such motions with disfavor 
and are not easily persuaded to grant them 
Gimrd v Appleby, 660 P 2d 245, 248 (Utah 
1983) Even the most calculating litigants 
are fin likely to risk losing their claim merely 
In I he hope of gaining some kind of advan 
tage through the element of surpi ise This 
is especially true when the potential advan-
tage to be gamed could be eliminated by 
opposing counsel through an objection to the 
introduction of the evidence at trial and a 
showing that the amendment would prejudice 
them In the presentation of the merits of 
their action The Rules of Civil Procedure 
are sufficient to discourage litigants from 
intentionally concealing counterclaims until 
the e re of trial We are not willing to fur-
ther constrict the discretion of trial judges by 
second guessing their judgment every time 
an amendment to a parly's pleadings is per 
milled 
Because England failed to object to the 
picsentatlon of evidence of Horbach's conn 
terclaim at trial, we conclude that the trial 
com t was within Its discretion to permit Uor-
bach to amend his pleadings to conform to 
the evidence introduced at trial 
Taking I he facts as the trial court found 
them, we conclude that the coui t of appeals 
erred in reversing the district court If on 
May 91, 1991, the parties were convinced 
t i n t Horbach owed England $25,000, there 
could have' been no accord and satisfaction, 
because there was ho uncertainty or dispute 
about the amount owed Although the facts 
on the record are somewhat ambiguous, Fmg-
land does not mge us to reexamine the trial 
comt's findings of fact but merely tries to 
make the trial comt's facts fit wilhln the 
court of appeals' theory of the case This is 
an awkward fit at best and would require the 
court to define "uncertainty1 so as to include 
"mistakes." Tin's is not just a bioad defini-
tion, it is a misdefinitibn, and by conflating 
the two terms, the com t would also conflate 
two doctrines, effectively subsuming the doc 
trine of mutual mistake within the theory of 
accord and satisfaction Such a change in 
the common law is not justified by logic or by 
equity, particularly considering that the re-
sult in this case would be to permit one pai ty 
to retain what appears to be an unjust en-
richment of $169,501 75 
The judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the trial cow fc judgment rein-
stated. 
ZIMMERMAN, O J , STEWAJIT, 
Associate C J , and HO WE and RUSSON, 
J J , concur 
o^ I^KJilM^ 
Shirley CARRIER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
r . 
PRO-TECH RESTORATION tflia Stone 
Carpets, William Roger Smith, and Tlie 
City of P leasant Grove, Defendants and 
Peti t ioners. 
No. 900118. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug 8, 1997 
Eastbound motorist who was injured in 
collision with southbound motorist brought 
negligence action against southbound motor-
ist, company that employed him at time of 
accident, and city The Fourth District 
Comt, Utah County, Ray M. Harding, S r , J , 
entered judgment on jury verdict holding 
plaintiff 60 pprceht negligent, southbound 
motorist 40 percent negligent, and city not 
CARRIER v. P R O - T E C H RESTORATION 
Cite B9 944 r 2 d 346 (Utnli 1997) 
Utah 
negligent to any extent Plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, 909 P 2d 271, Orme, 
VJ, reyersed and remanded, holding that 
trial court granted excessive number of per 
emptory challenges to defendants Granting 
certiorari, the Supreme Court, Zimmerman, 
C J , held that: (I) trial court should have 
limited discretion in its decisions with respect 
to whether coparties may exercise separate 
sets of peremptory challenges; (2) there was 
no substantial controversy between south 
bound motorist and his former employer «;o 
as to warrant granting them separate sets of 
peremptory challenges; (3) rule that preju 
dice is presumed when trial court grants one 
side too many peremptory challenges re 
mains good law; (4) rule requiring that co 
parties jointly exercise peremptory chsl 
lenges unless substantial controversy exists 
between them does not deny those coparties' 
rights to due process or equal protection 
under Federal Constitution and does not vlo 
late provision in State Constitution requiring 
Wiiform operation of laws of a general na 
ture; and (5) plaintiff waived objection to the 
granting of separate set of peremptory chal 
lenges to city 
Decision of Court of Appeals affirmed 
Russon, J , concurred in the result 
J. Certiorari «=»63 1 
On certiorari, Supreme Courts reviews 
decision of court of appeals, not of trial court 
2. Certiorari <2^G4(1) 
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews 
coui t of appeals' decision for correctness and 
gives its conclusions of law no deference 
3. Certiorari ^ 6 4 ( 1 ) 
Correctness of court of appeals' decision, 
as determined by Supreme Court on certio 
rari review, depends initially upon whether it 
applied appropriate standard of review to 
trial court's decision 
4. Jury e»H6(3) 
In deciding whether coparties are enti 
tied to separate sets of peremptory chal 
lenges, the trial court must determine whpth 
er a substantial controversy exists between 
them; determination is a mixed question of 
fact and law, requi t ing trial couit f 
make fa<t findings as to the nature 
controversy between onpartin*' and I 
determine whether those Torts mep 
standard of substantial contio\Piny 
CivTroc, ROIP 47 
5 Appenf and E r r o r '>=?(M(J 
Tour factors should be <nns»de 
determining the appropriate grant nf t 
tion to trial cnmt in applying legd 
complexity and * at iet\ of farts undo 
rule, pxtent of Supreme Com I s pvpo 
applying legal principle onr! it^ ilul 
anticipate and articulate outcome-dp|«n 
tivp factors, extent to which trial judf 
observed fart1; rplp^anl to application 
law that cannot bo adequatel\ refWl 
record, and strength of any pohc\ con 
ations supporting narrow disr return 
fi Tnry ^PUKT) 
Trial comt should have limited A 
tion m its decisions with respect in w\ 
coparties may exercise aoparafo ^ets o 
emptory challenges, on sppctnrm of d 
Hon, running from fie nmo on (he nop 
to broad discretion on the nlhr-i, approj 
discretion on Hiiq is«*ue lira r !n*r» to alt! 
probably not at, thp de no\o end i 
Civ Proc , Rule 47 
7 fury t=>13G(3) 
Conflict between, employ o\ and fe 
employee, as to nbe the r company ad 
former employee to lie about r nllisinn in 
ing ernployep and company * an on < 
d i h e r did not constitute "substantial coi 
versy ' so as to v a r r an t granting p pp ' 
sets of peremptory challenges to em pi 
and employer in nrgligencp action by o 
driver; those defendants both as^oiter 
defense that plaintiff was more rc-^pon 
for causing accident than the\ noifhru 
cro^s-claim against the other, and there 
no separate related litigation behreen \\ 
Rules Civ Froc Rule 47 
See publication Words and F l i r i ' c 
Fot other juchrn? construe tion*; and \\\ f 
mlttom? 
8 I n n ^ H O H ) 
Fact that employer and former crop 
ee were represented by separate coun^e 
Exhibit H 
i$09G QUU/ZL1 9B:IL d^i TO/iO/TT 
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I s* Pares, ID #: 16-20-136-006 (Space above ibt Cavnty Recorder's use} 
| ^ TRUSTEE'S DESD 
This Deed is made by ScottLundberg, as Trustee under the Tnsst Detd described below, in 
feyor rf Chase Manhattan. Bank; successor by merger to Chase Bank af Texas, N,A., fka Texas 
Commerce Bank, N.A-, as custodian, 4708 Mercantile Drive North, Fort Worth, TX 7S137-
3605, as Grantee. 
WHEREAS, on May 24, 1996, Lan C England, as Tmstor, executed and delivered to First 
American Title of Utah, as Trustee, ior the benefit of Option One Mortgage Corporation* as 
Benefatary* a Trust Deed to secure the performance by the Trustor of bis obligations under a 
Promissory Note executed and delivered for a valid consideration to Option One Mortgage 
Corpo ation on or about May 24, 1996. The Trust Deed was tecordedin the oiEce of the Recorder 
of Sail Lake County, State of Utah, on May 31,1996, as Entry No, 6371918 in Book 7412 at Page 
2835, .aid covered the'property described below; and 
WHEREAS, a default occurred under the terms of the Trust Deed as set forth in the Modce 
of Def lult described below; and 
WHEREAST Scott Lundberg was appointed by the Beneficiary as Trustee by a Substitution 
of Trustee recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of UtahT on 
Augus: 25,2000, as Entry No. 7706191 in Book 8383.at Page 5279; and 
WHEREAS, Scott Lundberg executed and filed for record in the Office of the County 
Recorc ex of Salt Lake County, a written Notice of Default and Election to Sell which was recorded 
on August 25, 2000, as Entry No. 7706192 in Book 83S3 at Page 5281; and 
WHEREAS, the Trustee executed his Notice of Trustee's Sale stating tfeat he wouid sell at 
public luction to the highest bidder the property therein and hereafter described* and fixing the time 
and pkee of said sale as December 28,2000, at 1Q:30 am of said day, and did cause copies of the 
notice a be posted for not less than 20 days before the date of saie> in three public places in the ca 
county in which the property is located, and aiso in a conspicuous place on the property; and said ^ 
Trustee* did cause a copy of nodes to be published once a week for three consecutive weeks be&rs -£-
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in the county in which the property is situated, the Srst date of such publication being December 1, 
2000, and the last date being December 15,2000; and 
WHBREAS, all applicablesiatatory provisions of the State ofUtah and ail of rhe provisions 
of the* Trust Deed have been complied with as to the acts to be performed and the notices to be 
given; and 
WHEREAS, the Trustee didf at the time and piace of sale, sell at public auction, to Grantee 
above named^  being the highest bidder, the property &r the sum Of $528,552.00. 
NOW, THEREFORE, Trustee, in consideration of the premises recited and of the sum bid 
and prid by <3rame£, by virtue of his authority under the Trust Deed, grants and conveys to the 
Grant:«, without any covenant or warranty, express or impix£d, all of the property situated in Salt 
Lake 'Comity, Stare of Utah, described qs follows: 
Lota I through 3, inclusive, of Block 3, GENEVA PLACE, according to the aSJciai plat 
thereof, filed in Book C of P!ats, at Pago 90 of the official records of Salt Lake County 
Recorder, 
Together with all the improvement now or hereafter srecied OH the property, and ail cssenn&is, appurtenances, and 
nxturei ttow or henatfter a part of the property. 
DATED: December 28,2000. 
State cf Utah ) 





The foregoing Trustee's Deed was acknowledged before mc on December 28, 2000 by 






STEVEN W. CALL (A5260) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Telefax: (801) 532-7543 




 ^ COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION 
AND Aaron d. kennard, IN HIS CAPACITY 
AS Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM JN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Case No. 010910255 
Hon. Stephen L. Henroid 
Defendant Principal Funding Corporation ("PFC") submits this memorandum of points 
and authorities in opposition to the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction filed by the plaintiff, Chase Manhattan Bank. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order fails to comply with the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. There has been no affidavit filed with the Court setting forth the requirements 
under Rule 65 A and the complaint has not been verified. Substantively, the plaintiff will not 
suffer any irreparable harm because the plaintiff has a six month statutory right of redemption to 
redeem the property after sale by the Sheriff. Moreover, there is no substantial likelihood that 
plaintiff will be successful on the merits because PFC's judgment lien arose long before 
plaintiff s junior deed of trust was created. The Utah Court of Appeal's decision to reverse the 
decision of the District Court was never remitted to the District Court because the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision of the District Court before the case was ever remitted back to the 
District Court. This is standard procedure under the Utah Rules of Civil and Appellate 
Procedure. Plaintiffs argument that somehow the Judgment Creditor's lien was lost during the 
appellate process is entirely unfounded and contrary to Utah law. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Defendant "PFC's predecessor, Eugene Horbach (hereinafter the "Judgment 
Creditor") obtained a money judgment against Lan C. England (hereinafter the "Judgment 
Debtor ") in the matter of England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 346 (Utah 1997). The judgment 
has been assigned to PFC. 
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2. Upon the entry of the money judgment by the clerk of the District Court, a 
judgment lien arose on all non-exempt real property of the judgment debtor situated in Salt Lake 
County, Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1. 
3. An appeal from the foregoing judgment was made to the Utah Court of Appeals 
which ruled that the money judgment should be vacated. However, the Utah Supreme Court 
granted the Judgment Creditor's petition for a writ of certiorari, and as a result, the record before 
the Utah Court of Appeals was forwarded to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court. 
4. At no time was the case remitted back to the District Court by the Utah Court 
Appeals because the Utah Supreme Court had granted the Judgment Creditor's petition for 
certiorari. Thereafter, the Utah Supreme affirmed the decision of the District Court. After the 
Supreme Court affirmed the order of the District Court, the clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
remitted the case back to the District Court. 
5. Plaintiffs argument that the judgment lien, which arose from the District Court's 
judgment, was interrupted or avoided during the appellate process is without merit and its motion 
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction based thereon should be denied for 




THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
BECAUSE ANY ALLEGED URGENCY HAS BEEN CREATED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
In the present case, the money judgment at issue was made in April 1994. The judgment 
lien on the Judgment Debtor's property in Salt Lake County arose immediately thereafter. The 
writ of execution to foreclose the judgment lien was issued by the clerk of the Third District 
Court on September 28, 2001. The Sheriffs deputy served the writ of execution upon the debtor 
on October 1, 2001. A return of service has been filed with the Court. The Sheriff was also 
required to post the property after the writ of execution was served, and to advertise the property 
for sale for no less than 3 weeks under the requirements of Rule 69(i)(l) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the judgment lien was a matter of public 
record before plaintiff took a junior interest in the property. As such, it took its junior lien on the 
property with constructive notice of PFC's judgment lien thereon. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO GIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF HEARING 
The law is settled that a party must be given adequate notice before a hearing may be 
held on a motion for a preliminary injunction. Utah R. Civ. P. 65 A; Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 
P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977). 
In the present case, plaintiff has waited until the last hour to file a motion for a temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction for the purpose of obtaining advantage over PFC. 
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The plaintiffs pleadings in this case were not filed or served upon counsel until after business 
hours on Friday, November 16th even though plaintiff set for hearing for the following Monday 
morning. This is not adequate notice. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FAILS TO COMPLY WITH RULE 65A 
Rule 65 A of the Utah Rides of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part as follows: 
(b) Temporary restraining orders. 
(1) Notice. No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the 
adverse party or that party's attorney unless (A) it clearly appears from specific facts 
shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, 
loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's 
attorney can be heard in opposition, and (B) the applicant or that applicant's attorney 
certifies to the court in writing as to the efforts, if any, that have been made to give notice 
and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be required. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A (emphasis added). 
A review of the record on file before the Court reflects that no affidavit has been filed 
and that the plaintiffs complaint has not been verified. In addition, there is nothing in a 
complaint or affidavit stating under oath why the plaintiff waited until the last minute of the 
eleventh hour to file its motion, and why it failed to provide PFC with prior notice that it was 




PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY IRREPARABLE HARM 
A preliminary injunction must be denied unless the applicant proves that the injunction is 
necessary to prevent irreparable injury. Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(l). Irreparable injury is injury 
that cannot remedied with money damages. System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427-
28 (Utah 1983). 
In the present case, the sheriff is proceeding forward with the execution sale under Rule 
69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure of a parcel of property to which the Judgment Creditor's 
judgment lien attached. However, Utah law is well settled that an execution cannot convey fee 
simple interest and that a junior creditor has a statutory right of redemption under Rule 69(j), 
which provides in part: 
(j) Redemption of real property from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to redemption, or any part sold 
separately, may be redeemed by the following person or their successors in interest: (A) 
the judgment debtor; (B) a creditor having a lien by judgment, mortgage, or other lien on 
the property sold, or on some share or part thereof, subsequent to that on which the 
property was sold. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j)(l). Rule 69(j)(3) provides that the redemption may be made any within six 
months. Id. Thus, because the property may be redeemed, there is no irreparable harm to be 
suffered by plaintiff if the Sheriff completes the execution sale as scheduled. 
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In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bishop, 839 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D. Me. 
1993), the court stated as follows in denying an injunction. "We do not find irreparable injury 
where only money is at stake and where the plaintiff has a satisfactory remedy at law to recover 
the money at issue." Id. (Quoting Foxboro Co. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 805 F.2d 34, 36 
(1st Cir. 1986).) Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff has a right of redemption 
which is an adequate remedy at law. Therefore, no injunction should issue by the Court as a 
matter of law. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT PFC MAY SUFFER 
IRREPARABLE HARM IF THE INJUNCTION ISSUES 
PFC's judgment lien arises from a judgment that was made and entered by the Court on 
or about the 18th day of April 1994. Thus, the judgment will expire eight years thereafter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22. Even if the judgment is renewed through an action, the 
judgment lien which arose from the original judgment be lost. See Cox Corporation v. Vertin, 
754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988)(lien of renewal judgment attaches only from the date of the entry of 
new judgment). Thus, if the Court stays the execution sale, PFC may lose the entire value of its 
judgment. Therefore, the balance of harm weighs heavily in PCF's favor. 
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POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS 
To obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show a substantial likelihood that it will 
prevail on the merits at trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(4); Water & Energy Sys. Technology, Inc. v. 
Keil, 91A P.2d 411 (Utah 1998). 
In the present case, there is no substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the 
merits. The is no dispute, and the facts stated by the plaintiff sustain, that PFC's judgment lien 
arose well before the junior trust deed obtained by the plaintiff The sole basis for plaintiffs 
argument is that the judgment lien created by the judgment made and entered by the District 
Court was somehow lost between the time the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and 
the time the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. 
However, as this Court knows, once an appeal is filed the District Court is divested of 
jurisdiction on appeal until the case is remitted to the District Court. Once the Utah Court of 
Appeals renders its decision, the case is not remitted to the District Court until the time for 
further appeal to the Utah Supreme Court has expired. 
The general rule has therefore been that an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction 
and transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court, where it remains until the appellate 
proceedings terminates and the trial court regains jurisdiction. 
White v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1990) 
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A party may file a petition for writ of certiorari under Utah R. App. P. 49. Upon entry of 
an order granting the petition, the clerk of the Utah Supreme Court's notifies by writ or 
otherwise, that the Utah Supreme Court has decided to review the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Utah R. App. P. 51(b). The Court of Appeals is divested of jurisdiction to the Utah 
Supreme Court. Indeed, Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(2) makes it perfectly clear that the case may not 
be remitted by the Court of Appeals back to the District Court unless and until the time of filing 
a petition for writ of certiorari has expired. The Rule provides in relevant part: 
Rule 36. Issuance of remittitur. 
(2) In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the 
expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. If a petition for writ of 
certiorari is timely filed, issuance of the remittitur by the Court of Appeals will 
automatically be stayed until the Supreme Court's disposition on the petition for 
writ of certiorari. If the Supreme Court denies the petition, the Court of Appeals shall 
issue its remittitur five days after entry of the order denying the petition. If the Supreme 
Court grants the petition, jurisdiction of the appeal shall be transferred to the 
Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals shall close its file and transfer the record 
on appeal, if any, to the Supreme Court. 
Utah R. App. P. 36(2)(emphasis added). The foregoing rule removes all doubt that the decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals is never remitted back to the trial court when certiorari has been 
granted. Thus, the judgment of District Court remained valid and enforceable through the 
completion of the appeal which collimated in the affirmation of the judgment by the District 
Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
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Based upon the foregoing, there is simply no question that PFC's judgment and the 
resulting judgment lien remained valid through the appeal process as a matter of law. As such, 
there is no question that plaintiff cannot be successful on appeal as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff has failed to establish a legal basis for relief under 
Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, defendant PFC prays the Court to deny plaintiffs motion for temporary 
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of November 2001. 
RAY, QU1NNEY & NEBEKER 
STEVEN W. CALL 
Attorneys for Principal Funding Corporation 
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PARK WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Atlonuvys for Plaintiff 
Ui.'S Souih Stale Slrect, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Sail lake City, Utah 04147-0019 
i'elopiionn: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHAM MANHATTAN BANK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
1'RINCIPAI. FUNDING CORPORATION; 
and AARON f). KENNARD, in his 
cjtp.K hy as Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
WHEREAS, plaintiff seeks an injunaion restraining defendants from conducting a 
sheriff's sole of the following-described real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah: 
Lots 1 through 8, inclusive, of Block 3, Geneva Place, according to the 
official plat thereof, filed in Book C of Plats, at Page 90 of the official 
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
Said property is hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Properly," 
WHEREAS, the court having hoard argument on plaintiff's Motion for Temporary 
Retraining Order, and 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Civil No. 010910255PR 
judge Stephen L. Henriod 
WMlRf AS, defendant Principal Funding Corporation was given notice of plaintiff's 
Mohon for Temporary Restraining Order; 
NOW, 11 TOFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED lhat defendants Principal Funding 
Corporation and the Salt Lake County Sheriff are hereby restrained and enjoined from 
conducting a shctiff's sale or otherwise executing on the Subject Properly; and 
11 b FUR 11IER ORDERED that said defendants appear before the Honorable 
Stephen i . ! lonriod m his courtroom at 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
tt<m 1 • IU60 on Novewber 3 , 2001 at 2 : 00 o'clock £ . m . , for a hearing to 
doiiMrrimc if said defendants should bo preliminary enjoined from conducting a sheriffs 
sjl«* duiinp, tho pendency of this action; and 
II IS rURTHFR ORDERED that the temporary restraining order contained in tho 
pK-athnft paragraph shall expire at ? \QO o'clock£_.m. on November S> , 2001. 
Plaintiff is hereby directed to file with this court, as security prescribed by Rule 
Ur)A u\ the t Hah Rules of Civil Procedure, a bond in the amount of $ fd.ooo , for the 
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is 
found to have boon wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 
MADE AND ENTERED this /*? day of November, 2001, at Hr_\ Od o'clock 
BY THE COURT: 
Exhibit K 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
Jeffrey D. Stevens, Esq. (8496) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; and MP 
VENTURES, L G , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION; 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his 
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 010910255PR 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Plaintiffs Chase Manhattan Bank and MP Ventures, L.C. ("MP Ventures"), by their 
counsel, respectfully submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs seek in this action a decree determining that defendant Principal Funding 
Corporation ("Principal Funding") does not hold a judgment lien against the property 
now owned by plaintiff MP Ventures. After a hearing on November 19, 2001, the court 
entered a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the defendants from conducting a 
sheriffs execution sale that had been scheduled for November 20, 2001. 
The claimed judgment lien stems from a Judgment that was originally entered 
against the prior owner of the subject property on April 18, 1994 in Lan C. England v. 
Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No. 930901471CV (the "Horbach Judgment"). The 
Horbach Judgment was vacated by the Utah Court of Appeals on October 19, 1995 and 
a Remittitur was issued on November 22, 1995. While a petition for certiorari was 
pending before the Utah Supreme Court, the property owner borrowed $500,000 from 
Option One Mortgage Corporation secured by a Deed of Trust recorded on May 31 , 
1996. One year later, on May 30, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court issued an Opinion on 
the certiorari petition and reinstated the Horbach Judgment. The Option One trust deed 
was foreclosed and a Trustee's Deed was recorded at the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
office in favor of Chase Manhattan Bank on January 10, 2001. The property was then 
conveyed to plaintiff MP Ventures. 
The sole issue raised by the facts in this case is whether the priority of Principal 
Funding's claimed judgment lien relates back to the date that the Horbach Judgment was 
originally entered or has a priority as of the date the Horbach Judgment was reinstated 
by the Utah Supreme Court. Plaintiffs submit that there can be no question that the 
judgment lien's priority is the date the Horbach Judgment was reinstated and, therefore, 
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the judgment lien was foreclosed as a junior encumbrance by the foreclosure of the 
Option One trust deed. 
ARGUMENT 
Principal Funding has raised three arguments against the issuance of an injunction: 
(1) that plaintiffs wil l not suffer irreparable harm because of their redemption rights, (2) 
that Principal Funding may suffer harm if it's judgment lien expires during the injunction 
period, and (3) that plaintiffs wil l not likely succeed since the Utah Court of Appeals 
purportedly did not issue a remittitur after vacating the Horbach Judgment. As 
demonstrated below, each of those arguments is without merit. 
A. Plaintiffs Wil l Suffer Irreparable Harm if an Injunction Is Not Issued. 
Principal Funding's argument that the availability of the right of redemption protects 
plaintiffs fails to recognize the reality of litigation. The period of redemption provided 
by Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is six months. Consequently, if 
defendants conduct a sheriffs sale, plaintiffs would be forced to exercise their 
redemption rights within that six month period of time which, most certainly, would be 
prior to the resolution of this case. The potential loss of unique real property is 
universally recognized as irreparable harm. See, e.g., Dixon v. Thatcher, 742 P.2d 1029, 
1030 (Nev. 1987) ("real property and its attributes are considered unique and loss of real 
property rights generally results in irreparable harm"); Greater Houston Bank v. Conte, 
641 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. App. 1982) ("[i]t is well established law that each and every 
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piece of real estate is unique. Therefore, if appellants were allowed to foreclose 
appellees would be irreparably harmed, since real estate is so unique."). 
B. Principal Funding Wil l Not be Harmed by an Injunction Because a ludgment 
Continues While Enforcement is Staved. 
Principal Funding argues that it would be harmed by an injunction because the 
injunction would allow the Horbach Judgment to expire according to the eight-year 
statute of limitation while prohibiting Principal Funding from executing on it. [See 
Principal Funding's memorandum in opposition at p. 7.] However, this is not the case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 provides: "judgments shall continue for eight years unless 
previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is staved in accordance with 
law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (2001) (emphasis added). Additionally, § 78-12-41 
provides: "When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory 
prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the action." ]d- § 78-12-41. Accordingly, the 
period covered by this court's injunction will not be charged against the statute of 
limitation. The Utah Supreme Court addressed this very issue in Sittner v. Schriever, 
2001 Utah Ct. App. 99, f1f 12, 14 n.6, 22 P.3d 784. In Sittner, the plaintiff was 
prohibited from executing on his judgment by a bankruptcy stay. After the bankruptcy, 
the plaintiff proceeded to execute on the judgment, even though it was beyond the eight 
year limitations period. The court held: "[t]hus, under both the Bankruptcy Code and 
our own statute the automatic stay tolls the eight-year statute of limitations for the time is 
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was in effect." ]d. at f 14 n.6. Therefore, an injunction entered by this court which wil l 
stay Principal Funding's execution on the Horbach Judgment wil l not shorten the life of 
the Judgment or harm Principal Funding in any manner. 
C. Plaintiffs Wil l Prevail on the Merits Because the Utah Court of Appeals Vacated the 
Horbach judgment and Issued Its Remittitur. 
Principal Funding argues that the vacation of the Horbach Judgment was not 
effective because the Utah Court of Appeals did not issue its Remittitur. [See defendant's 
memorandum in opposition at p 9 ] That assertion is simply wrong. Even assuming that 
the Utah Court of Appeals' power to vacate the Horbach Judgment was contingent upon 
the issuance of the remittitur,1 Principal Funding's argument fails because the Remittitur 
was in fact issued to the district court. 
Principal Funding mistakenly relies on the most recent version of Rule 36 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to conclude that M[t]he foregoing rule removes all 
doubt that the decision of the Court of Appeals is never remitted back to the trial court 
when certiorari has been granted." jd. This version of Rule 36 became effective April 1, 
2001. Utah R. App. P. 36 (2001). The rule which was in effect at the relevant time, 
however, stated: "In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue 
1Plaintiffs only assume the correctness of Principal Funding's contention that the Utah 
Court of Appeals' power is contingent upon the issuance of a remittitur for the purpose 
of illustrating the failure of Principal Funding's argument. Plaintiffs maintain that where 
the Utah Court of Appeals has proper jurisdiction over a case, as is undisputed in this 
suit, then it has the power to "reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose of any order 
or judgment appealed from," Utah R. App P. 30(a), whether or not a remittitur issued. 
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immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari." 
Utah R. App. P. 36 (2000) (effective October 1, 1992) (emphasis added). A copy of the 
relevant version of Utah R. App. P. 36 is attached hereto. According to the plain 
language of the appropriate version of Rule 36, the remittitur was required to be issued 
from the Utah Court of Appeals at the expiration of the time for filing the petition for 
certiorari whether or not the Utah Supreme Court granted the petition. In fact, the Utah 
Court of Appeals issued the Remittitur on November 22, 1995 and it was docketed in 
the district court on December 1, 1995. Therefore, Principal Funding's argument that 
the Horbach Judgment was never vacated because a remittitur never issued from the 
Utah Court of Appeals is flatly wrong. 
Horbach could have sought a stay of the remittitur pending certiorari review to 
maintain the judgment lien. See Utah R. App. P. 36(b) (2000); State v. Palmer, 802 P.2d 
748 (Utah App. 1990) ("Rule 36(b), Utah R. App. P., provides that a stay of the remittitur 
may be granted pending application for [certiorari] review.")2 Because a stay was 
available upon posting a supersedeas bond, the rational adopted by courts in other 
2lt should be noted that in Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water 
Co., 942 P.2d 305 (1996), the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to modify a judgment where the Utah Court of Appeals prematurely remitted 
the case. That decision has no application in this instant case because (1) the Utah 
Court of Appeals vacated the Horbach Judgment and no modification is at issue here, 
and (2) the Remittitur here was timely issued after the period for filing a certiorari 
petition had expired. Moreover, the Hi-Country court specifically stated that it did not 
disagree with the proposition that the certiorari petition itself does not stay execution of 
the Utah Court of Appeals' decision. 
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jurisdictions holding that a reinstated judgment takes priority as of the date of 
reinstatement most certainly applies in Utah. See, e.g., Bulmash v. Davis, 157 Cal.Rptr. 
66, 597 P.2d 469, 472-73 (noting that if the judgment creditor obtained a stay "he would 
have been allowed to retain his lien by filing an undertaking insuring that he would pay 
all costs and damages plaintiffs would sustain by reason of the lien in the event that the 
order of the court below were sustained in favor of plaintiffs."). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs respectfully submit that the court should grant 
their motion for a preliminary injunction. 
A 
DATED this 2% day of November, 2001. 
PARR WARDOUPS BRQWhLGEE & LOVELESS 
By: 
RonaW p. Russell, Esq\ 
Jeffrey D. Stevens, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
>6. I hereby certify that on the <M) day of November, 2001 a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION was 
hand-delivered to: 
Steven W. Call, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
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5 0 5 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE R u l e 36 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. ^ur. 2&- — 5 A m « J u r 2 d Appellate C. J.S. — 5 C J S Appeal and Error § 676 et 
Review § 878 et seq. seq. 
Rule 36o Issuance of reiimittitiuir. 
(a) Date of issuance. 
(1) In the Supreme Court the remittitur of the COUIT shall issue 15 days after 
the entry of the judgment. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed, the 
remittitur of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order 
disposing of the petition. 
(2) In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue immedi-
ately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. 
(3) The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, enlarged, or 
shortened by order of the court. A certified copy of the opinion of the court, any 
direction as to costs, and the record of the proceedings shall constitute the 
remittitur. 
(b) Stay, supersedeas or injunction pending application for review to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. A stay or supersedeas of the remittitur or 
an injunction pending application for review may be granted on motion and for 
good cause. A motion for a stay of the remittitur or for approval of a 
supersedeas bond or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting 
an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must ordinarily be made in the 
first instance in the court rendering the decision appealed from. A motion for 
such relief may be made in the reviewing court, but the motion shall show that 
a motion in the court rendering the decision is not practicable, or that the court 
rendering the decision has denied such a motion or has failed to afford the 
relief which the movant requested, with the reasons given by the court 
rendering the decision for its action. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be 
given to all parties. The period of the stay, supersedeas or injunction shall be 
for such time as ordered by the court up to and including the final disposition 
of the application for review. If the stay, supersedeas, or injunction is granted 
until the final disposition of the application for review, the party seeking the 
review shall, within the time permitted for seeking the review, file with the 
clerk of the court which entered the decision sought to be reviewed, a certified 
copy of the notice of appeal, petition for writ of certiorari, or other application 
for review, or shall file a certificate that such application for review has been 
filed. Upon the filing of a copy of an order of the reviewing court dismissing the 
appeal or denying the petition for a writ of certiorari, the remittitur shall issue 
immediately. A bond or other security on such terms as the court deems 
appropriate may be required as a condition to the grant or continuance of relief 
under this paragraph. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Counsel the petition for writ of certiorari is 30 days from 
should note that the petition for certiorari the entry of the decision of the Court of Ap-
alone is not sufficient to stay the judgment of peals, the motion for the stay must be filed 
the Court of Appeals Counsel must also file a withm 14 days of the entry of the decision of the 
motion to stay the remittitur or for an injunc- Court of Appeals or withm five days of the entry 
tion or supersedeas Although the time for filing of a decision regarding a motion for rehearing 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Time for issuance of remittitur rules and m refusing to recall the remittitur, 
Cited the judgment of the trial court was void because 
the court had no jurisdiction to enter a judg-
Time for issuance of remittitur. ment while the case was still pending in the 
Because the Court of Appeals had ened m appellate courts Hi-Country Estates Home-
remittmg a case to the District Court before the ow ners Ass n v Foothills Water Co , 942 P 2d 
time to seek certioian had e jpned under these 305 (Utah 1996) 
Exhibit L 
STEVEN W. CALL (A5260) 
MICHAEL E. MAYFIELD (A8237) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Telefax: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for Principals Funding Corporation 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION 
AND Aaron d. kennard, IN HIS CAPACITY 
AS Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
SUR-REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Case No. 010910255 
Hon. Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendant Principal Funding Corporation (hereinafter "PFC"), submits this sur-reply 
memorandum in opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction filed by plaintiffs Chase 
Manhattan Bank and MP Ventures L.C. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish the elements needed to enjoin the Sheriffs sale of the 
subject property. Plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable harm by the sale because they have a six 
month statutory right of redemption. The primary issues in the underlying action are pure issues 
of law which can be adjudicated before plaintiffs' right of redemption expires. Plaintiffs also 
have title insurance to protect their interest in the property and may file a claim thereunder. In 
addition, PFC stands to suffer more injury than plaintiffs if the injunction issues through the 
expiration of its judgment lien, the increase of costs and expenses, the loss of sale proceeds and 
the possible loss or damage to the collateral and other potential damages. There is no likelihood 
that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of their claim based upon the controlling decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court in Hi-Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills Water Co., 
942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that the District Court lacks 
jurisdiction to alter or amend its original judgment until the Supreme Court has made its final 
decision when a petition for certiorari has been timely filed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Defendant PFC's predecessor, Eugene Horbach (hereinafter the "Judgment 
Creditor") obtained a money judgment (hereinafter the "Judgment") against Lan C. England 
(hereinafter the "judgment debtor") in the matter of England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 346 
(Utah 1997). The Judgment has been assigned to PFC. 
2. A copy of the Judgment certified by the clerk of the District Court is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "4." 
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3. A certified copy of the docket in the District Court for the aforementioned case is 
attached as Exhibit " 1 . " 
4. Upon the entry of the Judgment by the District Court clerk, a judgment lien arose 
on all non-exempt real property of the judgment debtor located in Salt Lake County under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1. 
5. An appeal from the District Court Judgment was made to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. A certified copy of the Appellate docket from the Utah Court of Appeals is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "2." 
6. The Court of Appeals issued it decision which states in relevant part as follows: 
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the accord and satisfaction 
unenforceable for lack of consideration and because we conclude the agreement was not 
founded upon a mutual mistake of fact, we reverse and remand for further action 
consistent with this opinion. 
A copy of the Utah Court of Appeals opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit "5." 
7. The instructions given by the foregoing decision reflects that the Court of 
Appeals sought to remand the matter back to Judge Frederick so that he could alter and amend 
his judgment. 
8. On November 20, 1995, the Judgment Creditor filed a petition for certiorari to the 
Utah Supreme Court, and on that same day the Utah Supreme Court sent formal notice to the 
District Court giving notice that a petition for a writ of certiorari had been filed in the case. 
9. The formal notice of the petition for certiorari that was given by the Utah 
Supreme Court to the District Court was docketed on the District Court docket on November 20, 
1995. A certified copy of the notice is attached hereto as PFC's Exhibit "6." 
10. At the time the foregoing notice was given by the Utah Supreme Court the record 
on appeal had not been remitted to the District Court by the Utah Court of Appeals. (See District 
Court Docket, Exhibit 1, at 18) 
11. On November 22,1995, two days after the Utah Supreme Court gave formal 
notice of the pending petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals attempted to remit the record 
on appeal to the District Court. (See District Court Docket, Exhibit 1 at 18). 
12. At no time after the formal notice was given by the Utah Supreme Court of the 
pending petition for certiorari, did Judge Frederick vacate, alter or amend his Judgment. (See 
District Docket, Exhibit 1) 
13. On February 14, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court gave formal notice to the District 
Court that it had granted the petition for writ of certiorari. A certified copy of the notice is 
attached as Exhibit "7", and a certified copy of the Utah Supreme Court's docket in the case is 
attached as Exhibit "3 ." 
14. On May 24,1996, a deed of trust was recorded against the Judgment Debtor's 
property. A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit "8." 
15. At the time for the foregoing deed of trust was recorded, the Judgment and the 
formal notices relating to review by the Utah Supreme Court were reflected on the District 
Court's docket. (See District Court Docket, Exhibit 1, at 18) 
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16. On May 30, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in the England v. 
Horbach matter. A copy of the published decision is attached hereto as Exhibit "9." 
17. On October 1, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court remitted the appellate record to the 
District Court. A certified copy of the remittitur from the Utah Supreme Court is attached as 
Exhibit "10." 
18. Sometime in the year 2000, Scott Lundberg as trustee, filed a notice of default 
under the deed of trust. (See Exhibit 11, at 1.) Thereafter, a non-judicial sale was conducted by 
the trustee whereat the trustee sold the subject property to Chase Manhattan Bank for the sum of 
$528,552. (Exhibit 11, at 2) 
19. At no time prior to the non-judicial sale did the trustee or the beneficiary 
thereunder seek to have a court determine the priority of liens on the subject property. 
20. On December 28, 2000, Scott Lundberg executed a Trustee's deed to the buyer at 
the sale which was recorded at the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on January 10, 2001. A 
copy of the deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "11." 
21. The deed provides in relevant part as follows: 
NOW, THEREFORE, Trustee, in consideration of the premises recited and of the sum 
bid and paid by Grantee, by virtue of his authority under the Trust Deed, grants and 
conveys to the Grantee, without any covenant or warranty, express or implied, all of the 
property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah . . . " (Exhibit 11, at 2)(emphasis 
added). 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Utah Rule Civ. P. 65A(e) provides that a preliminary injunction may issue only upon a 
showing by the applicant that: (1) the applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; (2) the threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; (3) the order or 
injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and (4) there is a substantial 
likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case 
presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of farther litigation. 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish the foregoing elements in this case for the following 
mutually exclusive reasons: 
REPLY POINT 1 
PLAINTIFFS WILL NOT SUFFER 
IRREPARABLE HARM IF AN INJUNCTION DOES NOT ISSUE 
The person seeking an injunction must establish that its legal remedy is not adequate, and 
that the injunction is necessary prevent great and irreparable harm.1 In the present case, 
plaintiffs cannot establish irreparable harm for the following reasons: 
1
 "Irreparable injury. An injury that cannot be adequately measured or compensated by money 
and is therefore often considered remediable by injunction. Also termed irreparable harm." 
Black's Law Dictionary, (7th ed.) at 789-90. 
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First, the facts are undisputed that the scheduled sale is a judicial sale and that the 
plaintiffs have a legal right to redeem the property within six months." Courts have long held 
that a right to redemption provides an aggrieved party with an adequate remedy at law thereby 
precluding injunctive relief. See Calvert Associates v. Harris, 469 F.Supp. 922, 927 (E.D. Mich. 
1979)(U.S. District Court refused to enjoin foreclosure sale notwithstanding defects in notice of 
sale because the debtor had a right to redeem the property after sale); In re Grand Traverse 
Development Company Limited Partnership, 151 B.R. 702, 799 (W.D.Mich. 1993)(affirmed 
bankruptcy court's decision not to grant injunction after court determined that debtors had an 
adequate remedy at law through the right of redemption and through state action); Alpine 
Fellowship Church of Love and Enlightenment, 1987 SL 49378 (N.D.Cal. 1987)("Moreover, 
plaintiff has an adequate legal remedy since he may pay the taxes and sue for a refund). Flora v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). Nor does plaintiff face irreparable harm since he may 
exercise his right of redemption under 26 U.S.C. 6357(b) at any time within 180 days after the 
sale of the property").3 
~ Rule 69(3) provides as follows: (3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property 
may be redeemed within six months after the sale by paying the amount of the purchase with a 
surcharge of 6 percent thereon in addition, together with the amount of any assessment or taxes, 
and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any 
improvements upon the property, which the purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase, 
with interest at the lawful rate on such other amounts,... Utah R. Civ. P. 69Q)(3) 
3
 See also; Smith v. Peoples National Bank of Mora, WL 2 50529 (Minn. App. 
1996)(unpublished)(appellants failed to make a sufficient showing of irreparable harm where 
they had a right of redemption). 
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Second, the plaintiffs are protected by title insurance. Defendant believes that the facts 
will establish that a title policy was issued on the subject property in connection with plaintiffs' 
interest therein. Therefore, if the property is sold at the Sheriffs sale and no redemption is made 
within six months, plaintiffs can still file a claim against the title company which insured their 
interest in the property. PTC contends that the title insurance on the property provides plaintiffs 
with an adequate remedy at law. 
Third, plaintiffs have waived their right to seek injunctive relief. A review of the 
trustee's deed manifests that the plaintiffs' chain of title came through a foreclosure sale by the 
trustee. The sale associated with the property was conducted the year 2000 almost three years 
after the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Judgment of the District Court. Moreover, the trustee 
stated that the sale was made without any express or implied warranty of any kind. See Exhibit 
11, at 2). Because plaintiffs obtained the property voluntarily by a sale which was held three 
years after the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District Court, plaintiffs took 
title to the property with notice of the judgment lien thereon. As such, plaintiffs should not be 
allowed to assert a claim for irreparable harm arising from their interest in the property. This is 
especially true when the plaintiffs could have obtained a ruling on the issue of priority before it 
conducted its own sale of the property. 
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REPLY POINT 2 
THE THREATENED INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT 
OUTWEIGH THE INJURY TO PFC IF AN INJUNCTION ISSUES 
PFC stands to suffer financial injury if an injunction issues by the Court. If the Sheriffs 
sale is allowed to go forward, the property will be sold to the highest bidder. This will ensure 
that PFC will receive the proceeds from the sale without bearing any farther risk of loss or 
destruction of the property. If the sale does not go forward, the value of the property could be 
destroyed or diminished through man-made or natural disasters or through other means. 
Moreover, PFC runs the risk of having its judgment lien expire before a foreclosure sale may be 
properly conducted. If PFC sues to renew the judgment, the new judgment lien will lose its 
priority. See Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1988)(priority of judgment lien is 
lost when new judgment is obtained thereon.) 
REPLY POINT 3 
PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS PFC 
Public policy favors the enforcement of judgments that are properly made and entered by 
the Court. A party who buys a property knowing that a judgment lien may exist on the property 
and that underlying judgment is under review by the Utah Supreme Court should bear any risk of 
loss associated therewith. This is especially true in this case where the plaintiffs' interest derives 
from a foreclosure sale that was conducted by the trustee for the benefit of plaintiff Chase 
Manhattan Bank. Why should a creditor be allowed to conduct its own foreclosure sale which 
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foreclosed the owners interest in the property only to turn and argue that it is now entitled to 
quiet title before a judicial sale is conducted? This is especially true where plaintiffs' sale was 
not a judicial sale and there was no right of redemption associated therewith for the judgment 
debtor. 
REPLY POINT 4 
THERE IS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD 
THAT PLAINTIFFS WILL PREVAIL ON THE MERITS 
BASED UPON CONTROLLING UTAH CASE LAW 
Plaintiffs mistakenly argue that the Court of Appeal's decision to vacate the Judgment 
released PFC's judgment lien and allowed Plaintiffs to obtain a deed of trust superior to PFC's 
judgment lien. Plaintiffs suggest that the District Court had the power to vacate its prior 
judgment because the Court of Appeals had remitted the record on appeal to the District Court. 
Plaintiffs' argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Hi-Country Estates Home-
Owners Association v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996). A copy of the decision is 
attached as Exhibit "13." In Hi-Country, like in the instant case, appellants timely filed a 
petition for certiorari but the Court of Appeals remitted the record to the District Court. When 
the appellate record was remitted to the District Court, the District Court modified its judgment 
in accordance with the instructions of the Court of Appeals. The Hi-Country appellants, like 
Plaintiffs in this case, mistakenly asserted that "the remittitur itself... returned jurisdiction to the 
trial court; the court of appeals decision was not automatically stayed; and upon receipt of the 
remittitur the trial court was vested with jurisdiction to issue whatever orders it deemed 
necessary." Hi-Country, 942 P.2d at 306. 
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The Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument and held that even though the 
appellate record had been remitted to the District Court, the District Court never regained 
jurisdiction to modify the judgment because the judgment was still under review by the Utah 
Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The issue is not whether execution may be stayed, but whether the trial court 
regained jurisdiction to enter a judgment or an order of any kind. This case 
exemplifies the basis for the rule prohibiting the trial court from exercising 
jurisdiction in a case while it is on appeal. Here the trial court modified its 
judgment while this court had the same judgment on review. As a result, different 
versions of the same judgment were being analyzed simultaneously at three levels 
of court, presenting the proverbial "moving target" the rule was designed to 
prevent. 
The Court of Appeals erred in remitting the case before the time to seek ^ 
certiorari had expired under the rules and erred again when it refused to Si 
recall its erroneously issued remittitur. The judgment of the district court is 
void because that court had no jurisdiction to enter a judgment while the 
case was still pending in the appellate courts. 
The district court judgment is vacated as void. 
Id., at 307 (emphasis added).4 Accord, White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990)(cThis 
court has long followed the general rule that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case 
while it is under advisement on appeal.") 
The foregoing decision is completely dispositive of the pending case before this Court. 
Even through the record on appeal was remitted by the Utah Court of Appeals to the clerk of the 
District Court, the District Court did not regain jurisdiction over the Judgment because the 
4 twVoid. Of no legal effect; null. The distinction between void and voidable is often of great 
practical importance. Whenever technical accuracy is required, void can be properly applied 
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Judgment was still under review by the Utah Supreme Court. Appropriately, Judge Frederick 
took no action to vacate his Judgment while the Judgment was being reviewed by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Hi-Country from the facts of this case by arguing that 
the appellate court's reversing and remanding the Judgment does not constitute a "modification" 
is unfounded. There is perhaps no greater way to modify a pending judgment than to vacate it 
altogether. Likewise, Plaintiffs' citation to California5 case law regarding the date that a 
judgment is "reinstated" is not relevant in light of the Utah Supreme Court's controlling 
decision. 
Plaintiffs also mistakenly argue that the Court of Appeals decision automatically vacated 
the Judgment without further action by the District Court. This argument is again unfounded. 
The Utah Court of Appeals had pour-over appellate jurisdiction which it received from the Utah 
Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) and 78-2-2(4). Once the Court of 
Appeals made its decision, the Utah Supreme Court had the right upon a grant of certiorari to 
review and alter the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals as a matter of law before the 
Judgment was altered or amended by Judge Frederick. 
only to those provisions that are of no effect whatsoever - those that are an absolute nullity." 
See Black's Dictionary, (7th ed.) at 1568. 
5
 Bulmash v. Davis, 157 Cal.Rptr. 66, 597 P.2d 469, 472-73 (1979). 
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REPLY POINT 5 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO FULL AND ADEQUATE 
SECURITY IF AN INJUNCTION ISSUES BY THE COURT 
In the event that this Court decides to grant a preliminary injunction, the Court should 
"condition issuance of the order or injunction on the giving of security by the applicant, in such 
sum and form as the court deems proper." Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c)(l). The requirement that 
security be posted is important because it "assures the enjoined party that it may readily collect 
damages from funds posted or surety provided in the event that it was wrongfully enjoined." 
Continuum Co. v Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1989). 
Although the purpose for the posting of security is to provide a fund in the event that a 
party is wrongfully enjoined, Rule 65A also states that the "amount of security shall not establish 
or limit the amount of costs, including reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the 
restraining order or preliminary injunction, or damages that may be awarded to a party who is 
found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjoined." Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c)(2). Additionally, 
the Utah Supreme Court has held: "[i]f... it is found that the injunction was wrongfully issued, 
the enjoined party has an action for costs and damages incurred as a result of the wrongfully 
issued injunction." Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 
P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984). 
13 
If the Court issues an injunction, the Court should require Plaintiffs to obtain a bond in 
the amount of at least $400,000 to protect the full value of PFC's lien on the property, and any 
damages and costs associated with the injunction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing independent reasons, the plaintiffs have utterly failed to establish a 
legal right to enjoin the execution sale which has issued from Judge Frederick's Court. 
WHEREFORE, defendant PFC prays the Court to deny plaintiffs' motion for preliminary 
injunction. 
Respectfully submitted this J ^ d a y of C ^ < r ^ - J * ~ — 2001. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEVEN W. CALL 
Attorneys for Principal Funding Corporation 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing sur-reply in 
opposition to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to be served upon plaintiffs' counsel 
by causing the same to be hand delivered on December 3, 2001 to: 
Ronald Russell 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
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TRUST TOTALS Trust Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 







REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 130.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT 
rinted: 11/28/01 14:51:39 Page 1 







REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 180.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT 
Amount Paid: 2 0.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT 
Amount Paid: 5.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: ABSTRACT 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credi t: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT 
Amount Paid: 5.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT 
Amount Paid: 25.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT 
Amount Paid: 20.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 40.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT 
Amount Paid: 40.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
rinted: 11/28/01 14:51:39 Page 2 
\SE NUMBER 930901471 {Civil} 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 20.00 
Amount Credit: 0,00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 2 0.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 20.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 120.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 2 0.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 20.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 20.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 2 0.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: 0.50 
Amount Paid: 0.50 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 4.00 
Amount Paid: 4.00 
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S^E NUMBER 930901471 {Civil} 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: 1.00 
Amount Paid: 1.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 4.25 
Amount Paid: 4.25 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 




























REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: WRIT OF EXECUTION 
Amount Due: 20.00 
Amount Paid: 2 0.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
rinted: 11/28/01 14:51:39 Page 4 
ASE NUMBER 930901471 {Civil} 
Balance: 





















REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: 9.50 
Amount Paid: 9.50 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: BAIL 
Posted By: KIRTON MCCONKIE POELMAN 
Posted: 300.00 
Forfeited: 0.00 














** ON APPEAL 
DECISION 
** HOLDING ORDER FOR STAY-NEED REQUEST FOR 
ROCEEDINGS 
3-15-93 Filed: Complaint 
3-15-93 Judge FREDERICK assigned. 
3-15-93 Fee Account created Total Due: 130.00 
convert 
convert 
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COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC Payment Received: 130.00 
Note: CV FILING/JURY DEMAND 
Note: FILED: COMPLAINT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED) 
SUMMONS TO MEDICODE ON RETURN 
SUMMONS ON RETURN SERVED (EUGENE HORBACH) 
MEDICODE'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
HORBACH'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 





















MEDICODE'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 

































































































& SIGNED: EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING PRE-JUDGMENT WRIT 
luannh 
ATTACHMENT AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SCH 8/5/93 AT 
luannh 
COPY OF FIDELITY BOND FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT 
luannh 
& DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND $10,000.00) ORIGINAL 
luannh 
DOWNSTAIRS WITH BONDS luannh 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL (SAMUEL D MCVEY) luannh 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF ATTACHMENT 
luannh 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAN C ENGLAND 
NOTICE OF FILING $10,000 BOND 
: PRE-JUDGMENT WRIT OF ATTACHMENT (S.L. COUNTY) 
MEDICODE'S MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE PREJUDGMENT WRIT 
luannh 
ATTACHMENT OR TO ENJOIN ITS ENFORCEMENT AGAINST 
luannh 
MEDICODE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
THE PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF ATTACHMENT OR TO ENJOIN 
ENFORCEMENT AGAINST MEDICODE 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL (RICHARD D BURBIDGE) 





AFFIDAVIT OF EUGENE HORBACH 
93 Order to Show Cause scheduled on August 05, 
Fourth Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK. 
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PARTE ORDER GRANTING PREJUDGMENT WIRT OF 































MINUTE ENTRY - HRG HELD ON DEFTS' RESPECTIVE 
cindyb 
DISSOLVE PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF ATTACHMENT. THE COURTcindyb 
DETERMINES THE WRIT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED AND ORDERS 
cindyb 
THE PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF ATTACHMENT CONTINUE AS cindyb 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. cindyb 
EXHIBIT SHEET cindyb 


















AND OSC ON RETURN SERVED (EUGENE HORBACH) SCH 
10:00 AM 
EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING PREJUDGMENT WIRT OF 
AND OSC ON RETURN SERVED (EUGENE HORBACH) SCH 
10:00 AM 
PRE-JUDGMENT WRIT OF ATTACHMENT ON RETURN SERVED 
HORBACH) 
PRE-JUDGMENT WRIT OF ATTACHMENT ON RETURN SERVED 
HORBACH) 
FILED: PRE-JUDGMENT WRIT OF ATTACHMENT ON RETURN SERVED 
EUGENE HORBACH WITH ATTATCHED PRAECIPE 
& SIGNED: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 




CONTINUING PRE-JUDGMENT WRIT OF ATTACHMENT 
COVER LETTER FROM JEFF B. SKOUBYE 
COVER LETTER FROM JEFF B. SKOUBYE 
& SIGNED: AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
cindyb 
& SIGNED: AMENDED ORDER CONTINUING PRE-JUDGMENT 
cindyb 
ATTACHMENT AND ENJOINING TRANSFER, ENCUMBRANCE OR cindyb 
DISPOSITION OF STOCK 
CERTIFICATION OF READINESS FOR TRIAL 
MOTION FOR PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on October 05, 1993 
in Fourth Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK. 
)-08-93 Note: TEL scheduled for 10/05/93 at 0830 A in room 
with JDF 
'-20-93 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF OFFICE RELOCATION (STEVEN L. TAYLOR) 
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Pretrial Conference scheduled on December 13, 1993 at 08:30 AM 
in Fourth Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK. 
Note: Scheduling Order and Trial Notice 
Note: PTC scheduled for 12/13/93 at 0830 A in room F 
with JDF 
Note: TRJ scheduled for 12/21/93 at 
with JDF 
STIPULATION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT MEDICODE, 
& SIGNED: ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANT MEDICODE, 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
STIPULATION RE WAIVER OF JURY 
& SIGNED: ORDER RE WAIVER OF JURY 




































































COUNTERCLAIM, AND TO EXTEND DISCOVERY PERIOD 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
: COVER LETTER FROM STEVEN L. TAYLOR 
: NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFT HORBACH'S MOTION 
CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL, LEAVE TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM 
EXTEND DISCOVERY PERIOD 
: MINUTE ENTRY - DEFT HORBACH'S MOTION FOR 
OF 
TRIAL, ETC IS DENIED. COUNSEL FOR PLTF TO PREPARE 
(GEORGE TINGO JR) 












NOTICE TO WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on January 25 
in Fourth Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK. 
Note: TEL scheduled for 01/25/94 at 0830 A in room F 
with JDF 
Pretrial Conference scheduled on March 14, 1994 at 08:30 AM in 
Fourth Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK. 
Bench Trial scheduled on March 22, 1994 at 10:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK. 
Note: Scheduling Order and Trial Notice 
Note: PTC scheduled for 03/14/94 at 0830 A in room F 
with JDF 
Note: TRL scheduled for 03/22/94 at 1000 A in room F 
with JDF 
Note: FILED: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Note: FILED: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Note: FILED: AFFIDAVIT OF FILING OF UNSIGNED DEPOSITION-LAN C 
ENGLAND 
Note: FILED: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE (WESLEY FELIX 
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^SE NUMBER 930901471 {Civil} 
DISCOVERY) 
3-17-94 Note: FILED: 
8/5/93 




























REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS PROCEEDINGS ON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (DEFT'S ANSWERS TO PLTF'S 
OF INTERROGATORIES & REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION TO 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
94 Judgment #1 Entered 












TRL HELD. COURT GRANTS DEFT'S 
AMEND PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE AND 





S. CROCKETT TO PREPARE THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT. 
TRIAL MEMORANDUM (DEFT) 
PLAINTIFF LAN C. ENGLAND'S TRIAL BRIEF 
DEPOSITION OF LAN C. ENGLAND 
EXHIBIT SHEET 
Case judgment is Trial Judgment 
94 Note: FIELD: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ON RETURN SERVED (MEDICODE 
INCORP) 
94 Note: FIELD: PLAINTIFF LAN C ENGLAND'S OBJECITONS TO THE 
PROPOSED 
94 Note: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT 

































MINUTE ENTRY - PLTF'S OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT ARE DENIED. THIS COURT IS PERSUADED 
FINDINGS & JUDGMENT ARE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE 






94 Bail Account created 
COVER LETTER FROM WESLEY D. FELIX 
& SIGNED: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
& SIGNED: JUDGMENT 
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGE'S RULING DATED 
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kSE NUMBER 930901471 {Civil} 
Payment Received: 300.00 
180.00 
5-17-94 Bail Posted 
Note: COST BOND 
•17-94 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF POSTING OF BOND 
•17-94 Note: ISSUED: SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER TO LAN C. ENGLAND 
17-94 Note: 5/26/94 @ 8:30 A WITH JDF 
•18-94 Fee Account created Total Due: 180.00 
•18-94 COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC Payment Received: 
Note: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
•18-94 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
•19-94 Note: FILED: MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT OF 
BOND 
5-19-94 Note: FORWARDED COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT 
5-23-94 Note: FILED: MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL 










































SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER ON RETURN 





94 Note: FILED: 
94 Note: FILED: 
ATTORNEY-SUPP 
94 Note: ORDER IS CONTINUED WITHOUT DATE 
94 Fee Account created Total Due: 
94 GARNISHMENT Payment Received: 
Note: WRIT OF GARNISHMENTS 
94 Note: FILED: APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (BRIGHTON BANK) 
APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (KEY BANK) 
APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (FIRST SECURITY BANK) 
APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK) 
94 Fee Account created Total Due: 5.00 
94 GARNISHMENT Payment Received: 5.00 
Note: WRIT OF EXECUTION 
94 Note: ISSUED: WRIT OF EXECUTION (SALT LAKE COUNTY) 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (NOT FOR GARNISHMENT OF 
luannh 






















































WITH ATTATCHED INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE 
WRIT OF GARNISHEMTN ON RETURN FROM (KEY BANK OF 
WITH ATTATCHED INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE 
RELEASE OF GARNISHMENT 





RELEASE OF GARNISHMENT (FIRST SECURITY BANK) 
RELEASE OF GARNISHMENT (BRIGHTON BANK) 
RELEASE OF GARNISHMENT (KEY BANK OF UTAH) 
ANSWERS TO GARNISHEE (FIRST SECURITY BANK) 
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FILED: LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT NO, 940284 nms 
FILED: REQUEST FOR COPY OF PARTIAL TRIAL TRANSCRIPT luannh 
FILED: REPORTER'S COMMUNICATION IN RE APPEAL TRANSCRIPT luannh 













3-01-94 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO SUBPOENA DUCES 
FILED: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ON RETURN SERVED 
NATIONAL BANK 
FILED: REPORTER'S NOTICE OF FILING APPEAL TRANSCRIPT 











FILED: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ON RETURN SERVED (BRIGHTON 
luannh 
FILED: LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT (POURED OVER TO COURT OFbha 
APPEALS) bha 


































Total Due: 25 
Payment Received: 
00 
95 Fee Account created 
95 ABSTRACT 
Note: TRANSCIPT 
95 Fee Account created 
95 GARNISHMENT 
Note: WRIT OF EX FILING FEE 
95 Note: ISSUED: WRIT OF EXECUTION (S.L. 
95 Fee Account created 
95 GARNISHMENT 
Note: 5 GARNISHMENTS 
95 Note: FILED: APPLICATION (5) 
95 Note: ISSUED: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO OMNI PLANNERS, 
95 Note: ISSUED: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO RETAIL SYSTEMS 
INTERNATIONAL 
95 Note: ISSUED 
95 Note: ISSUED 
95 Note: ISSUED 
PROCEDURAL 
95 Note: 
95 Note: ISSUED 
95 Note: FILED: 
ACAD 
95 Note: 
95 Note: FILED: 
RETAIL 
95 Note: 
95 Note: FILED: 
95 Note: 



















WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO COMPACT CLASSICS 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO HOSPITAL SERVICES CORP 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO AMERICAN ACADEMY OF 
anned 
CODERS INC. anned 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER RETURNABLE 4/20/95 AT 8:30 AM luannh 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN SERVED (UT AMERICAN 
luannh 
luannh OF PROCEDURAL CODERS INC) 
WIRT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN SERVED (ST OF UTAH 
SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) ON RETURN SERVED 
STATE OF UT HOSPITAL SERVICE CORP OF AMERICA 
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\SE NUMBER 930901471 {Civil} 
FILED: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN SERVED(OMNI PLANNERS 
-07-95 Note: 
INC) 
-07-95 Note: FILED: SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER ON RETURN SERVED (LAN C. 
ENGLAND) 
-07-95 Note: SCH 4/20/95 AT 8:30 
-10-95 Supplemental Order scheduled on April 20, 1995 at 08:30 AM in 
3rd Floor Room 303 with Judge NOT A JUDGE. 
-20-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY- BASED ON NON APPEARANCE THE SUPP 
ORDER 
Note: IS DISMISSED. 
Fee Account created Total Due: 20.00 
•20-95 
•02-95 
•02-95 Payment Received: 
• 0 4 - 9 5 
• 0 4 - 9 5 




Note: ISSUED: WRIT OF EXECUTION (S.L. COUNTY) 
WRIT OF EXECUTION ON RETURN 






















































































Fee Account c 
COMPLAINT-NO 
OF PROCEDURAL CODERS) 
WRIT OF GARNISHEMNT ON RETURN SERVED 
CORPORATION) 





MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUZANNE WEST 
OSC RETURNABLE 6/5/95 AT 
OSC RETURNABLE 6/5/95 AT 
OSC RETURNABLE 6/5/95 AT 
OSC RETURNABLE 6/5/95 AT 
OSC RETURNABLE 6/5/95 AT 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE/OMNI PLANNERS INC. 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE/RETAIL SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE/COMPACE CLASSICS INC. 












































ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE/AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PROCEDURAL 
reated 40,00 Total Due: 
AMT SPC Payment Received: 40.00 
Note: 2 GARNISHMENTS 
Order to Show Cause scheduled on June 05, 1995 at 09:00 AM in 
Fourth Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK. 
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0 6 - 9 5 
0 6 - 9 5 
0 6 - 9 5 
0 6 - 9 5 
1 2 - 9 5 




















GARNISHMENTS. THE COURT GRANTS RELIEF AS PRAYED 
TO ATTORNEY WEST'S REVIEW OF THE COURT'S FILE TO 
NO ANSWERS TO THE GARNISHMENTS HAVE BEEN FILED. 
GRANTS REASONABLE ATTY'S FEES. COUNSEL TO SUBMIT 







































APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL) 
APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL) 
Total Due: 40.00 
Payment Received: 40.00 
GARNISHEMNT/1 WRIT OF EXECUTION 
EXECUTION (UN-SERVED) 
WRIT OF EXECUTION (S.L. COUNTY) 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (AMERICAN ACADEMY ) 
APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
COPY LETTER TO SUZANNE WEST FROM TERRI ELDREDGE 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) FROM HOSPITAL SERVICES 
AMERICA) WITH ATTATCHED INTERROGATORIES TO 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) FROM RETAIL SYSTEMS 
WITH ATTATCHED INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE 
WRIT OF GARNISHEMNT FROM OMNI PLANNERS INC WITH 
INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE 
























CODERS INC WITH ATTATCHED INTERROGATORIES TO 
luannh 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT FROM COMPACT CLASSICE INC WITHluannh 
ATTATCHED INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE luannh 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN (AMERICAN ACADEMY OFjulier 
PROCEDURAL CODERS, INC.) 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN 
INTERNATIONAL INC) 












5-14-95 Note: RECORD 
ENV)_ 
5-14-95 Note: 
5-16-95 Note: FILED: 
5-16-95 Note: 
julier 
julier ON RETURN (CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL INC) 
(FILE-1 VOL, TRANS-3 VOL, DEPO-1 VOL, EXHIBITS-2 
bha 
TRANSMITTED TO COURT OF APPEALS - CO.A.#940695-CAbha 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT AND ATTACHED ANSWERS ON RETURNjulier 
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PROCEDURAL CODERS julier 
rinted: 11/28/01 14:51:41 Page 13 












•95 Note: FILED: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT AND ATTACHED ANSWERS ON RETURNjulier 
•95 Note: CRYSTAL INTERTERNATIONAL julier 























95 Note: (CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL) 
9 5 Note: FILED: REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES 
95 Note: FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND REQUEST FOR 
HEARING 
95 Note: (REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES) ORAL ARGUMENT 
REQUESTED 
95 Note: FILED: REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES 
95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY - DEFT'S NOTICE TO SUBMIT ON ITS 
REPLY TO 







SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REPLY ITSELF. THE MATTER 















REQUEST FOR DECISION. 
95 Fee Account created Total Due: 
95 COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC Payment Received: 
Note: GARNISHMENT 
95 Note: FILED: APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
95 Note: ISSUED; WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL) 
95 Note: FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND REQUEST FOR 
HEAIRNG 
95 Note: (REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES) 
95 Note: FILED: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT OPN RETURN SERVED (CRYSTAL 
INTERNAT) 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN SERVED (CRYSTAL INT) 
luannh 
ATTATCHED INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE luannh 
MINUTE ENTRY - THERE BEING NO TIMELY OPPOSITION TO 
cindyb 


















SOUGHT THEREIN IS GRANTED AS PRAYED. COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANT TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE ORDER & 
JUDGMENTS. 
•95 Note: FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND REQUEST FOR 
HEARING 
•95 Note: (REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES 6/2 6/95 
•95 Fee Account created Total Due: 20.00 
•95 COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC Payment Received: 20.00 
Note: GARNISHMENT 
•95 Note: FILED: APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
•95 Note: ISSUED: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL) 
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SET ASIDE GARNISHMENT"DEFAULT 
OF TERRILL ELDREDGE 
SET ASIDE "DEFAULT" 
OF TERRILL ELDREDGE 
SET ASIDE "DEFAULT" 
OF TERRILL ELDREDGE 
SET ASIDE "DEFAULT" 
OF TERRILL ELDREDGE 
SET ASIDE "DEFAULT" 
Total Due: 
Payment Received: 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN 
INC) WITH 
IN SUPPORT OF 
RULING 
IN SUPPORT OF 
RULING 
IN SUPPORT OF 
RULING 


















ATTATCHED INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE luannh 
APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL) 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO GARNISHEES' MOTIONS 
ASIDE RULING 
AFFIDAVIT OF CATHIE SMITH 
MINUTE ENTRY - PLTF'S REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
REPLY, ETC. FILED JUNE 26, 1995 IS DENIED. THIS 














OF SUZANNE WEST REGARDING ATTORNEYS FEES 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ON GARNISHEES 
luannh 
luannh 
OF SUZANNE WEST REGARDING ATTORNEYS FEES 
COSTS INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH REPLY TO 
ANSWERS 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN SERVED (CRYSTAL 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
GARNISHEE' 
AFFIDAVIT 
S MOTION TO SET ASIDE RULING 
OF TERRILL ELDREDGE IN SUPPORT OFF 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
GARNISHEE' 
NOTICE OF 
S MOTION TO SET ASIDE RULING 
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Note: FILED: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) ANSWER (CRYSTASL 
INTERNATIONAL 
Note: FILED: OBJECTION TO ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Note: FILED: OBJECTION TO ORDER REGARDING HORBACH'S REPY TO 
Note: GARNISHEE ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES 
Fee Account created Total Due: 120.00 
COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC Payment Received: 120.00 
GARNISHMENTS 
APPLICATION (6) 






: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO 
: WRIT OG GARNISHMENT TO 
: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO 
: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO 
: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO COMPANT CALSSICS, INC 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION ORAL ARGUMENT 
(MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE GARNISHMENT "DEFAULT" 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) ON RETURN COMPACT 














Note: CORPORATION OF AMERIFAN 
Note: FILED: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN 
INTERNATIONAL INC 





















HOSPITAL SERVICES CORP 
CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL 
OMNI PLANNERS, INC 









PROCEDURAL CODERS INC 
WRIT OF GARNICHMENT ON RETURN (WAGE) CRYSTAL 
NATIONAL INC 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) ON RETURN OMNI PLANNERS 
THIRD NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION (DEF PROP 
OSC & PLA OBJECTION TO OSC) 
FOURTH NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION (DEF PROP 
REGARDING HORBACH'S REPLY TO GARNISHEE ANSWERS TO 
INTERROGATORIES) 
MINUTE ENTRY - GARNISHEES' MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE 

































WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) ANSWER AMERICAN ACADEMY 
cindyb 
cindyb 
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3-24-95 Note: FILED: WRIT 
SERVICES 
Note: CORP 
Note: FILED: WRIT 
INTERNATIONAL 
Note: INC 















PROCEDURAL CODERS INC 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) ANSWER COMPACT 
OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) ANSWER HOSPITAL 
OF AMERICFA 
OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) ANSWER CRYSTAL 





















PERSONAL SERVICE) ANSWER CRYSTASL INTERNATIONAL 
















REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES 
MINUTE ENTRY - DEFENDANT'S SO CALLED "THIRD" AND 
"FOURTH" NOTICE TO SUBMIT ARE STRICKEN AS UTTERLYluannh 
CONFUSED OR AT BEST CONFUSING TO THIS COURT. THE 
luannh 























Fee Account created 
COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Note: GARNISHMENT 
Note: FILED: APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT 
Note: ISSUED: WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL) 
Note: FILED: SIXTH WRIT OF GARNISHMENT SERVED (CRYSTAL 
INTERNATIONAL) 
Fee Account created 
COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Note: GARNISHMENT 
Note: FILED: APPLICATION 






15-95 Note: FILED 
INTERNA-
Note: 



























SIXTH WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) ANSWER CRYSTAL 
INTERNATIONAL 
SEVENTH WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (WAGE) ANSWER CRYSTAL 
INTERNATIONAL INC 
EXECUTION (HEARING REQUEST ATTACHED 
EXECUTION (HEARING REQUEST ATTACHED 
created Total Due: 20.00 
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• 0 1 
• 0 1 
• 0 1 
• 0 2 
• 2 1 
• 2 2 
• 2 2 
2 2 
• 0 6 
• 0 6 
• 0 6 
• 0 6 
• 0 6 
• 0 6 








•95 Note: ISSUED: EIGHTH WRIT OF GARNISHMENTS) CRYSTAL 
INTERNATIONAL marleneb 
•95 Note: FILED: EIGHTH WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN (CRYSTAL 
INTER) anitag 
•95 Note: FILED: EIGHTH WRIT OF GARNISHMENT WITH ATTACHED 
INTERROGATORIES anitag 
•95 Fee Account created Total Due: 20.00 convert 
•95 COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC Payment Received: 20.00 lauriec 
Note: GARNISHMENT 
•95 Note: FILED: EIGHTH WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ON RETURN julier 
(CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL) julier 
FILED: APPLICATION FOR GARNISHMENT juliep 
ISSUED: NINTH WRIT OF GARNISHMENT (CRYSTAL INTERNATIONAL)juliep 







95 Note: FILED: 
95 Note: 
95 Note: RECORD RECEIVED 
ENVELOPES 
95 Note: FILED: 
INTERNATIONAL) 
LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT (PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERT FILED - SUPREME COURT NO. 950506) 











9 6 Note: 
96 Note: 
9 7 Note: 
97-680 
9 7 Note: 







REMITTITUR RECEIVED COURT OF APPEALS NO 
(REVERSED AND REMANDED) 
FILED: REMITTITUR (REVERSED #2191332) 
FILED: WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL (DEF) 
FILED: LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT 
SUPPL INDEX: CERT/COPY OF SUPPL INDEX SENT TO SUPREME 
susanc 
SUPPL RECORD (WHOLE RECORD OF FILES-2,TRANS-3,DEPO-1,susanc 
EXHIBITS-2 ENV) TRANSMITTED TO SUPREME COURT 










REVERSES THE PRIOR DECISION OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS) 
FILED: REMITTITUR RECEIVED FROM SUPREME COURT-REVERSED 
RECORD: FILES-2, TRANS-3, DEPO-1, EXH-2 ENV) RECEIVED 
GAVE FILES TO DAVE SHEWELL-FILED TRANS/DEPO DOWNSTAIRS susanc 
9 7 Tracking started for Order to Show Cause. Review date Feb 20, 
1998. 
9 7 Note: Began tracking Exhibit 
02/20/98 
99 Trust Account created Total Due: 
99 Bail Refunded Payment Received: 
99 Bail/Bond Refund Payment Received: 
99 Note: 










•99 Note: Check #8845 mailed to Kirton & McConkie 
#1800 Salt Lake City UT 84111 
-28-99 Received: April 28, 1999 
Container: * Location: * 
60 E So Temple 
cindyn 
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&SE NUMBER 930901471 {Civil} 
4-28-99 Notice - EVIDNOTC for Case 930901471 ID 326201 Susies 
Three months have elapsed since the final disposition of this case 
and no appeal or request for rehearing has been made. Pursuant to 
the Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-206(9), you are notified 
that unless you withdraw the exhibits or file a written objection 
within 30 days, the exhibits will be disposed of pursuant to the 





































































Tracking ended for Exhibit. 
Filed: Notice of Intent 
Fee Account created 
Fee Account created 




Fee Account created 
Fee Account created 




Fee Account created 
COPY FEE 
Fee Account created 
COPY FEE 
Fee Account created 
COPY FEE 



















Issued: Writ of Execution 
Filed: Praecipe for Writ 
Fee Account created 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 














ion: WRIT OF EXECUTION 
Issued: Writ of Execution 
Clerk karries 
Filed return: Writ of Execution - Levy Recorded 
Service Type: 
Fee Account created 
COPY FEE 
Fee Account created 
COPY FEE 
Fee Account created 
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Tab 2 
/28/2001 
land v. Horbach 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Docket Event Listing 
•- . . lucrsigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of 
. 1 . , iic hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
. u. and correct copy of an original document 
\. m trie Utah Court of Appeals. In testimony 
;o', i have set my hand and affixed the seal of 
^OUft. 
&LUctti> S&CL 
ket No: 941695 Docket Date: 11/16/1994 
. Type: Civil Appeal 
Agency: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
Status: Closed 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Qburjh 
Case: 930901%! rtff^^jtfjj 
C. England - Appellant 
SAMUEL D. MCVEY ( KIRTON & MCCONKIE ) 
RANDY T. AUSTIN ( KIRTON & MCCONKIE ) 
ene Horbach - Appellee 
STEVEN G. CROCKETT ( BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY ) 
STEVEN L. TAYLOR ( MABEY & COOMBS, L.C. ) 
icode Incorporated - Appellee 
STEVEN G. CROCKETT ( BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY ) 
STEVEN E. MCCOWIN ( ATTORNEY AT LAW ) 
WESLEY D. FELIX ( BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY ) 
xit 
36/09/1994 Notice of Appeal Filed 
)6/23/1994 Default Letter Sent 
: have notice re transcript filed within 10 days. 
)6/30/1994 Transcript Request Received 
i Bennett, reporter. Dated June 30th. Unidentified dates 
16/30/1994 Docketing Statement Filed 
7/07/1994 Ack. of Request for Transcript 
Bennett received request July 1st. Will file Aug. 1st 
7/13/1994 Extension of Time for Summ. DiGranted 07/13/1994 RCH 
llee's stipulated motion to July 27th to file motion 
summary disposition 
7/21/1994 Extension of Time for Summ. DiGranted 07/26/1994 RCH 
llee's ex parte motion for enlargement to 4 days after 
ipt of transcript to file motion for summary disp. 
8/09/1994 Notice of Transcript Filed in 
Bennett filed transcript Aug. 5th. 
8/11/1994 Motion-Appellee-Summary DisposDenied 10/04/1994 
8/18/1994 Extension of Time-Misc. Granted 08/19/1994 RCH 
llant's motion for 14-day extension to Sept. 7th to 
response to motion for summary disp. 
9/07/1994 Opposition to Motion 
randum of points and authorities in opposition to 
Llee's motion for summary affirmance. 
10/04/1994 Motion-Appellee-Summ Disp Deni 
ties should proceed to the next step in the appeal 
cess because the time is no longer suspended under RIO. 
11/14/1994 Transfer to CA per Sec 78 
11/16/1994 Received from Supreme Court(po 
d copy of cost bond. Need copy of record index to 
briefing. 
11/22/1994 Cost Bond 
12/08/1994 Record Index Filed-With Transc 
-llant's brief is due Jan. 20, 1995. 
H/20/1995 Appellant's Brief Filed 
)2/21/1995 Appellee's Brief Filed 
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for Appellant 
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Appellees 
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BILLINGS, Judge: ! 
Plaintiff, Lan C. England, appeals from the trial court's 
dismissal of his complaint and judgment in favor of defendant, 
Eugene Horbach. Plaintiff contends the crial court erred when it 
held the parties' accord and satisfaction was unenforceable. We 
agree and therefore reverse and remand-1 
1. Because we conclude cne crial court erred when it found the 
accord and satisfaction was unenforceable, we need not react 
plaintiff's remaining claims on appeal. Moreover, we vacate the 
trial court's judgment based upcn defendant's counterclaim, as 
defendant's right to reimbursement for overpayment was settled 
under the accord and satisfaction. 
FACTS 
In late 19 8 9 or early 1990, plaintiff and defendant entered 
into a contract: whereby defendant agreed to purchase 253,363 
shares of Medicode snook from plaintiff. The parties agreed the 
purchase price would be $2.75 per share, resulting in a tonal 
purchase price of $710,498.25. At trial, plaintiff testified and 
defendant did not dispute, that the purchase money was to be paid 
within the first: .quarter of 1990. Defendant made periodic 
payments on the stock an least through September 1990. 
In May 1991, at defendant's request, the parties met to 
finalize the stock purchase. At this time, plaintiff still 
retained the stock certificates and believed defendant owed 
additional money on the original purchase agreement. Plaintiff 
also believed defendant had breached the original stock purchase 
agreement by failing to pay the entire amount: within the agreed 
time. At the May meeting, plaintiff informed defendant that at 
least $25,000 was still owing under the original purchase 
agreement. Defendant did not dispute that amount. The parties 
then reached an agreement whereby defendant agreed to remit to 
plaintiff an additional $25,000 and hold in trust two percent of 
the Medicode stock for plaintiff. In return, plaintiff agreed to 
immediately transfer to defendant the stock certificates and to 
forego his right to sue for defendant's breach of the original 
agreement. 
At trial, both parties agreed that plaintiff would not have 
transferred the stock certificates- to defendant had the second 
agreement not been entered into. Further, both plaintiff and 
defendant testified that at the May meeting both believed that 
money was still owing under the original contract. 
In December 1992, pursuant to the second agreement, 
plaintiff made a demand for the two percent Medicode stock that 
defendant was purportedly holding in trust for him. Defendant, 
however, refused to produce the stock, contending that the two 
percent agreement was meant only to secure defendant's payment of 
the additional $25,000. Plaintiff therefore sued defendant for 
breach of the two percent agreement. Prior to trial, defendant 
discovered additional business records which defendant claimed 
documented that, before entering into the second agreement, he 
had actually overpaid plaintiff for the purchase of the Medicode 
stock. 
A bench trial was held on March 22, 1994. The court ruled 
that plaintiff could not enforce the second agreement as an 
accord and satisfaction because in was not supported by 
ccnsideranion and because it was based upon a mutual mistake that 
defendant owed additional money on the original agreement. The 
crial court therefore dismissed olamniff s complaint and entered 
judgment in favor of defendant based upon his "counterclaim" 
alleging that, an the time the second agreement was entered, 
defendant had already overpaid plaintiff for the Medicode stock. 
ACCORD AUD SATISFACTION 
It is settled that 
?I
 [a] n accord and satisfaction arises when the 
parties to a contract: mutually agree than a 
performance different than that required by 
the original contract will be made in 
substitution of the performance originally 
agreed upon and that the substituted 
agreement calling for a different performance 
will discharge the obligation created under 
the original agreement. ,f 
KTeiderhauser Builders & Dev. Cairo. v. Campbell, 324 P.2d 1193, 
1197 (Utah App. 19 92} (quoting Tebbs. Smith & Assocs. v. Brooks, 
735 P. 2d 13 05, 13 07 (Utah 1986)) . Moreover, for an accord and 
satisfaction to have any legal effect, the elements of a 
contract, including consideration, must be present. Id. at 1197-
98. The elements of an accord and satisfaction include: 
(i) a bona fide dispute [or uncertainty] over 
an unliquidated amount; (ii) a payment 
tendered in full settlement of the entire 
dispute; and (iii) an acceptance of the 
payment. 
Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. , 844 P. 2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992) (citing 
Mart on Remodeling v. Jensen, 70S P,2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985)); 
accord Neiderhauser, 824 P.2d at 1197-98. 
A. Consideration2 
In its first claim of error, plaintiff contends the trial 
court erred when it concluded the second agreement did not 
constitute an accord and satisfaction because there was no 
2. Defendant alleges that plaintiff should be precluded from 
raising this issue on appeal because it was not raised at trial. 
A careful review of the record, however, reveals that whether the 
second agreement was predicated on sufficient consideration was, 
m fact, raised by plaintiff at trial. Mere significantly, 
consideration formed one basis for the trial court's 
determination that the accord and satisfaction was unenforceable. 
consideration to support that agreement. In Utah, i t i s c lear 
than considerat ion for an accord may consist: of a compromise of a 
bona fide dispute or uncer ta in ty as to the amount actual ly owing. 
See, e.g. , Golden Kev Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 733" 
(Utah 1985} (holding suf f ic ien t considerat ion e x i s t s when 
credi tor agrees to accept l esser amount than i s due where bona 
fide dispute as to amount i s present) ; Suaarhouse Fin. Co. v. 
Anderson! 510 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980) ( s t a t ing where 
underlying claim i s uncer ta in , assent to d e f i n i t e payment amounts 
to suf f ic ient considerat ion) ; accord In re Es ta te of Grimm, 784 
P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah App. 1989), ce r t , denied, 752 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1990) . Moreover, ,! [i] t i s not necessary for the dispute 
[or uncertainty] to be well-founded so long as i t i s in good 
faith. '1 Golden Kev, 599 P. 2d at 733; see a lso Ashton v. Skeen, 
85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 1073, 107S (1935). 
Thus, i f the p a r t i e s in good fa i th be l ieve there i s a 
disputed or uncer ta in claim, mere set t lement of the amount due 
and acceptance of t ha t amount cons t i tu tes the consideration 
necessary to support the contract . Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 
325; accord Golden Kev, 699 P.2d at 733; Ashton, 39 P.2d at 1076. 
In the i n s t an t case , p l a in t i f f received several checks from 
defendant in p a r t i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n of the o r i g i n a l agreement over 
a nine month per iod . P l a in t i f f believed defendant s t i l l owed 
between $25,000 and $75,000 on the o r ig ina l purchase agreement. 
When the p a r t i e s met a t defendant 's request in May 1991, 
p l a in t i f f informed defendant of the amount he bel ieved was then 
due and offered to s e t t l e the or ig inal cont rac t for an addit ional 
$25,000 and two percent of the Medicode s tock. Defendant did not 
dispute t h i s claim, as he was equally unsure of the amount then 
owing on the o r i g i n a l purchase agreement. Rather, he accepted 
the proposal in the i n t e r e s t of resolving the mat ter . 
At tha t meeting, defendant was i n t e r e s t e d in ge t t ing the 
stock c e r t i f i c a t e s and p l a i n t i f f was i n t e r e s t e d in ge t t ing paid 
the ful l purchase p r i c e . Although unfounded, p l a i n t i f f asserted 
in good f a i t h tha t he bel ieved addit ional money was- s t i l l owing. 
Defendant accepted t h i s representat ion without dispute and 
accepted p l a i n t i f f ' s r eso lu t ion proposal. The May 1991 agreement 
re f lec t s the p a r t i e s ' good"faith bargain regarding an uncertain 
claim. We conclude the t r i a l court erred when in determined the 
second agreement: was not: supported by cons idera t ion and was 
therefore unenforceable.3 
3. Moreover, we note tha t courts have found chat forbearance to 
prosecute a l ega l ly enforceable claim or to perform an ace which 
one i s not otherwise l ega l ly bound co perform provides suff icient 
considerat ion. Safety Fed. Sav. & Lean Ass'n v. Thurston, 648 
(continued.. .) 
B. Mutual Mistake 
Plaintiff further claims the trial court erred when it held 
that because neither party was aware that defendant: had already 
paid the original purchase agreement in full, a mutual mistake-"of 
fact precluded the enforcement of the accord and satisfaction. 
An accord and satisfaction based upon a mutual mistake as to 
a material fact can be rescinded by either party. Deibel v. 
Kreiss, 50 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943); 6 Arthur L. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1292, at 178 (1962). ,fXA mutual 
mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, 
share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon 
which they based their bargain.' ,! Desioain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 
254, 258 (Utah App. 1993) 1quoting Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 
656
 f 663 (Utah App. 1992)). Thus, an accord and satisfaction may 
be rescinded where there is a mutual mistake as to the bargain 
giving rise to the accord. 
Accepting the facts as found by the trial court, at the May 
1991 meeting, the parties were indeed mistaken that additional 
money was owed under the original agreement. However, this 
mistake did not go to the terms of the parties' accord; rather, 
it merely demonstrates cheir accord was indeed a compromise of a 
bona fide dispute which was not necessarily well-founded, but was 
made in good faith. See In re Estate of Grimm, 784 P. 2d 123 8, 
1244 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
In the instant case, both parties were uncertain as to the 
amount that remained owing on the original contract when they 
entered into their agreement. Although mistaken as to whether 
money was then owing, the parties were clearly not mistaken as to 
the agreement they reached to compromise a good faith, though 
mistaken, claim. The accord and satisfaction accurately reflects 
the intent of the parties at the time it was entered. There was 
3 . (. . .continued) 
P.2d 267, 270 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); accord Sucarhouse Fin. Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980) ; Long v. Forbes, 136 
P.2d 242, 246-47 (Wyo. 1943). Thus, ffAthe giving of further time 
for the payment of an existing debt by a valid agreement, for any 
period however short, . . . is a valuable consideration, and is 
sufficient to support:'!l a contract. Farmers & Merchants State 
Bank v. niacins, 89 P.2d 915, 917 (Kan. 1939) (citation emitted); 
accord Suaarhouse Fin., 510 P.2d at 1372. 
In the instant case, although the entire debt was to be paid 
within the first quarter of 1990, plaintiff extended payment 
thrcuah 1991. 
therefore no mistake regarding a basic assumption underlying the 
accord and satisfaction, thus, it is not void-4 
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the 
accord and satisfaction unenforceable for lack of consideration 
and because we conclude the agreement was not: founded upon a 
mutual mistake of fact, we reverse and remand for further action 
consistent with this opinion. 
uuditii M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
s/rresian Gregory K^cnieTTP esiaiiig Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
4. To illustrate the difference between a bona fide uncertainty 
which is compromised by an accord and satisfaction from a mutual 
mistake going to the essence of the accord, the following example 
is helpful. If, in this case, the parties had agreed to exchange 
$25,000 for 258,3 63 shares of stock which both parties believed 
was transferable and it was then discovered the stock was not 
transferable, a mutual mistake as to the essence of the accord 
and satisfaction would be present. Under such a scenario, the 
mistake--that the stock was transferable--goes directly to a 
basic assumption underlying the substitute agreement and 
therefore constitutes a mutual mistake which voids that 
agreement. In the instant case, the parties were mistaken as to 
facts relevant to the original contract--whether money was zhen 
due and owing--not as to a term underlying the accord and 
satisfaction. 
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DEED OF TRUST 
LAW 
THIS DEED OF TRUST ("Secunty Instrument") is made on May 2 4 , 1396 
C, ENGLAND, A MARRIED MAN AS HIS SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY 
The trustor is 
("Borrower'1). 
The trustee is F IRST AMERICAN TITLE OF UTAH 
("Trustee"). The beneficiary is OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 
wnich is organized and existing under the laws of CALIFORNIA and whose address is 
2 0 2 0 EAST FIRST STREET SUITE 1 0 0 , SANTA ANAf CA 9 2 7 0 5 ("Lender'). 
Borrower owes Lender the principal sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND 
. . . AND NO/lQOTHa Dollars (U.S. $500 ,000 .00 ). 
This debt is evidenced by Borrower's note dated the same date as this Secunty Instrument ("Note"), which provides for monthly 
payments, with the full debt, if not paid earlier, due and payable on June 01 , 2026 . This Secunty 
Instrument secures to Lender: (a) the repayment of the debt evidenced by the Note, with interest, and all renewals, extensions 
and modifications of the Note; (b) the payment of ail other sums, with interest, advanced under paragraph 7 to protect the secunty 
of this Secunty Instrument; and (c) the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and 
the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following 
desenbed property located in S a l t Lake County, Utah: 
LOTS 1 THROUGH 8r INCLUSIVE, OF BLOCK 3 , GENEVA PLACE, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT 
THEREOF, FILED IN BOOK C OF PLATS, AT PAGE 90 OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY 
RECORDER. 
which has the address of 
Utah 84107 
[Zip Code) 
2 I S 7 SOUTH LINCOLN STREET, 
("Property Address '); 
SALT LAKE CITY [Street, City], 
TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, appurtenances, 
and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property All replacements and additions shall also be covered by this Security 
Instrument A.11 of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as the 'Property ' 
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the nght to grant 
and convey the Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except tor encumbrances of record Borrower warrants and wdl 
defend generally the title to the Property against ail claims and demands, subject to any encumbrances of record. 
COVENANTS Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: 
1. Payment or Principal and Interest; Prepayment and Late Charges. Borrower shall promptly pay when due the principal 
of and interest on the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment and late charges due under the Note. 
Init *G# 
UTAH ^a&* Pi-
Inn Init Init 
Loan Number 011012535 Servicing Number 928275-7 Date: 05 /24 /96 
2. Funds for Taxes and Insurance. Subject to applicable law or to a written waiver by Lender, Borrower shall pay to 
Lender on the day monthly payments are due under the Note, until the Note is paid m full, a sum ("Funds") for: (a) yearly taxes 
and assessments which may attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien on the Property; (b) yearly leasehold payments 
or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) yearly hazard or property insurance premiums; (d) yearly flood insurance premiums, 
if any, (e) yearly mortgage insurance premiums, if any; and (f) any sums payable by Borrower to Lender, m accordance with the 
provisions ot paragraph 8, in lieu or the payment of mortgage insurance premiums. These items are called "Escrow Items.' Lender 
mav, at any tune, collect and hold Funds in an amount not to exceed the maximum amount a lender for a federally related mortgage 
loan may require for Borrower s escrow account under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 as amended from 
tune to time, 12 U S C. Section 2601 et seq ("RESPA"), unless anodier law that applies to the Funds ids a lesser amount. If so, 
Lander may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount not to exceed the lesser amount. Lender may estimate the amount 
of Funds due on the basis of current data and reasonable estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in 
accordance with applicable law 
The Funds shall be held m an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity 
(including Lender, if Lender is such an institution) or m any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the 
Escrow Items Lender may not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually analyzing the escrow account, or 
verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the Funds and applicable law permits Lender to make such 
a charge. However, Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for an independent real estate tax reporting service used 
by Lender in connection with this loan unless applicable law provides otherwise Unless an agreement is made or applicable law 
requires interest to be paid, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and 
Lender may agree in writing, however, mat interest shall be paid on the Funds Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, 
an annual accounting of the Funds, showing credits and debits to me Funds and me purpose for which each debit to die Funds was 
made. The Funds are pledged as additional security for all sums secured by this Security Instrument. 
If the Funds held by Lender exceed the amounts permitted to be held by law, Lender shall account to Borrower for the 
excess Funds in accordance with the requirements of applicable law If the amount of the Funds held by Lender at any time is not 
sutficient to pay the Escrow Items when due, Lender may so notify Borrower in writing, and, in such case Borrower shall pay to 
Lender the amount necessary to make up the deficiency Borrower shall make up the deficiency in no more than twelve monmiy 
payments, at Lender's sole discretion. 
Upon payment m mil of ail sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall prompdy refund to Borrower any Funds 
held by Lender If, under paragraph 21, Lender shall acquire or sell the Property, Lender, prior to the acquisition or sale of the 
Property, shall apply any Funds held by Lender at the tune or acquisition or sale as a credit against the sums secured by this 
Security Instrument. 
3. Application of Payments. Unless applicable law provides otherwise, all payments received by Lender under paragraphs 
1 and 2 shall be applied first, to any prepayment charges due under the Note; second, to amounts payable under paragraph 2, third, 
lo interest due; fourth, to principal due; and last, to any late charges due under the Note. 
4 Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines and impositions attributable to the Property 
which may attain priority over this Security Instrument, and leasehold payments or ground rents, if any Borrower shall pay these 
obligations in the manner provided in paragraph 2, or if not paid in that manner, Borrower shall pay them on time directly to the 
person owed payment. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this paragraph If 
Borrower makes these payments directly, Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender receipts evidencing the payments. 
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless Borrower, (a) agrees 
in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the hen in a manner acceptable to Lender; (b) contests in good faith the hen 
fay, or defends against enforcement of the lien in, legal proceedings which in die Lender's opinion operate to prevent the 
enforcement of me lien, or (c) secures from die holder of die hen an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinatmg the lien to this 
Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a hen which may attain priority over dus 
Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying die lien. Borrower shall satisfy me hen or take one or more 
of me actions set forth above within 10 days of die giving of notice. 
5 Hazard or Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the Property 
insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term 'extended coverage" and any other hazards, including floods or 
flooding, for which Lender requires insurance This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods mat Lender 
requires The insurance earner providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject ta Lender's approval which shall not 
be unreasonably withheld If Borrower fails to maintain coverage described above, Lender may, at Lender's option, obtain coverage 
to protect Lender's rights in die Property in accordance with paragraph 7 
All insurance policies and renewals shall be acceptable to Lender and shall include a standard mortgage clause Lender shall 
have the right to hold the policies and renewals If Lender requires, Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid 
premiums and renewal notices In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance earner and Lender Lender 
may make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree m writing, or applicable law otherwise requires, insurance proceeds shall 
be applied first to reimburse Lender for costs and expenses incurred in connection with obtaining any such insurance proceeds, and 
then, at discretion, and regardless of anv impairment of security or lack thereof (i) to me sums secured may determine m Us sole 
and absolute discretion, and/or (n) to Borrower to pay the costs and expenses of necessary repairs or restoration of the Property 
to a condition satisfactory to Lender If Borrower abandons the Property, or does not answer within 30 days a notice from Lender 
that the insurance carrier has otfered to settle a claim, Lender may collect the insurance proceeds Lender may, m its sole and 
absolute discretion, and regardless of any impairment of security or lack thereof, use die proceeds to repair or restore the Property 
or to pay the :>ums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due The 30-day period will begin when the notice is 
given 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in vnting, any application of proceeds to principal shall not extend or 
Dostoone the due date or the monthly payments reterred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 or change the amount ot the payments If under 
paragraph 21 the Property is acquired by Lender Borrower s right to any insurance policies and proceeds resulting from damage 
to the Property prior to the acquisition shall pass to Lender to the extent of the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately 
prior to the acquisition 
1ml Imt hm hyt Init 
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If Borrower obtains earthquake insurance, any other hazard insurance, or any other insurance on the Property and such 
insurance is not specifically required by Lender, then such insurance shall (i) name Lender as loss payee thereunder, and (ii) be 
subject to the provisions of this paragraph 5. 
6. Preservation, Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Borrower's Loan Application; Leaseholds. Borrower shall 
not destroy, damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate, or commit waste on the Property. Borrower snail 
be in default if any forfeiture action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is begun that in Lender's good faith judgment could 
result in forfeiture of the Property or otherwise materially impair the lien created by this Security Instrument or Lender's security 
interest. Borrower may cure such a default and reinstate, as provided in paragraph 18, by causing the action or proceeding to be 
dismissed with a ruling that, in Lender's good faith determination, precludes forfeiture of the Borrower's interest in the Property 
or other material impairment of the lien created by this Security Instrument or Lender's security interest. Borrower shall also be 
in default if Borrower, during the loan application process, gave materially false or inaccurate information or statements to Lender 
(or failed to provide Lender with any material information) in connection with the loan evidenced by the Note, including, but not 
limited to, representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the Property as a principal residence. If this Security Instrument 
is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease. If Borrower acquires fee tide to the Property, the 
leasehold and the fee title snail not merge unless Lender agrees to the merger in writing. 
Borrower shall, at Borrower's own expense, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the Property 
or any portion thereof or Borrower's tide thereto, the validity or priority of the lien created by this Security instrument, or the rights 
or powers of Lender or Trustee with respect to this Security Instrument or the Property. All causes of action of Borrower, whether 
accrued before or after the date of this Security Instrument, for damage or injury to the Property or any part thereof, or in 
connection with any transaction financed in whole or in part by the proceeds of the Note or any other note secured by this Security 
Instrument, by Lender, or in connection with or affecting the Property or any part thereof, including causes of action arising in tort 
or contract and causes of action for fraud or concealment of a material fact, are, at Lender's option, assigned to Lender, and the 
proceeds thereof shall be paid directiy to Lender who, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees, may apply such proceeds to the sums secured by this Security Instrument or to any deficiency under this Security Instrument 
or may release any monies so received by it or any part thereof, as Lender may elect. Lender may, at its option, appear in and 
prosecute in its own name any action or proceeding to enforce any such cause of action and may make any compromise or 
settlement thereof. Borrower agrees to execute such further assignments and any other instruments as from time to time may be 
necessary to effectuate the foregoing provisions and as Lender shall request. 
7. Protection of Lender'3 Rights in the Property. If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in 
this Security Instrument, or there is a legal proceeding that may significantly affect Lender's rights in the Property (such as a 
proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture or to enforce laws or regulations), then Lender may do and pay 
for whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and Lender's rights in the Property, Lender's actions may include 
paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument, appearing in conn, paying reasonable attorneys' 
fees and entering on the Property to make repairs. Although Lender may take action under this paragraph 7, Lender does not have 
to do so. 
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this paragraph 7 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security 
Instrument. Unless Borrower and Lender agree to other terms of payment, these amounts shall bear interest from the date of 
disbursement at the Note rate in effect from time to time and shall be payable, with interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower 
requesting payment. 
8. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required mortgage insurance as a condition of making the loan secured by this Security 
Instrument, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the mortgage insurance in effect. If, for any reason, the mortgage 
insurance coverage required by Lender lapses or ceases to be in effect, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage 
substantially equivalent to the mortgage insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to the cost to Borrower of 
the mortgage insurance previously in effect, from an alternate mortgage insurer approved by Lender. If substantially equivalent 
mortgage insurance coverage is not available, Borrower shall pay to Lender each month a sum equal to one-twelfth of the yearly 
mortgage insurance premium being paid by Borrower when the insurance coverage lapsed or ceased to be in effect. Lender will 
accept, use and retain these payments as a loss reserve in lieu of mortgage insurance. Loss reserve payments may no longer be 
required, at the option of Lender, if mortgage insurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires) provided 
by an insurer approved by Lender again becomes available and is obtained. Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain 
mortgage insurance in effect, or to provide a loss reserve, until die requirement for mortgage insurance ends in accordance with 
any written agreement between Borrower and Lender or applicable law. 
9. Inspection. Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of die Property. Lender shall give 
Borrower notice at the time of or prioF to an inspection specifying reasonable cause for the inspection. 
10. Condemnation. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or consequential, in connection with any 
condemnation or other taking of any part of the Property, or for conveyance in lieu of condemnation, are hereby assigned and shall 
be paid to Lender. Lender may apply, use or release the condemnation proceeds in the same manner as provided in paragraph 5 
hereof with respect to insurance proceeds. 
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the condemnor offers to make 
an award or settle a claim for damages, Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender 
is authorized to collect and apply the proceeds, at its option, either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the sums secured 
by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any application of proceeds to principal shall not extend or 
postpone the due date of the monthly payments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 or change the amount of such payments. 
11. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for payment or modification of 
amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument granted by Lender to any successor in interest of Borrower shall not 
operate to release the liability of the original Borrower or Borrower's successor in interest. Lender shall not be required to 
commence proceedings against any successor in interest or reruse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of 
the sums secured by this Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower or Borrower's successors 
in interest. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any 
right or remedy. 
i n i t . ^ y i j ^ * Imt. init. Init. IniL Init, 
Loan'Number: 011012535 Servicing Number 928275-7 Date: 0 5 / 2 4 / 9 6 
12. Successors and Assigns Bound; Joint and Several Liabdiry; Cosigners. The covenants and agreements of dus Security 
Instrument shall bind and benefit die successors and assigns of Lender and Borrower, subject to the provisions of paragraph 17 
Borrower s covenants and agreements shall be joint and several. Any Borrower who co-signs this Security Instrument but does not 
execute the Note: (a) is co-signing this Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey that Borrower's interest in the 
Property under the terms of this Security Instrument; (b) is not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by mis Security 
Instrument, and (c) agrees that Lender and any odier Borrower may agree to extend, modify, forbear or make any accommodations 
with regard to die terms of this Security Instrument or the Note wimout that Borrower1 s consent. 
13. Loan Charges. If the loan secured by diis Security Instrument is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges, 
and that law is finally interpreted so that me interest or odier loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the loan 
exceed the Dermitted limits, then* (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by die amount necessary to reduce me charge to the 
permitted limit; and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to Borrower 
Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing die principal owed under the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower. 
If a refund reduces principal, the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment wi&out any prepayment charge under the Note, 
14 Notices. Any notice to Borrower provided for in this Security Instrument shall be given by delivering it or by mailing 
it by first class mail unless applicable law requires use of anouier method. The notice shall be directed to the Property Address or 
any other address Borrower designates by notice to Lender. Any notice to Lender shall be given by first class mail to Lender's 
address stated herein or any other address Lender designates by notice to Borrower. Any notice provided for m dus Security 
Instrument shall be deemed to have been given to Borrower or Lender when given as provided in this paragraph. 
15. Governing Law; Severability. This Security Instrument shall be governed by federal law and the law of the-jurisdiction 
m which the Property is located In me event that any provision or clause of this Security Instrument or the Note conflicts with 
applicable law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security Instrument or the Note which can be given effect 
without the conflicting provision To mis end the provisions of this Security Instrument and the Note are declared to be severable. 
16. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given one conformed copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument. 
17. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. If all or any part of the Property or any interest in it is 
sold or transferred (or if a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred and Borrower is not a natural person) wimout 
Lender's prior written consent, Lender may, at its option, require immediate payment m full of all sums secured by this Secuntv 
Instrument However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if exercise is prohibited by federal law as of the date of this 
Security Instrument. 
If Lender exercises mis option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide a period of not 
less dian 30 days from die date the notice is delivered or mailed within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security 
Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to me expiration of dus period. Lender may invoke any remedies permitted 
by dus Security Instrument wiuiout further notice or demand on Borrower. 
18. Borrower's Right to Reinstate. If Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower shall have the right to have enforcement 
of dus Security Instrument discontinued at any time prior to the earlier of: (a) 5 days (or such omer period as applicable law may 
specify for reinstatement) before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in this Security Instrument; or (b) 
entry of a judgment enforcing this Security Instrument Those conditions are diat Borrower* (a) pays Lender all sums which then 
would be due under this Security Instrument and die Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any default of any other 
covenants or agreements, (c) pays ail expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, including, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorneys' fees; and (d) takes such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure mat the Hen of dus Security 
Instrument, Lender's rights in the Property and Borrower's obligation to pay die sums secured by this Security Instrument shall 
continue unchanged Upon reinstatement by Borrower, mis Security Instrument and die obligations secured hereby shall remain fully 
effective as if no acceleration had occurred. However, dus right to reinstate shall not apply in the case of acceleration under 
paragraph 17 
19 Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer. The Note or a partial interest m die Note (together with dus Security 
Instrument) may be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower A sale may result m a change in me entity (known 
as die 'Loan Servicer') that collects monthly payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument There also may be one 
or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note. If mere is a change of the Loan Servicer, Borrower will be 
given written notice of the change in accordance wiui paragraph 14 above and applicable law The notice will state the name and 
address of the new Loan Servicer and address to which payments should bcrnade. The notice will also contain any other information 
required by applicable law The holder of the Note and dus Security Instrument shall be deemed to be the Lender hereunder 
20. Hazardous Substances. Borrower shall not cause or permit me presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any 
Hazardous Substances on or in die Property Borrower shall not do, nor allow anyone else to do, anydnng affecting the Property 
diat is in violation of any Environmental Law The preceding two sentences shall not apply to the presence, use, or storage on the 
Property of small quantities of Hazardous Substances that are generally recognized to be appropriate to normal residential uses and 
to maintenance of the Property 
Borrower shall promptly give Lender written notice of any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit or other action by any 
governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any Hazardous Substance or Environmental Law 
of which Borrower has actual knowledge. If Borrower learns, or is notified by any governmental or regulatory authority, diat any 
removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting die Property is necessary, Borrower shall promptly take all 
necessary remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law 
Borrower shall be solely responsible for, shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Lender, us directors, officers, 
employees, attorneys, agents, and their respective successors and assigns, from and against any and all claims, demands, causes 
of action, loss, damage cost (including actual attorneys fees and court costs and costs of any required or necessary repair, cleanup 
or detoxification ot the Propeny and the preparation and implementation of any closure, abatement, containment, remedial or other 
required plan), exnenses and liaoihty directly or indirectly arising out or or attributable to (a) the use, generation, storage, release, 
threatened release, discharge disposal, abatement or presence of Hazardous Substances on, under or about the Property (b) the 
transport to or from the Propeny ot any Hazardous Substances, (c) die violation ot any Hazardous Substances law and (d) any 
Hazardous Substances claims 
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As used in this paragraph 20, 'Hazardous Substances' are those substances defined as toxic or hazardous substances by 
Environmental Law and the following substances* gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides 
and herbicides, volatile solvents, materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials As used in this paragraph 
20, Environmental Law" means federal laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate to health, sateiy 
or environmental protection. 
ADDITIONAL COVENANTS Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
21 Acceleration; Remedies. If any installment under the Note or notes secured hereby is not paid when due, or if Borrower 
should be in default under any provision of this Secunty Instrument, of if Borrower is in default under any other deed of trust or 
other instrument secured by the Property, all sums secured by this Secunty Instrument and accrued interest thereon shall at once 
become due and payable at the option of Lender without pnor notice, except as otherwise required by applicable law, and regardless 
of any pnor forbearance. In such event. Lender, at its option, and subject to applicable law, may then or thereafter invoke the power 
of sale and/or any other remedies or take any other actions permitted by applicable law Lender will collect all expenses incurred 
in pursuing the remedies described in this Paragraph 21, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title 
evidence. 
If the power of sale is invoked, Trustee shall execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event of default and of die 
election to cause the Property to be sold and shall record such notice in each county in which any part of the Property is located. 
Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of such notice in the manner prescribed by applicable law to Borrower and to the other persons 
prescribed by applicable law. Trustee shall give public notice of the sale to the persons and in the manner prescribed by applicable 
law. After the time required by applicable law, Trustee, without demand on Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to 
the highest bidder at the time and place and under the terms designated in die notice of sale in one or more parcels and in any order 
Trustee determines. Trustee may in accordance with applicable law, postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public 
announcement at the tune and place of any previously scheduled sale. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale. 
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without any covenant or warranty, expressed 
or implied The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall 
apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order: (a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable 
Trustee's and attorneys' fees; (b) to all sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally 
entitled to it or to the county clerk of the county in which die sale took place. 
22. Reconveyance Upon payment of all sums secured by this Secunty Instrument, Lender shall request Trustee to reconvey 
the Property and shall surrender this Secunty Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured by this Secunty Instrument to 
Trustee Trustee shall reconvey me Property without warranty and without charge to die person or persons legally entitled to it 
Such person or persons shall pay any recordation costs. 
23. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its option, may from time to time remove Trustee and appomt a successor trustee to any 
Trustee appointed hereunder Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all uie title, power and 
duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by applicable law 
24. Request for Notices. Borrower requests that copies of the notices' of default and sale be sent to Borrower's address 
which is the Property Address. 
25. Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure. Borrower has made certain written representation and disclosures in order to 
induce Lender to make die loan evidenced by the Note or notes which dus Secunty Instrument secures, and in me event that 
Borrower has made any material misrepresentation or failed to disclose any matenal fact, Lender, at its option and without pnor 
notice or demand, shall have the right to declare the indebtedness secured by this Secunty Instrument, irrespective of the maturity 
date specified m the Note or notes secured by this Security Instrument, immediately due and payable To the extent permitted by 
applicable law, Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Lender setting forth facts showing a default by Borrower 
under this paragraph, is authonzed to accept as true and conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act thereon hereunder 
26. Time is of the Essence. Time is of the essence in the performance of each provision of this Secunty Instrument. 
27. Waiver of Statute of Limitations. The pleading of the statute of limitations as a defense to enforcement of mis Secunty 
Instrument, or any and all obligations referred to herein or secured hereby, is hereby waived to uie fullest extent permitted by 
applicable law 
28. Modification. This Secunty Instrument may be modified or amended only by an agreement m writing signed by 
Borrower and Lender 
29 Reimbursement. To the extent permitted by applicable law, Borrower shall reimburse Trustee and Lender for any and 
all costs, fees and expenses which either may incur, expend or sustain in the execution of the trust created hereunder or in the 
performance of any act required or permitted hereunder or by law or in equity or omerwise arising out of or in connection with 
this Security Instrument, the Note, any ouier note secured by tins Secunty Instrument or any other instrument executed by Borrower 
m connection with the Note or Security Instrument To the extent permitted by applicable law, Borrower shall pay to Trustee and 
Lender their fees in connection with Trustee and Lender providing documents or services ansing out of or m connection with this 
Secunty Instrument, the Note, any other note secured by this Secunty Instrument or any other instrument executed by Borrower 
in connection with the Note or Secunty Instrument 
30 Clencai Error In the event Lender at any time discovers that the Note, any other note secured by this Secunty 
Instrument, die Security Instrument or any other document or instrument executed in connection with the Secunty Instrument, Note 
or notes contains an error that was caused by a clerical mistake, caicuiauon error, computer malfunction, pnnting error or similar 
error, Borrower agrees, upon notice from Lender, to reexecute any documents that are necessary to correct any such error(s) 
Borrower iurther agrees that Lender m\\ not be liable to Borrower for any damages incurred by Borrower that are directly or 
indirectly caused by any such error 
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31 Lost Stolen, Destroyed or Mutilated Secunty Instrument and Other Documents. In the event of the loss, theft or 
destruction of the Note, any other note secured by this Secunty Instrument, the Secunty Instrument or any other documents or 
instruments executed in connection with the Secunty Instrument, Note or notes (collectively, the 'Loan Documents'), upon 
Borrower's receipt of an indemnification executed m favor of Borrower by Lender, or, in the event of the mutilation of any ot the 
Loan Documents, upon Lender's surrender to Borrower of the mutilated Loan Document, Borrower shall execute and deliver to 
Lender a Loan Document m form and content identical to, and to serve as a replacement of, the lost, stolen, destroyed, or mutilated 
Loan Document, and such replacement shall have the same force and effect as the lost, stolen, destroyed, or mutilated Loan 
Documents, and may be created for all purposes as the ongmal copy of such Loan Document. 
32. Assignment of Rents. As additional secunty hereunder, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender the rents of the Property 
Borrower shall have the nght to collect and retain the rents of the Property as they become due and payable provided Lender has 
not exercised its nghts to require immediate payment in full of the sums secured by this Secunty Instrument and Borrower has not 
abandoned the Property. 
33. Riders to this Secunty mstrument. If one or more nders are executed by Borrower and recorded together with this 
Secunty Instrument, the covenants and agreements of each such nder shall be mcorporated mto and shall amend and supplement 
the covenants and agreements of this Secunty Instrument as if the nder(s) were a part of this Secunty Instrument. 
[Check applicable box(es)] 
S3 Adjustable Rate Rider 
LJ No Prepayment Penalty Opnon Rider 
D Other(s) (specify) 
LJ Condominium Rider 
LJ Planned Unit Development Rider 
D 1-4 Family Rider 
SJ Occupancy Rider 
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this Secunty Instrument and 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Lan C. ENGLAND, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Eugene HORBACH, an individual, Medicode, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, and Does I 
through V, Defendants and Petitioners. 
No. 950506. 
May 30, 1997. 
Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1997. 
Seller of stock sued buyer, seeking to enforce 
accord and satisfaction agreement under which 
buyer was to pay seller $25,000 as final amount 
owed for shares. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., dismissed 
complaint on grounds that accord and satisfaction 
lacked consideration, and seller appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, 905 P.2d 301, reversed and 
remanded. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) Court of Appeals 
erred by accepting trial court's fact finding that 
parties were mutually mistaken in concluding that 
$25,000 was owed on contract, and then 
determining that amount due was uncertain, as 
required for accord and satisfaction to apply, and (2) 
failure to object at trial precluded challenge to trial 
court's allowance of counterclaim by buyer, alleging 
overpayment of $169,501.75 
Court of Appeals' judgment reversed; trial court's 
judgment reinstated. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and hrroi <^=>842(2) 
30k842(2) 
[1] Appeal and Error <®^1083(1) 
30kl083(l) 
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's conclusions of 
law for correctness, and likewise Supreme Court 
accords no particular deference to conclusions of 
law made by Court of Appeals, but reviews such 
conclusions for correctness. 
[2] Appeal and Error <®^1008.1(5) 
30kl008.1(5) 
Copr. © West 2001 No C 
Court of Appeals may reverse factual Imdmg oi trial 
court only if it determines that finding is "clearly 
erroneous," that is, if trial court's ruling contradicts 
great weight of evidence or if court reviewing 
evidence is left with definite and firm conviction that 
mistake has been made. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
52(a). 
[3] Appeal and Error ® ^ 1094(1) 
30kl094(l) 
Court of Appeals erred by purporting to accept trial 
court's factual determination that parties to sale of 
stock mistakenly believed that buyer owed seller an 
additional $25,000, and then concluding that parties 
were uncertain as to amount owing on contract, so 
as to allow buyer's payment of $25,000 to seller to 
operate as accord and satisfaction; Court of Appeals 
was bound by trial court's factual determinations 
unless findings were "clearly erroneous," and no 
such determination was made in present case. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
[4] Accord and Satisfaction <®^10(1) 
8kl0(l) 
Absence of uncertainty as to amount due under 
contract for sale of shares of corporation precluded 
determination by court of appeals that payment of 
$25,000 by buyer to seller was an accord and 
satisfaction; trial court found mutual mistake 
present, under which parties concluded with 
certainty, albeit mistakenly, that $25,000 of 
purchase price remained unpaid. 
[5] Pleading <@==>236(5) 
302k236(5) 
While trial court has only limited discretion to grant 
amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence 
adduced at trial, as it must first find that 
presentation of merits of action will be subserved by 
amendment and that admission of evidence in 
question would not prejudice adverse party in 
maintaining his action or defense on merits, 
thereafter trial court has full discretion to allow an 
amendment of the pleadings; that is, it may grant or 
deny party's motion for amendment upon any 
reasonable basis, and court's decision can be 
reversed only if abuse of discretion appears. Rules 
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Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b). 
[6] Pleading <®^411 
302k411 
Failure to object at trial precluded challenge to trial 
court's allowance during trial of counterclaim by 
buyer of stock, alleging he had overpaid by 
$169,501.75, after trial court found that agreement 
under which buyer was to pay seller an additional 
$25,000 was founded on mutual mistake and was 
unenforceable. 
*341 Samuel D. McVey, Randy T. Austin, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
Steven G. Crockett, Steven E. McCowin, Wesley 
D. Felix, Steven L. Taylor, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and petitioners. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURHAM, Justice: 
This case comes to us on a writ of certiorari to the 
court of appeals, which held that the parties had 
reached an accord and satisfaction of their dispute. 
We reverse. 
In 1989, defendant Eugene Horbach orally agreed 
to buy 258,363 shares of Medicode stock from 
plaintiff Lan England at $2.75 per share, for a total 
purchase price of $710,498.25. Over the course of 
the next ten months, Horbach made several 
payments to England totaling $859,599.35. Taking 
into account a reimbursement of $4,599.35 for 
certain additional expenses that England had 
incurred on Horbach's behalf, by September 14, 
1990, Horbach had in fact overpaid England by 
$144,501.75. 
Nevertheless, when the parties met again eight 
months later, on May 23, 1991, both were 
apparently under the mistaken impression that more 
money was owed on the original contract. 
Horbach, because of errors he attributes to his 
accounting department, was uncertain of the amount 
then due. England testified that he thought Horbach 
owed him an amount between $25,000 and $75,000. 
But England also testified that he told Horbach that 
the amount owed was $25,000. Horbach believed 
England, and the trial court found that "at the May 
23rd meeting both the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
mistakenly believed that $25,000 remained owing 
under the 1989 stock purchase agreement." 
Consequently, on May 23, 1991, the parties came 
to an agreement (the "May 23 agreement") whereby 
England delivered the 258,363 shares to Horbach 
and Horbach gave England a post-dated check for 
$25,000 along with a note promising to "hold 2% of 
Medicode stock in trust for you [England] forever 
unless 1 have different instructions by you on 
disposition of that stock." But when England later 
asked Horbach to reconvey the promised two 
percent of Medicode stock, Horbach refused. 
Horbach argued at trial that he meant to deliver only 
a security interest in the two percent to secure 
payment of the post-dated check and that the 
language of the agreement was merely "an 
unfortunate choice of language," possibly resulting 
*342 from the fact that "we had a few drinks at 
lunch." England brought an action in the Third 
District Court to recover the proceeds of the shares, 
which by stipulation of the parties had been sold for 
$369,140.60. Horbach raised a counterclaim at the 
trial for recovery of $169,501.75, the amount that 
he had overpaid on the original contract. 
The trial court found that the May 23 agreement 
was executed under a mutual mistake of fact and 
was therefore unenforceable. Because Horbach had 
already overpaid England by the time of the May 23 
agreement, the court found that England had a 
preexisting duty to deliver the shares to Horbach. 
The court therefore concluded that Horbach's 
promise to give England an interest in two percent 
of the Medicode stock was without consideration. 
The court also granted Horbach's motion for a 
counterclaim and awarded him a judgment against 
England in the amount of $169,501.75 for 
overpayments under the original contract. 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court. 
England v. Horbach, 905 P.2d 301 
(Utah.Ct.App. 1995). The court of appeals found 
that the May 23 agreement constituted an accord and 
satisfaction and found consideration for the 
agreement in the bargained-for settlement of the 
parties' uncertain claims. Id. at 304. The court 
stated that "if the parties in good faith believe there 
is a disputed or uncertain claim, mere settlement of 
the amount due and acceptance of that amount 
constitutes the consideration necessary to support the 
contract." Id. (citations omitted). As for the trial 
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court's finding of mutual mistake, the court of 
appeals recognized that "the parties were indeed 
mistaken that additional money was owed under the 
original agreement. However," the court 
continued, "this mistake did not go to the terms of 
the parties' accord; rather it merely demonstrates 
their accord was indeed a compromise of a bona fide 
dispute which was not necessarily well- founded, but 
was in good faith." Id. at 305 (citations omitted). 
This court granted Horbach's petition for certiorari. 
913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
The petition for certiorari and the briefs of the 
parties indicate that we must resolve at least three 
issues. We must first decide whether the court of 
appeals applied the correct standard of review and 
gave proper deference to the trial court's findings of 
fact. Next we must determine whether the May 23 
agreement was a compromise of an unsettled claim 
constituting an accord and satisfaction or merely the 
conclusion of the original contract based on 
mistaken assumptions about the parties' legal 
obligations. If the May 23 agreement did in fact 
constitute an accord and satisfaction, we must also 
decide whether the parties' mutual mistake merely 
goes to the terms of the original agreement or 
whether it invalidates any further "accord" the 
parties may have reached on May 23. Finally, we 
must decide whether the trial court erred in granting 
Horbach's motion to amend his pleading to conform 
to the evidence, thus allowing Horbach to 
counterclaim for overpayments to England in the 
amount of $169,501.75. 
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW BEFORE THE 
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 
[1][2] The court of appeals reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness, and likewise this 
court "accord[s] no particular deference to 
conclusions of law ... made by ... the court of 
appeals, but review[s] such conclusions for 
correctness." Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 
P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). The court of appeals 
may reverse a factual finding of the trial court only 
if it determines that the finding is "clearly 
erroneous," Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), that is, if the 
trial court's "ruling contradicts the great weight of 
evidence or if a court reviewing the evidence is left 
with *a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made.' " Sevy v. Security Title Co., 90^ 
P.2d 629, 635 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This court must 
determine in its turn "whether the court of appeals 
correctly decided that the trial court's ruling on this 
issue was clearly erroneous." Id. 
[3] Horbach argues that the court of appeals 
improperly set aside the trial court's finding of fact 
11, in which the trial court states, "The Court finds 
that at the May 23rd meeting both the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant *343 mistakenly believed that 
$25,000 remained owing under the 1989 stock 
purchase agreement." In fact, the court of appeals 
accepted the trial court's finding that "at the May 
1991 meeting, the parties were indeed mistaken that 
additional money was owed under the original 
agreement." England, 905 P.2d at 305. However, 
the court of appeals also writes that "both parties 
were uncertain as to the amount that remained owing 
on the original contract when they entered into their 
agreement." Id. This finding of uncertainty clearly 
ignores or overrides the trial court's finding that the 
parties were certain, though mistaken, that Horbach 
owed England $25,000, and the court of appeals' 
finding can therefore be upheld only if that court 
correctly decided that the trial court's finding of fact 
11 was clearly erroneous. 
However, the court of appeals never explicitly 
assigns error to the factual findings of the trial 
court, but claims to be "[ajccepting the facts as 
found by the trial court." Id. Likewise, England 
does not argue that the trial court's finding of fact 
on this issue was clearly erroneous or even that the 
court of appeals found it to be clearly erroneous. 
Instead he argues that the court of appeals' ruling is 
consistent with the facts as found by the trial court. 
We disagree. If one accepts the trial court's finding 
that both parties believed $25,000 was owing on the 
original agreement, one cannot also accept the court 
of appeals' finding that the parties were uncertain of 
the amount owed. Thus, while the court of appeals 
claims to be "[accepting the facts as found by the 
trial court," it has instead assumed facts contrary to 
those found by the trial court, implicitly rejecting 
the trial court's findings. The court of appeals errs 
in reversing a trial court's finding of fact unless such 
a finding is determined to be clearly erroneous. 
Sevy, 902 P.2d at 635. The court of appeals made 
no such determination, and England has not even 
argued, much less shown, clear error in the trial 
court's finding that Horbach executed the May 23 
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agreement under the belief that he owed England 
$25,000. We therefore conclude that the court of 
appeals erred insofar as it relied on the assumption 
that both parties were uncertain of the amount owed, 
and we explicitly adopt the trial court's finding that 
"at the May 23rd meeting both [England] and 
[Horbach] mistakenly believed that $25,000 
remained owing under the 1989 stock purchase 
agreement." 
II. WAS THE MAY 23 AGREEMENT AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION? 
[4] We must next determine whether, accepting the 
facts as found by the trial court, the court of appeals 
correctly found that the May 23 agreement 
constituted an "accord and satisfaction" agreement 
enforceable separately from the parties' original 
1989 agreement. According to the rule cited by the 
court of appeals, "[t]he elements of an accord and 
satisfaction include[ ] '(i) a bona fide dispute [or 
uncertainty] over an unliquidated amount; (ii) a 
payment tendered in full settlement of the entire 
dispute; and (iii) an acceptance of the payment.' " 
England, 905 P.2d at 303 (change in original) 
(quoting Estate Landscape & Snow Removal 
Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 
844 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992) (citing Marion 
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 
1985); Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. 
Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah.Ct.App. 1992) 
)). In view of its finding that the parties were 
uncertain of the amount owed under the original 
contract, the court of appeals concluded that their 
May 23 agreement was the result of a compromise 
between England and Horbach-a new agreement 
constituting an accord and satisfaction. Id. at 304. 
The court of appeals then determined that while the 
parties were both under the mistaken impression that 
money was still owed on the contract, this mistake 
went to the terms of the original contract but did not 
affect the terms of the new and separate agreement— 
the accord and satisfaction-entered into by the 
parties on May 23, 1991. Id. at 305. The law of 
mutual mistake in this state declares, " 'A mutual 
mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of 
contracting, share a misconception about a basic 
assumption or vital fact upon which they based their 
bargain.' " Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 
(Utah.Ct.App.1992) (quoting Robert Langston Ltd. 
v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 
(Utah.Ct. App. 1987)). The court of appeals M44 
writes, "In the instant case, the parties were 
mistaken as to facts relevant to the original 
contract—whether money was then due and owing— 
not as to a term underlying the accord and 
satisfaction." England, 905 P.2d at 305 n. 4. While 
a mutual mistake does invalidate only the agreement 
entered into in reliance on the mistaken assumption, 
we do not decide the correctness of the court of 
appeals' legal conclusion that a mistake as to the 
amount owed does not go to the terms of an accord 
in satisfaction of that debt. Instead, we conclude 
that the court of appeals misapplied this rule of law 
to the facts of the present case. 
Taking the facts as found by the trial court, there 
could have been no accord and satisfaction entered 
into on May 23, 1991, because the first element of 
accord and satisfaction-the existence of a bona fide 
dispute or uncertainty over an unliquidated amount-
was not present. The trial court's finding that both 
parties believed Horbach owed England $25,000 
precludes the possibility of a dispute over the 
amount owing and forces us to conclude that any 
uncertainty Horbach may have had was cleared up, 
before he signed the May 23 agreement, by 
England's own statement that Horbach owed him 
$25,000. Therefore, when Horbach executed the 
agreement he was certain, though mistaken, of the 
amount he owed. If there was no dispute and no 
uncertainty, there could have been no compromise 
and thus no accord. Accepting the facts as found 
by the trial court, we must conclude that the May 23 
agreement represented merely the conclusion of the 
parties' original contract, not a new accord in 
satisfaction of an uncertain debt. 
The court of appeals' ultimate conclusion that the 
parties' mistake went to the underlying agreement, 
not to their May 23, 1991, accord and satisfaction, 
is based on a mischaracterization of the trial court's 
findings of fact. If we accept the facts as actually 
found by the trial court, there could have been no 
accord and satisfaction. The parties agreed that 
Horbach would pay England $25,000 based on their 
mutual mistaken belief that Horbach owed England 
$25,000, not as a compromise to satisfy an uncertain 
debt. The trial court therefore correctly concluded 
that "the May 23rd agreement was made under a 
mutual mistake of fact which went to its essence 
and, therefore, the putative agreement is 
unenforceable." Horbach's additional promise to 
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give England two percent of the Medicode stock 
must therefore be treated either as a gratuitous 
promise unsupported by consideration or, as 
Horbach suggests, as a promise to hold the stock as 
security for payment on Horbach's post-dated 
$25,000 check. In either case, we may uphold the 
trial court's conclusion that "[a]ny concession 
extracted from [Horbach] by [England] in the May 
23rd alleged agreement lacks consideration and the 
agreement, therefore, is unenforceable." 
On appeal, England does not argue that the trial 
court's factual finding was in error, only that the 
common mistake of the parties constitutes an 
"uncertainty" within the meaning of the rule of 
accord and satisfaction. By blurring the distinction 
between mistake and uncertainty, England tries to 
make the trial court's facts fit within the court of 
appeals' theory of the case. A mistake, however, is 
clearly different from an uncertainty. In fact, one 
might argue that making a mistake requires some 
degree of certainty or at least some confidence that 
one's assumptions are correct. England's argument 
that the parties' mutual mistake should constitute an 
uncertainty within the rule of accord and satisfaction 
would effectively eliminate the doctrine of mutual 
mistake from contract law because any mutual 
mistake could be called merely an uncertainty. 
Such a broad definition of "uncertainty" is 
unwarranted by logic or precedent and would 
require courts to enforce contracts in ways that the 
parties could never foresee at the time of contracting 
and that might even be contrary to the intent of both 
parties. 
Because there was no dispute between the parties 
and no uncertainty in the parties' minds at the time 
of the May 23 agreement, that agreement cannot be 
characterized as an "accord and satisfaction" but 
merely as the conclusion of their original 1989 stock 
sales agreement. As such, the May 23 agreement 
was premised on a mutual mistake of material fact 
and is unenforceable. The court of *345 appeals' 
decision to enforce that agreement must therefore be 
reversed. 
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN 
ALLOWING HORBACH'S COUNTERCLAIM 
FOR 
OVERPAYMENTS? 
England argues finally that the trial judge abused 
his discretion in allowing Horbach to amend his 
pleading to conform to the evidence at trial, thereby 
permitting Horbach's counterclaim for 
overpayments. Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides: 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground 
that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). 
[5] The decision to permit amendment under rule 
15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is subject 
to what we have called conditional discretionary 
review. See Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 
307 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4, (Dec. 31, 1996) (applying 
conditional discretionary review to Utah R. Civ. P. 
36(b)). The trial court's discretion to grant 
amendment of the pleadings is conditioned on the 
satisfaction of two preliminary requirements: a 
finding that the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved by amendment and a 
finding that the admission of such evidence would 
not prejudice the adverse party in maintaining his 
action or defense on the merits. The trial court has 
only limited discretion in making these preliminary 
findings, but once these prerequisites are met, the 
trial court has full discretion to allow an amendment 
of the pleadings; that is, it may grant or deny a 
party's motion for amendment upon any reasonable 
basis, and the court's decision can be reversed only 
if abuse of discretion appears. Cf. id. 
[6] In this case, England argues convincingly that 
he was prejudiced in maintaining his defense against 
Horbach's counterclaim because of the lateness of 
the amendment. In Langeland, this court held that 
"the factors most important to our finding of 
prejudice ... include (i) the temporal proximity of 
the amendment to the date of trial, and (ii) whether 
the party opposing amendment relied on the 
[pleadings] in such a way as to detrimentally affect 
its ability to prepare its case." Langeland at 8, at 
-—. In this case, Horbach first mentioned his 
counterclaim in his trial memorandum and moved 
for permission to amend his pleadings at the end of 
the presentation of evidence. Prejudice might be 
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found in the fact that England had no opportunity to 
prepare a response to the counterclaim and no time 
to brief and argue legal defenses such as waiver and 
estoppel, and also in the fact that England waived 
his right to a jury trial or rejected settlement offers 
in reliance on his understanding that no counterclaim 
would be pursued. 
However, the rule requires the trial court to 
consider prejudice only "[i]f evidence is objected to 
at the trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). As his own 
brief states, "England acknowledges that no 
objection was raised at trial." Because England 
failed to object, the trial court had full discretion to 
grant or deny Horbach's motion to amend the 
pleadings and can be reversed only upon a finding of 
abuse of discretion, that is, if "no reasonable basis" 
for the trial court's decision can be found. 
Considering the trial court's finding that Horbach 
had overpaid England by $169,501.75, the court's 
decision to allow Horbach's claim for that amount is 
reasonable and does not constitute an abuse of its 
discretion. 
England suggests that the counterclaim for 
overpayments that Horbach introduced at trial was 
intentionally kept hidden until the day of trial and 
that allowing Horbach to amend his pleadings at that 
late date will encourage other litigants to keep 
counterclaims hidden until the eve of trial. 
However, the trial court's decision is not likely to 
have the precedential effect England fears. First, 
any real advantage a party might gain by such 
surprise would constitute prejudice within the 
meaning of rule 15(b), and if objected to at trial, the 
court would not have *346 discretion to allow the 
amendment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). Second, 
even in the absence of prejudice the trial court's 
decision to permit a rule 15(b) amendment is within 
the discretion of the trial court and any such "secret 
claims" would be lost if the trial judge found any 
reasonable basis for denying the motion. 
Litigants are adequately discouraged from keeping 
their claims secret until the eve of trial by the fact 
that the trial judge has full discretion to deny late 
motions to amend for any reason and the knowledge 
that most courts look on such motions with disfavor 
and are not easily persuaded to grant them. Girard 
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). Even 
the most calculating litigants are unlikely to risk 
losing their claim merely in the hope of gaining 
some kind of advantage through the element of 
surprise. This is especially true when the potential 
advantage to be gained could be eliminated by 
opposing counsel through an objection to the 
introduction of the evidence at trial and a showing 
that the amendment would prejudice them in the 
presentation of the merits of their action. The 
Rules of Civil Procedure are sufficient to discourage 
litigants from intentionally concealing counterclaims 
until the eve of trial. We are not willing to further 
constrict the discretion of trial judges by second-
guessing their judgment every time an amendment to 
a party's pleadings is permitted. 
Because England failed to object to the presentation 
of evidence of Horbach's counterclaim at trial, we 
conclude that the trial court was within its discretion 
to permit Horbach to amend his pleadings to 
conform to the evidence introduced at trial. 
Taking the facts as the trial court found them, we 
conclude that the court of appeals erred in reversing 
the district court. If on May 23, 1991, the parties 
were convinced that Horbach owed England 
$25,000, there could have been no accord and 
satisfaction, because there was no uncertainty or 
dispute about the amount owed. Although the facts 
on the record are somewhat ambiguous, England 
does not urge us to reexamine the trial court's 
findings of fact but merely tries to make the trial 
court's facts fit within the court of appeals' theory 
of the case. This is an awkward fit at best and 
would require the court to define "uncertainty" so as 
to include "mistakes." This is not just a broad 
definition, it is a misdefinition, and by conflating the 
two terms, the court would also conflate two 
doctrines, effectively subsuming the doctrine of 
mutual mistake within the theory of accord and 
satisfaction. Such a change in the common law is 
not justified by logic or by equity, particularly 
considering that the result in this case would be to 
permit one party to retain what appears to be an 
unjust enrichment of $169,501.75. 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, 
and the trial court judgment reinstated. 
ZIMMERMAN, L.J., STEWART, Associate C.J., 
and HOWE and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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xaUSTEE'SDEES) 
This Deed is made By ScottLundberg, as Trustee under the Tnist De$d described below, in 
favor )£ Chase Manhattan Bank,, successor by merger to Chase Bank of Toaa, KA., fka Texas 
Commerce Bank, N.A-, as custodian, 4708 Mercantile Drive North, Fort Worth, TX 76337-
3605, as Grantee. 
WHEREAS, on May 24,1996, Lan C. England, as Trustor, executed and delivered to First 
American Title of Utah, as Trustee, for the benefit of Option One Mortgage Corporation, as 
Beneficiary, a Trust Deed to secure the performance by the Trustor of bis obligations under a 
Promissory Note executed and delivered for a valid consideration to Option One Mortgage 
Corpo *ation on or about May 24,1996. The Trust Deed was tecoidedin the office of ibe Recorder 
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2835, <ind covered the'property described below; and 
WHEREAS, a default occurred under the terms of the Trust D^ed as set forth in the Notice 
of Default described below; and 
WHEREAS,, Scotl Lundberg was appointed by the Beneficiary as Trustee by a Substitution 
of Trustee recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, an 
Augus:25,2000, as Entry No. 7706191 in Book 8383.at Page 5279] and 
WHEREAS, Scott Lundberg executed and filed for record in the Office of the County 
Recorc er of Salt Lake County, a written Notice of Default and Election to Sell which was recorded 
on August 25> 2000r as Entry No. 7706192 in Book 8383 at Page 5281; and 
WHEREAS, the Trustee executed his Notice of Trustee's SaJe stating lhat he would sell at 
public xuction to the highest bidder the property therein and hereafter described* and fixing the time 
and pkee of said sale as December 28,2000, at 1Q:30 a.m. of said day, and did cause copies of the 
notice a be posted for not less than 20 days before the date of sale* in three public places in the 
county in which the property is located, and also in a conspicuous place on the property; and said 
Truster did cause a copy of notice to be published once & week for three consecutive wztks before 
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in 1h£ county in which the property is situated, the fzat date of such publication being December 1, 
2000, «ui the last date being December 15,2000; and 
WHEREAS, all applicable statutory pocovision$ of the State of Utah and all of the provisions 
of thet Trust Deed have been complied with as to the acts to be perrbnned and the notices to be 
given; and 
WHEREAS, the Trustee did, at the time and place of sale, sell at public auction, to Grantee 
above named> being the highest bidder, the property &r the sum of$52S95SX 00. 
NOW, THERJ5FORE, Trustee, in consideration of the premses recited and of the sum bid 
and pud by <3ratitea, by virtue of his authority under the TYust Deed, grants and conveys to the 
Grant x, without any covenant or warranty, express or implied, all of the property situated in Salt 
Lake f l in ty , Stare o f Utah, describedas follows: 
Lots \ trough 3, inclusive, of Block 3, GENEVA PLACE* according to the oSJcial plat 
thereof, filed in Book C of PJats, at Pago 90 of the official records of Salt Lake County 
Recorder, 
Togeth it with ail the improvements now or hereafter erected oq the property* md ail csseaienis, appurteaances, md 
fixture* now or hentafter a part of the property* 
DATED: Decembers , 2000. 
State cf Utah ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 




The foregoing Trustee's Deed was acknowledged before me on December 28, 2000 by 
Scott Lundberg, 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Carolyn J. WHITE, individually and as Trustee for 
the White Family Trust and as 
General Guardian for Ryan White, Richard White 
and Victoria White, Plaintiffs, 
Appellants, and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
The STATE of Utah and The Department of 
Financial Institutions for the State of 
Utah, Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-
Appellants. 
Nos. 900034, 900035, 
June 20, 1990. 
After appeals were taken from entry of judgment 
granted in favor of plaintiffs, defendants sought to 
modify judgment alleging that plaintiffs failed to 
account for certain amounts already paid. The 
Second District Court, Davis County, Douglas 
Cornaby, J., refused to act on the motion to modify 
judgment and found that appeal divested court 
jurisdiction. Appeal was taken. The Supreme Court 
held that motion to modify judgment did not affect 
legal issues raised on appeal, and, thus, trial court 
could hear motion to modify judgment without 
affecting appellate jurisdiction. 
Ordered accordingly. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Judgment <®=*340 
228k340 
District court has power to relieve party of judgment 
even though judgment is final. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59, 60(b). 
[2] Appeal and Error <S^436 
30k436 
If final judgment has been appealed, appeal divests 
trial court of jurisdiction and transfers jurisdiction to 
appellate court until appellate proceeding terminates 
and trial court regains jurisdiction. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59, 60(b). 
[3] Appeal and Error <&^439 
30k439 
Trial court retains jurisdiction to consider motion to 
relieve party of judgment, even if judgment is final, 
after appeal has been filed, and, if motion has merit, 
trial court must advise appellate court and moving 
party may then request remand. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59, 60(b). 
[4] Appeal and Error <®=^ 440 
30k440 
Adjudication of motion to reduce judgment by 
amounts allegedly already paid would not affect legal 
issues raised with respect to attorney fees and 
liability, and, thus, trial court could hear motion to 
modify judgment without affecting appellate 
jurisdiction; if motion were granted, trial court need 
only advise appellate court that judgment was 
modified. 
[5] Appeal and Error <®=^ 440 
30k440 
If motion is made to reduce judgment from which 
appeal has already been taken, which motion does not 
address issues raised on appeal, trial court may hear 
motion without affecting appellate jurisdiction and 
need only advise appellate court of any modifications 
in judgment made. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 54(b), 
60(b). 
*649 Douglas F. White, Tooele, for plaintiffs, 
appellants, and cross- appellees. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Stephen J. Sorenson, Bryce Pettey 
, Ray R. Christensen, Jay E. Jensen, Denton M. 




These cases are before the court on defendants' 
motion to consolidate, to stay the appeal proceedings, 
and to remand the cases to the district court for 
consideration of a motion brought under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b) to amend the judgment appealed 
in each case. The motion to consolidate was earlier 
granted. The motion to remand is now denied. The 
district court is directed to consider and decide the 
rule 60(b) motion. 
Judgment was granted in favor of plaintiffs and 
against defendants. Plaintiffs appealed from the 
judgment in case No. 900034, arguing that the trial 
court erred in not granting attorney fees to them. 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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Defendants appealed from the same judgment in case 
No. 900035, alleging error in finding liability on their 
part. Since the appeals are from the same judgment, 
they were consolidated under No. 900034. 
Defendants now aver that after the judgment was 
entered, they discovered that the amount of the 
judgment was overstated by approximately $9,000 
because plaintiffs failed to account for certain amounts 
repaid to them. On January 16, 1990, defendants 
moved to set aside or amend the judgment under rule 
60(b) on the alternative grounds of mistake, newly 
discovered evidence, or fraud. Because the time for 
appeal is not tolled by a rule 60(b) motion, unlike 
motions under rules 50(b), 52(b), and 59, defendants 
filed a notice of appeal on January 22, 1990, the last 
day before the appeal time expired. However, the 
district court thereafter refused to act on the rule 60(b) 
motion, ruling that the appeal had divested that court 
of jurisdiction. Defendants then brought this motion to 
stay proceedings in this court and to remand for the 
purpose of determining the rule 60(b) motion. 
[1][2] Under rule 60(b), the district court has the 
power to relieve a party of a judgment even though it 
may be a final judgment. [FN1] Where that final 
judgment has been appealed, however, the power in 
the trial court to modify or set it aside presents the 
appellate court with the possibility of being 
"confronted with an uncontrollable moving target." 
[FN2] The general rule has therefore been that an 
appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction and 
transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court, where it 
remains until the appellate proceeding terminates and 
the trial court regains jurisdiction. Where this 
divestiture of jurisdiction conflicts with rule 60(b)'s 
purpose to do justice, many courts have ruled that a 
party may apply to the appellate court for a temporary 
remand to the trial court for a hearing on the rule 
60(b) motion, as defendants have done in this case. 
Aune v. Reynders, 344 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1965); 
Norman v. Young, 422 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1970); 
Smith v. Lujan, 588 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1979); State 
ex rel Bell v. Hansen Lumber Co., 86 N.M. 312, 523 
P.2d 810 (1974); In re Estate of Condry, 117 Ariz. 
566, 574 P.2d 54 (Ct.App.1977). 
FN1. Indeed, it has been observed that the mle 
provides a "nice balance between the interest in 
finality [of judgments], and the desire to achieve 
justice." Wright & Miller, 11 Federal Practice and 
Procedure, § 2872 (1973). 
FN2. Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 
F.2d 1310, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981). 
[3] Some courts, observing that this solution serves 
only to delay review of the issues if the motion under 
rule 60(b) is ultimately denied, have formulated a 
second rule. Under the second rule, the trial court 
has jurisdiction to consider a rule 60(b) motion after 
an appeal has been filed and also has power to deny 
it. But if the *650 motion has merit, the trial court 
must so advise the appellate court, and the moving 
party may then request a remand. Ryan v. United 
States Lines Co., 303 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1962); 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SSZoe Colocotroni, 
601 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1979); Duriron Co. v. Bakke, 
431 P.2d 499 (Alaska 1967); Life of the Land v. 
Ariyoshi, 553 P.2d 464 (Haw. 1976). This court has 
never been confronted with this problem, prior to this 
case, although the Utah Court of Appeals recently 
adopted the second rule described above in Baker v. 
Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988). We now do the same. 
This court has long followed the general rule that the 
trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while 
it is under advisement on appeal. [FN3] We have 
made exceptions to the rule, in the interest of 
preventing unnecessary delay, where any action by 
the trial court is not likely to modify a party's rights 
with respect to the issues raised on appeal. Thus in 
Peters v. Peters, 15 Utah 2d 413, 394 P.2d 71 (1964), 
we held that the district court, which has continuing 
jurisdiction after entry of a final divorce decree, may 
adjudicate a petition to modify the decree due to a 
change of circumstances while the decree is pending 
on appeal since the petition for modification is 
collateral to the divorce decree. Similarly, where the 
trial court has, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b), certified as final a judgment against 
one party in a multi-party action, the remainder of the 
action remains in the trial court and is not necessarily 
affected by the appeal. In that case, the trial court 
has jurisdiction to proceed with the claims remaining 
unadjudicated. Lane v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333 (Utah 
1984). 
FN3. See, e.g., Smith v. Kimball, 76 Utah 350, 289 
P. 588 (1930). 
[4] [5] In the instant case, defendants seek to reduce 
the judgment against them by amounts which they 
aver have already been paid to plaintiff. [FN4] An 
adjudication of the motion, though a modification of 
the judgment may result, will not affect the legal 
issues raised here with respect to attorney fees and 




defendants' liability. Under these circumstances, we 
see no need to suspend our jurisdiction while the 
district court has the matter under consideration, as 
that will only delay proceedings. Instead, the trial 
court should hear the rule 60(b) motion and may deny 
it without interference from this court. If the motion 
is granted, the trial court in this case need only advise 
this court that the judgment has been modified. The 
district court action granting or denying the motion 
and the modified judgment should be included in the 
record when it is prepared for review by this court. 
FN4. We, of course, express no opinion on the 
merits of the motion, that being for the trial court to 
determine. 
Defendants' motion to stay proceedings and remand 
the case to the district court is denied, and the district 
court is directed to hear and determine the rule 60(b) 
motion. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, J. Rodney Dansie, and Bagley & 
Co., a Utah corporation, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, Counterclaimant, 
v. 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation, Counterclaim 
Defendant. 
Nos. 940190, 940296. 
Oct. 29, 1996. 
Homeowners association brought quiet title action 
against water company. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Pat B. Brian, J., found that 
homeowners association was legal owner, but entered 
judgment for water company after homeowners 
association failed to pay value of water system, and 
both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, 
Senior Judge, 863 P.2d 1, affirmed in part, reversed 
in part, and remanded in part. Water company 
moved to stay proceedings pending certiorari review. 
The District Court, Salt Lake County, declined stay 
and modified its previous judgment according to the 
Court of Appeals' remittitur, and water company 
appealed. The Supreme Court held that trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to modify its judgment while case 
was still pending on appeal. 
Vacated. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Certiorari <®=*1 
73kl 
Trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its judgment 
while appeal was pending on certiorari review, where 
appellant's time to seek certiorari had not expired; 
court of appeals issued its remittitur prematurely and 
jurisdiction was never returned to trial court. Rules 
App.Proc, Rule 36(a)(2). 
[2] Appeal and Error <@^>436 
30k436 
Generally, trial court is divested of jurisdiction over 
case while it is under advisement on appeal. 
[3] Appeal and Error <S=^436 
30k436 
Appeal divests trial court of jurisdiction and transfers 
it to appellate court, where it remains until trial court 
regains jurisdiction. 
[4] Appeal and Error <®^1191 
30kll91 
Rule that party may execute judgment even though 
appeal has been filed in appellate court did not support 
return to trial court before expiration of time to file 
petition for writ of certiorari. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
62(a). 
*305 Larry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for Hi-
Country. 
Val R. Antczak, Salt Lake City, for Foothills and 
Dansie. 
Ralph J. Marsh, Salt Lake City, for Bagley. 
PER CURIAM: 
An opinion was issued in this case by the Utah Court 
of Appeals on September 22, 1993. [FN1] Foothills 
Water Company and J. Rodney Dansie (collectively 
"Foothills") timely filed a petition for certiorari 
seeking this court's review of that decision, having 
obtained an extension of time from this court to do so. 
They did not, however, move in the court of appeals 
to stay remittitur of the case. Consequently, the 
court of appeals remitted the case to the trial court on 
January 18, 1994, while Foothills' time to seek 
certiorari was still pending. On January 20, 1994, 
Foothills petitioned the court of appeals to recall its 
remittitur. The court of appeals denied the motion, 
noting that "appellee [Foothills] may seek relief in the 
trial court." 
FN1. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Bagley & Co., 863 P.2d 1 (Utah.Ct.App. 1993). 
At the trial court, Foothills moved to stay 
proceedings pending certiorari review. However, the 
trial court declined the stay *306 and instead modified 
its previous judgment in accordance with the court of 
appeals' remittitur. Foothills thereupon filed this 
appeal from that modified judgment. 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
942 P.2d 305 
(Cite as: 942 P.2d 305, *306) 
Page 24 
On June 13, 1994, this court granted certiorari, 
limiting its review of the court of appeals' opinion to 
issues relating to the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Commission. That matter has now been decided, and 
the case was remanded for further proceedings in the 
court of appeals. See Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d 1017 
(Utah 1995). In this matter, we asked the parties to 
brief the issue of "whether the trial court has 
jurisdiction to enter a valid judgment while a timely 
petition for certiorari is pending or under advisement 
before this court." 
[1][2][3] Foothills contends that the trial court 
judgment is null and void because that court had no 
jurisdiction to modify its judgment while the case was 
pending review on certiorari at this court. This court 
follows the general rule that the trial court is divested 
of jurisdiction over a case while it is under advisement 
on appeal. An appeal divests the trial court of 
jurisdiction and transfers it to the appellate court, 
where it remains until the trial court regains 
jurisdiction. White v. State, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 
1990). The question then arises, was jurisdiction 
returned to the district court? 
Homeowners contends that jurisdiction was 
transferred back to the trial court when the court of 
appeals issued its remittitur and that Foothills was 
required to fde a motion to stay remittitur to prevent 
jurisdiction from being regained by the trial court. 
Homeowners relies on the advisory notes to rule 
36(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Advisory Committee Note.—Counsel should note 
that the petition for certiorari alone is not sufficient 
to stay the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Counsel must also file a motion to stay the remittitur 
or for an injunction or supersedeas. Although the 
time for filing the petition for writ of certiorari is 30 
days from the entry of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, the motion for the stay must be filed within 
14 days of the entry of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals or within five days of the entry of a 
decision regarding a motion for rehearing. 
This court has held a number of times that we may 
look to the notes of the advisory committee as an aid 
in interpreting the rules. [FN2] However, reliance on 
this note is misplaced, as it appears to refer to a rule 
which is not valid. [FN3] Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 36(a)(2) provides for remittitur by the court 
of appeals "immediately after the expiration of the 
time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari," and 
there is no reference to fourteen days. At the time 
the court of appeals issued its remittitur, this court 
had extended Foothills' time to file a petition for 
certiorari. Foothills' time to seek certiorari had 
therefore not expired. The court of appeals issued its 
remittitur prematurely, and jurisdiction was never 
returned to the trial court. 
FN2. See, e.g., Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 
858 P.2d 990, 995 n. 8 (Utah 1993); State v. Cude, 
784 P.2d 1197, 1200 n. 3 (Utah 1989); Slusher v. 
Ospital, 111 P.2d 437, 443 n. 10 (Utah 1989). 
FN3. Where the reference is invalid, the notes are 
not helpful. See Murphy v. Crosland, 915P.2d491, 
493 (Utah 1996). 
Homeowners argues that the remittitur itself, 
regardless of its validity, returned jurisdiction to the 
trial court; the court of appeals' decision was not 
automatically stayed; and upon receipt of the 
remittitur, the trial court was vested with jurisdiction 
to issue whatever orders it deemed necessary. 
Nevertheless, Homeowners also contends that when 
this court granted certiorari limited to issues relating 
to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, 
the court of appeals' remittitur returned jurisdiction to 
the trial court "on all but those excepted issues." 
Ultimately, Homeowners continues, even the Public 
Service Commission issues became moot once this 
court issued its opinion on certiorari, so that Foothills' 
appeal of the trial court's modified judgment is moot. 
[4] Homeowners points out that a notice of appeal 
does not stay execution of a valid judgment. Under 
rule 62(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party 
may execute on a *307 judgment even though an 
appeal has been filed in an appellate court, unless the 
appealing party obtains a stay of execution and posts 
an appropriate bond. Neither should a petition for 
certiorari review, which is discretionary rather than of 
right, stay execution of the decision of the court of 
appeals, according to Homeowners. 
We do not necessarily disagree with Homeowners as 
far as execution on the judgment is concerned, but its 
argument is inapposite. The issue is not whether 
execution may be stayed, but whether the trial court 
regained jurisdiction to enter a judgment or an order 
of any kind. This case exemplifies the basis for the 
rule prohibiting the trial court from exercising 
jurisdiction in a case while it is on appeal. Here, the 
trial court modified its judgment while this court had 
the same judgment on review. As a result, different 
versions of the same judgment were being analyzed 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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simultaneously at three levels of court, presenting the 
proverbial "moving target" the rule was designed to 
prevent. 
The court of appeals erred in remitting the case 
before the time to seek certiorari had expired under 
the rules and erred again when it refused to recall its 
erroneously issued remittitur. The judgment of the 
district court is void because that court had no 
Page 25 
jurisdiction to enter a judgment while the case was 
still pending in the appellate courts. 
The district court judgment is vacated as void. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., does not participate 
herein. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTME 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, and MP 
VENTURES, L.C. 
Plaintiffs, 
PRINCIPLE FUNDING CORPORATION 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his capacity 
as Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
RAYQUlNNB 
MEMORANDUM DECISION OEC 1 y 2001 
&NFBEKER 
CASE NO.010910255 a w " J L ^ m 
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
This matter came before the above entitled court on plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction. Having considered both of the parties' arguments as well as the relevant law, the Court 
enters the following ruling granting plaintiffs motion. 
In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure stated, in relevant part, that in 
the Court of Appeals, 
[t]he remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the expiration of 
the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari." 
The time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari was, and remains, thirty days from the entry of 
the Court of Appeals' decision. In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a 
decision reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on November 22, 1995, more 
than thirty days later, the Court of Appeals remitted the case back to the District Court. Shortly 
thereafter, on November 24, 1995, defendant filed a petition for certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Based upon this sequence of events, defendant contends that after remittitur the District Court 
did not obtain proper jurisdiction and consequently could modify its judgment in accordance with 
the instructions of the Court of Appeals. However, defendant's petition for certiorari was only 
granted after the Court of Appeals sent the case back to the District Court and after the thirty day 
waiting period had expired. Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, it was defendant who was in 
a better position to protect itself in this matter since defendant could have requested a stay of 
execution of judgment pending its petition. 
Thus, for purposes of priority, the relevant judgment's priority is to be determined from the 
date of reinstatement and does not relate back to the original judgment. Cox Corp. v Vertin 754 P.2d 
938 (Utah 1988) 
This is the final Order of this Court, no further Order is necessary. 
Dated this & day of December, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010910255 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail STEVEN W CALL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
79 SOUTH MAIN 
P.O. BOX 45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841450385 
Mail RONALD G RUSSELL 
ATTORNEY PLA 
185 SOUTH STATE STE 1300 
PO BOX 11019 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841470019 
Dated this day of 20 dl-
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STEVEN W. CALL (A5260) 
MICHAEL E. MAYFIELD (A8237) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Telefax: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for Principal Funding Corporation 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION 
AND Aaron D. Kennard, IN HIS CAPACITY 
AS Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO ALTER AND/OR 
AMEND MEMORAM3UM DECISION 
Case No. 010910255 
Hon. Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendant Principal Funding Corporation ("PFC") by and through its counsel of Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker, hereby moves the Court pursuant to Rules 52, 59 and 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure for an order altering, amending and clarifying the Court's memorandum 
decision dated December 10, 2001, and for the entry of a final declaratory judgment by the 
Court The motion is brought because the ruling of the Court is based upon the erroneous fact 
that more than 30 days had expired from the entry of the decision of the Utah Court of appeals in 
the matter of England v. Horbach, 944 P. 2d 340 (Utah 1997) before Horbach filed his petition 
for writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court. 
In its ruling, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals' decision was rendered on October 
19, 1995 but that Horbach's petition for writ of certiorari was not filed until November 24, 1995. 
The Court concludes that because the petition for certiorari was filed after the 30-day stay period 
had expired, the District Court regained jurisdiction over the case thereby vacating its prior 
judgment of record. However, the certified copy of the Supreme Court's docket, which was 
received by the Court as defendant's Exhibit 3, manifests that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals was docketed on April 19, 1995 and that Horbach's petition for certiorari was filed on 
Monday, November 20, 1995. However, because the 30th day fell on Sunday, November 19, 
1995, the last day of the thirty-day period expired on Monday, November 20, 1995 pursuant to 
Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Therefore, because Horbach's petition for certiorari was timely filed and the District 
Court never regained jurisdiction based on controlling case law set forth in Hi-Conntiy Estates 
Homeowners Association v. Foothills Water Company, 942 P.2d 305 and White v. State, 795 
P.2d 648 (Utah 1990). As a result thereof, the underlying judgment of the District Court was 
never vacated, altered or amended in compliance with the order of "remand and further action" 
made by the Court of Appeals in its decision. Consequently, the judgment lien which arose 
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automatically from the judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 remained valid 
throughout the appellate process as a matter of law. 
Finally, at the hearing before the Court the parties stipulated that the Court would not rule 
upon defendant PFC's motion for preliminary injunction but that the Court would make and 
enter a declaratory judgment on the ultimate issue of priority so that the Court's declaratory 
judgment could be immediately appealed by either party. Notwithstanding, the Court's 
memorandum decision appears to grant plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction. As a result, 
defendant PFC moves the Court to alter and amend the decision to reflect that the decision of the 
Court is a declaratory judgment as to the ultimate issue of priority and that the judgment is final 
as to the matters ruled upon there being no reason for further delay. 
WHEREFORE, defendant PFC prays the Court to alter an amend its memorandum 
decision to conform to the undisputed facts set forth in the certified dockets which were provided 
to the Court at hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ xlay of (^JU c** ^UUr<r- 2001. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEVEN W. CALL 
Attorneys for Principal Funding Corporation 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO ALTER 
AND/OR AMEND MEMORANDUM DECISION was mailed, postage prepaid, on this 24th day 
of December, 2001 to the following: 
Ronald Russell 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
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PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION 
AND Aaron D Kennard, IN HIS CAPACITY 
AS Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO ALTER AND AMEND 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 010910255 
Hon. Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendant Principal Funding Corporation (hereinafter "PFC"), submits this memorandum 
in support of its motion to alter and amend the memorandum decision ("Memorandum 
Decision") made by the Court on December 10, 2001. 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 10, 2001, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting Plaintiffs' 
motion for preliminary injunction. Material to its decision was the Court's determination that the 
defendant PFC (hereinafter "defendant") filed its petition for certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court on November 24, 1995, "more than thirty days" after the Court of Appeals issued its 
decision and after the Court of Appeals remitted the case back to the trial court. However, the 
Supreme Court's certified docket shows that Horbach timely filed his petition for certiorari on 
November 20, 1995, which was before the 30-day deadline expired and before the Court of 
Appeals' remittitur. Because the petition for certiorari was timely filed, the appellate process 
was not concluded and therefore neither the trial court nor the clerk thereof ever regained 
jurisdiction over the case, and therefore the original judgment remained undisturbed. See, Hi-
Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 
1996)(trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify judgment while the case is still pending in the 
appellate courts). In addition, even had the trial court regained jurisdiction over the Judgment 
before the appellate process was completed, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the Judgment. 
The reinstatement of the judgment made the Judgment effective from the date of its original 
entry on the record of the District Court. 
Because this Court's Memorandum Decision is based upon a clear mistake of fact that 
Horbach's petition for certiorari was not timely filed, this Court should alter and amend its 
Memorandum Decision to reflect that the petition for certiorari was indeed timely filed as 
reflected on Supreme Court's certified docket. 
i 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following facts are either uncontroverted or conclusively established by the 
certified dockets which were presented and received at trial. 
1. Defendant is the successor in interest and the judgment creditor which holds the 
money judgment (the "Judgment") which was entered in the matter of England v. Horbach, 944 
P.2d 340, 346 (Utah 1997). 
2. The foregoing Judgment was signed and filed by Judge Frederick on the docket of 
the District Court on April 18, 1994. (See District Court Docket at 9.) Certified copies of the 
dockets before the District Court, the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court were 
received as defendant's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 respectively at hearing. A copy of the foregoing 
Judgment was also received as defendant's Exhibit "4." 
3. An appeal from the foregoing Judgment was filed with the clerk of the District 
Court on May 18, 1994. (See District Court. Docket at 10.) 
4. After the appeal was filed, a motion for summary disposition was filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court on August 11, 1994. (See Court of Appeals, Docket at 1.) 
5. On October 4, 1994, the Supreme Court denied the motion for summary 
disposition. (Id. at 2.) 
6. On November 11, 1994, the Supreme Court filed a letter with the Clerk of the 
District Court indicating that the appeal was poured-over to the Court of Appeals (Dist. Ct. 
Docket at 11). 
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7. On November 16, 1994, the case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to the pour-over provisions of Title 78. (Court of Appeals Docket at 2.) 
8. The Court of Appeals issued it decision which states in relevant part as follows: 
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the accord and satisfaction 
unenforceable for lack of consideration and because we conclude the agreement was not 
founded upon a mutual mistake of fact, we reverse and remand for further action 
consistent with this opinion. 
A copy of the Utah Court of Appeals opinion was received at hearing as defendant's Exhibit "5." 
9. The foregoing opinion of the Court of Appeals sought to remand the case back to 
the District Court for further action consistent therewith. 
10. On November 20, 1995, Horbach filed with the Utah Supreme Court a petition for 
a writ of certiorari regarding the written decision made by the Court of Appeals. (Supreme Court 
Docket at 1). On that same day the Utah Supreme Court sent formal notice to the District Court 
that a petition for a writ of certiorari had been filed with the Utah Supreme Court. A certified 
copy of the foregoing document from the Utah Supreme Court was received at hearing as 
defendant's Exhibit 6. The foregoing notice from the Utah Supreme Court was docketed by the 
clerk of the District Court on November 27, 1995. 
11. Because November 19, 1995 was a Sunday, the last day for filing the petition for 
certiorari was November 20, 1995 pursuant to Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
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12. At the time the Utah Supreme Court's notice was filed with the District Court, the 
written opinion of the Court of Appeals had not been filed with the District Court. (See District 
Court Docket, at 18.) 
13. On December 1, 2001, several days after the Supreme Court gave formal notice 
that a petition for a writ of certiorari had been filed, the Court of Appeals attempted to remit the 
record on appeal to the District Court. (District Court Docket, Exhibit 1 at 18.) 
14. On February 14, 1996, the Supreme Court gave formal notice to the District Court 
that it had granted Horbach's petition for writ of certiorari. A certified copy of the notice was 
received at hearing as defendant's Exhibit "7". 
15. On May 24, 1996, a deed of trust was signed by England in favor of the named 
beneficiary therein. The foregoing deed of trust was thereafter recorded with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder on May 31, 1996. A copy of the foregoing deed of trust was received as 
defendant's Exhibit "8." 
16. At the time the foregoing deed of trust was made and recorded, the Judgment 
made by the District Court and the formal notices received by the Utah Supreme Court 
concerning the issuance of its writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals were both reflected 
on the District Court's docket. (District Court Docket at 9 & 11.) 
17. On May 30, 1997, the Supreme Court issued its written opinion which reversed 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals. A copy of the published decision was received at hearing as 
defendant's Exhibit "9." 
18. On October 1, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court remitted the record on appeal to the 
District Court. A certified copy of the remittitur from the Supreme Court was received as 
defendant's Exhibit "10." 
19. Sometime in the year 2000, Scott Lundberg, as substituted trustee, filed a notice 
of default under the deed of trust. (See Exhibit 11, at 1.) Thereafter, a non-judicial sale was 
conducted by the trustee whereat the trustee sold the subject property to Chase Manhattan Bank. 
20. On December 28, 2000, Scott Lundberg executed a trustee's deed to the buyer at 
the sale which was recorded at the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on January 10, 2001. A 
copy of the trustee's deed was received at hearing as defendant's Exhibit 11. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
PROCEDURE 
Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may 
amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(b). Pursuant to UtahR. Civ. P. 59, a motion to alter and amend a judgment may be 
made for the grounds set forth therein provided that the motion is filed within 10 days. Under 
Rule 60(b) a motion for relief from a judgment for mistake or inadvertence may be made after 
the entry of a judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Defendant PFC has timely moved the Court to 
alter and amend its Memorandum Decision based upon mistake or inadvertence with respect to 




THE COURT'S DECISION IS 
BASED UPON A MISTAKE OF FACT 
In its memorandum decision, dated December 10, 2001, the Court concludes as follows: 
In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a decision 
reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on November 22, 1995, more 
than thirty days after, the Court of Appeals remitted the case back to the District Court. 
Shortly thereafter, on November 24, 1995, defendant filed a petition for certiorari in the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
Based upon this sequence of events defendant contends that after remittitur the 
District Court did not obtain proper jurisdiction and consequently could modify its 
judgment in accordance with the instructions of the Court of Appeals. However, 
defendant's petition for certiorari was only granted after the Court of Appeals sent the 
case back to the District Court and after the thirty day waiting period had expired. . . 
Memorandum Decision, at 2. 
The Memorandum Decision is based upon the erroneous fact that Horbach's petition for 
writ of certiorari was not timely filed. However, the certified copy of the Supreme Court 
docket, which was received as defendant's Exhibit 3 at hearing, reflects that Horbach's petition 
for certiorari was indeed timely filed in compliance with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure stated, in relevant part, that in 
the Court of Appeals, "[t]he remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the expiration of 
the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari". Pursuant to Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of 
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Appellate Procedure, "[a] petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the final decision by the Court of Appeals." Id. 
Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the manner in which the 
30-day period is to be calculated. The Rule provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
(a) Computation of time. In computing any period of time prescribed by these rules, by 
an order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default 
which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of 
the period shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in 
which event the period extends until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a 
Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
Utah R. App. P. 22(a)(emphasis added). Based upon the foregoing, when the last day for the 
filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari falls on a Sunday, the last day shifts to the following 
Monday. 
In the instant case, the 30th day for the filing of Horbach's petition for certiorari was 
Sunday, November 19th. However, because that day was a Sunday, the last day of the 30-day 
period was Monday, November 20th. The certified docket of the Utah Supreme Court reflects 
that the Horbach petition for certiorari was indeed filed on November 20, 2001. (See Defendant's 
Exhibit 3). Based upon the foregoing, the petition for certiorari was timely filed within the 30-
day period and the Court's ruling is based upon a clear mistake of fact. 
The certified copy of the Supreme Court's docket also reflects that the Supreme Court 
granted Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari on February 13, 1996. (Supreme Court Docket 
at 1). The docket of the District Court also reflects that a formal written notice was given to the 
District Court that the petition for certiorari had been granted by the Supreme Court on Febmary 
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21, 1996. {See District Court Docket at 18). A certified copy of the notice was received at 
hearing by the Court as defendant's Exhibit 7. 
POINT II 
HORBACH'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT WAS GRANTED LONG BEFORE THE DEED OF 
TRUST WAS RECORDED AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S PROPERTY 
The ruling that because the loan against the property was made before the Supreme Court 
granted its petition for certiorari and before the writ of certiorari was issued to the Court of 
Appeals, the defendant was in a better position to protect itself, is inaccurate and erroneous. The 
certified dockets of the Supreme Court and the District Court establish that Horbach's petition 
for certiorari was granted on February 13, 1996. The District Court docket also reflects that 
formal notice of the writ of certiorari was given by the Supreme Court to the District Court and 
that the notice was entered on the District Court's docket on February 21, 1996. (See District 
Court Docket at 18). 
In light of the foregoing it is clear that the creditor who loaned money against the 
property was in the better position to protect itself. Indeed, the creditor had constructive notice 
that the Judgment had been signed and entered against the judgment debtor, and that the 
judgment had not been vacated by the trial court in compliance with the order of the Court of 
Appeals and that the Judgment was under review by the Utah Supreme Court. Therefore, when 
the creditor loaned money against the judgment debtor's property it did so knowing that the 
Judgment against the debtor was either valid or that it might be reinstated by the Supreme Court. 
As such, the creditor took its pledge of the property subject thereto. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S JUDGMENT HAS ABSOLUTE 
PRIORITY OVER PLAINTIFFS' INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
Sub-Point A 
THE RENEWAL OF AN AGING JUDGMENT 
IS NOT THE ISSUE IN THE INSTANT CASE 
In the second to last paragraph of its Memorandum Decision the Court states as follows: 
Thus, for purposes of priority, the relevant judgment's priority is to be determined 
from the date of reinstatement and does not relate back to the original judgment. Cox 
Corp. v. Vertin, 754P.2d 938 (Utah 1988). 
Memorandum Decision at 2. This Court's decision was based upon the Cox decision. However, 
a review of the Cox decision reflects that it is not applicable to the case at bar because the 
discussion in the case involved the affect of a renewed judgment (i.e., a renewal judgment). A 
renewal judgment is a new judgment that is obtained when a complaint is filed upon an aging 
judgment. In Cox7 a lien creditor attempted to renew his judgment lien after the debtor's 
bankruptcy case had discharged the debtor from personal liability on an aging judgment. The 
court in Cox upheld the trial court's conclusion that "since the bankruptcy discharged 
respondents' [the debtor's] personal liability on the judgment. . . neither the judgment nor the 
judgment lien could be renewed." Id. at 939 (emphasis added). The court made this conclusion 
because a "renewal judgment results in a new judgment" (id.) and the creation of a new 
judgment requires that personal liability exist. Accordingly, when an action is filed to obtain a 
renewal judgment, that action results in a new judgment being entered in a new docket. Thus, 
the Utah Supreme Court has held that the lien created by a renewal judgment will attach only 
from the date of its entry. Id. The instant action does not involve a renewal judgment but rather 
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a judgment that was affirmed and reinstated by the Supreme Court on appeal. As such, the only 
relevancy of the Cox decision to the present case is that defendant will lose its judgment lien 
once its Judgment expires. The decision does not hold for the proposition that a judgment loses 
its priority when it is affirmed or reinstated on appeal. 
SUB-POINT B 
THE JUDGMENT REMAINED 
VALE) THROUGH THE APPELLATE PROCESS 
The judgment made and entered by Judge Frederick remained valid and enforceable 
through the appeal process because the trial court never regained jurisdiction over the case to 
alter or vacate its judgment.1 Hi-Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills Water 
Co, 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996). 
The Court of Appeals erred in remitting the case before the time to seek certiorari 
had expired under the rules and erred again when it refused to recall its 
erroneously issued remittitur. The judgment of the district court is void because 
that court had no jurisdiction to enter a judgment while the case was still 
pending in the appellate courts. 
The district court judgment is vacated as void. 
Id , at 307 (emphasis added). Accord, White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990)("This 
court has long followed the general rule that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case 
while it is under advisement on appeal.") 
Finally, the law is well settled that rules of procedure are not to be construed to extend or 
limit the jurisdiction. See Utah R. Civ. P. 82. ("These rules shall not be construed to extend or 
1
 The decision of the Court of Appeals is clear that the case was to be remanded with further 
action by the trial court (i.e., the vacation of the Judgment). 
11 
limit the jurisdiction of the courts this state or the venue of actions therein."). Thus, even if 
there were some provision in the rules of procedure which were inconsistent with the holdings in 
Hi-Country and White, the later would control as a matter of law. This is obviously why Rule 36 
was amended to conform to the law. Amended Rule 36 provides in relevant part, "filf the 
Supreme Court grants the petition, jurisdiction of the appeal shall be transferred to the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals shall close its file and transfer the record on 
appeal if any, to the Supreme Court.77 Id. (emphasis added) The foregoing statement 
reflects the law in Utah at all relevant times herein. 
SUB-POINT C 
EVEN HAD THE JUDGMENT BEEN VACATED (WHICH IT WASN'T), 
THE JUDGMENT WAS REINSTATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
When a judgment is "reinstated2" as opposed to being renewed, the Utah Supreme Court 
has indicated that the original judgment should be revitalized and have the same force and effect 
as though the judgment were never set aside. See Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 302 
P. 2d 712 (Utah 1956). In Hewitt, the jury had returned a verdict in favor of the appellant and on 
the following day, the clerk signed and entered a judgment on the jury verdict. Id. at 712. 
Thereafter, the trial court granted a motion for a directed verdict and set aside the jury verdict 
and entered a judgment in favor of the respondent. Id. Upon appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, 
the judgment was reversed, and the Utah Supreme Court ordered that the judgment of the trial 
court be set aside, and that the jury verdict be reinstated. Id. However, when the case was 
remanded to the trial court so that the judgment could be reinstated in favor of the appellant, the 
trial court only permitted interest on the judgment to accrue from the date the Utah Supreme 
Court ordered the judgment reinstated, as opposed to the date that the original judgment on the 
jury verdict was entered. Id. As a result, the case went back to the Utah Supreme Court and they 
held that the trial court had erred in permitting interest to accrue only from the date on which the 
order had been entered for the judgment to be reinstated. Id. at 713. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The court's order entering judgment for the defendant was in error and abortive, 
and when this court issued its mandate ordering the judgment for defendant 
vacated and the judgment on the verdict for plaintiff reinstated, it vitalized that 
judgment to the same extent and with the same force as though the trial 
court had never entered the abortive and erroneous judgment for defendant. 
Id. at 713 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that it could not see any good reason why the 
appellant should lose the interest that had accrued on its judgment just because the 
respondent had been able to convince the trial court to make an erroneous ruling. 
Likewise, in this case, defendant PFC should not lose the priority of its judgment lien, 
just because England was able to convince the Court of Appeals to render a ruling that 
has since been overturned by the Supreme Court. 
2
 "Reinstate, To place again in a former state or position; to restore <the judge reinstated the 
judgment that had been vacated>." Black's Law Dictionary at 1290 (7 ed.)(emphasis added). 
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SUB-POINT D 
PLAINTIFFS' PREDECESSOR TOOK THE 
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE JUDGMENT 
In its pleadings before the Court, plaintiffs argue that the original loan against the 
property was made before the Supreme Court granted Horbach's petition for certiorari 
However, this is inaccurate The certified docket of the Supreme Court reflects that the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 13, 1996 (See Supreme Court Docket at 
2) A formal notice from the Supreme Court to the District Court that the petition was 
granted was promptly entered by clerk of the District Court (See District Court Docket 
at 180 ) The loan transaction on the property did not occur until May 24. 1996 (See 
Defendant's Exhibit 8) Thus, when the loan transaction was made, the lender knew that 
the loan might be subject to the Judgment3 Indeed, at the very least the Judgment gave 
notice of the pending action, i e , a lis pendens (Latin for "a pending law suit" Black's 
Law Dictionary (7th ed) at 942) As such, any person searching title to the property had 
constructive notice of the Judgment, that it was under review by the Supreme Court and 
that the Judgment was either valid or subject to reinstatement4 Furthermore, plaintiffs' 
3
 "From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed and filed in the 
office of the clerk of the district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all the real property 
of the judgment debtor, not except from execution, an the county in which the judgment is 
entered " Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1995)(while the statute was amended in 1997, the 
foregoing remained the law for all judgments made before July 1, 1997) See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-22-1(2) (2001) 
Thus, by loaning money behind the judgment the creditor assumed the risk that the 
decision of the Court of Appeals may be reversed on appeal 
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predecessor purchased the subject property expressly without warranty on December 28, 
2000, years after the judgment had been reinstated by the Supreme Court. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD MAKE AND 
ENTER A FINAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
At the hearing before the Court, the parties stipulated that this Court would treat the 
hearing as a motion for declaratory relief by the parties and that a final declaratory judgment 
would be entered on the issue of priority so either party could immediately appeal. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court's Memorandum Decision reflects that plaintiffs' 
motion for preliminary injunction is granted. As such, this Court's Memorandum Decision 
should be altered and amended to provide for a final declaratory judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the various reasons set forth above, the order of this Court should be altered and 
amended as a matter of law to conform to the conclusive facts set forth in the certified dockets 
presented to the Court at hearing. 
IS 
WHEREFORE, defendant PFC prays the Court to grant PFC's motion and to sign enter 
defendant PFC's proposed declaratory judgment which has been submitted to the Court 
concurrently herewith. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day o f L ^ ^ e - ^ ^ 2001. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEVEN W. CALL 
Attorneys for Principal Funding Corporation 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Alter and Amend Memorandum Decision be served upon plaintiffs' 
counsel by causing the same to be mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, on 
December"^V^, 2001 to: 
Ronald Russell 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 




STEVEN W. CALL (A5260) _-? r . . ,-,. r r , 
MICHAEL E. MAYFIELD (A8237) " , • . J 
RAY, QUTNNEY & NEBEKER _ ..,uT 
79 South Main, Suite 500 " L - -^' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 :"• ' • — £ _ . _ _ 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 v"' " " v -L,k,x 
Telefax: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for Principal Funding Corporation 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION 
AND Aaron D. Kennard, IN HIS CAPACITY 
AS Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR 




LEAVE TO SUBMIT 
PROPOSED ORDER 
Case No. 010910255 
Hon. Stephen L. Henriod 
Principal Funding Corporation, a defendant in the above captioned case, hereby 
moves the Court pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, for leave 
to submit its proposed form of declaratory judgment to the Court in connection with its 
Motion to Alter and Amend which has been filed with the Court. For the legal reasons 
set forth in the memorandum of points and authorities in support of its Motion to Alter 
and Amend, defendant asserts that cause exists for granting leave to defendani r i "f^ 
si lb i nit a proposed foi i i 1 of declarator yji idgmen t to tl le Coi; n t togetl ler witl 1 si ippor tive 
findings and conclusions. 
\\I-lI:RL.rUiM .. .;-jic:iu.:;.: I T C prays tlu- v oi;; : . - - •-; -.•. J.. .s--d 
declaratory judgment to the Court for consideration with defendant's pending motion to 
alter and amend. 
' I n r J ^ i s Q ' ' day of January 2002. 
_ j j 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
C" 
STEVEN W. CALL 
Attorneys for Principal Funding Group 
ORDER 
Foi cause appeal ing, the Coi II t: hei e'fay gi ants icu .- .\ :uun: : ' •• , .- / 
Corporation, to submit its proposed form of declarators iiidgment tn the Court ;;o iha. :L 
may be consiciad *c* ^^ I v.,.;; ;n connection w ith defendant's motion to alter and 
amend which is pending before the Court. 
DATED this day of 2002,,. 
B Y THE CO [ IE I : 
HON. STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
V\ ::irt CoilitJu<\r- > 
624472 
CERTIFICATE OF HAM) DEL1V l.K > 
I !;;-vh\ m-'ifv ili.-'i n rniv ;in ! correct copy of the foreiioina was hand-delivered, on this 
/ "* day of January, 2002: 
Mr. Ronald G. Russell 
PARR, WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, £1JUO 
Salt Lake Citv, U T ^ P 1 
V\WU±&. (^kodue-^ 
Prepared and submitted by: 
•* • I \ l.N W. CALL (A^ou; 
MiCHAEL £. MAYFIELD (A8237) 
RAY; QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Telefax: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for Principal Funding Corporation 
I N T i l h •••!!/• : ' ' •. : ) ! - :-: • • \<Y 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION 
AND Aaron D. Kennard, IN HIS CAPACITY 




Case Hu u lU'ilUiro 
Hon. Stephen L. Henriod 
A hearing was held before the G.uii KA\ iw, • di aay of December, 2001 Ronald G. 
Russell of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless :• ^;v • ! -.» ^f (T. V 
and MP Ventures, L .C. and Steven W. Call of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker appeared on behalf of 
r
'redoing lieaiir.L : • * '• • . • • " * !
 : • , •', - -^.y 
injunction and defendant's opposition thereto would be converted to cross motions for 
declai ator) i ellef concei i lii lg tl le in idei 1) ii lg issue of pi iorit] I his \ < a s to enable a final 
judgment on the issue of pri< -nfv to Ho entered hx Uie rmn-t so that either party could appeal. 
"ilic Court having considered the ccitmcd copies ol the court dockets of the District 
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court which it received at hearing, and having 
considered the other docunients received at hearing and having heard the argument of counsel 
ami tin othei cause appealing, the Cuinl heiHiy niaLcs il,s Inaliiit's < *".:.*?, ,, 
and declaratory judgment as follows; 
FIN DIN G SOI 'F 
1 Defendant is the si lecessor in interest and the judgment creditor which holds the 
money judgment .4. rudgmem ) whiJ, was entered in the matter Q{ Ln^Luui v. nu/A/u;. V4-t 
P.2d 340, 346 (Utah 1997). • 
2 fhe foregoing Judgment was signed and filed by Judge Frederick on the docket of 
the Disti ict Coi n t on 4 pi il 1 8 1 99 Ik (See Dist. Ct Docket at 9 ) Ge i: tified cc pies of the dockets 
of the District Court:,, the U tah Court of Appeals and the Utah, Supreme Court in this England} \ 
Horbat :h case wei e i ecei v ed as defei idai it' s Exl libits 1, 2 and 3 i espe ::ti \ el} \ cop) of tl le 
foregoing Judgment was also received as defendants Exhibit "4," 
3 An appeal from, the iore^oing Judgment was nled win. lik U ^ A oi ihe District 
Court on May 18, 1994. (See Dist. Ct. Docket at 10.) 
2 
4. After the appeal was filed, a motion for summary disposition was filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court on August 11, 1994. (See Court of Appeals, Docket at 1 ) 
5. On October z 1 199 \ the I J ta h Si ipren le Coi n t denied tl le motion for si immai > 
disposition. (Id. at 2.) 
6. Oi l l ] o\ e ti it e i: 11 199 t, tl le [ J tali Si ipi ei i le Cc " n 1: III eel a lettei • ith tl ic clei k of 
the District Court indicating that the appeal was poured-ove** *o the ( »MITI of Appeals (Dist Ct. 
i.'jcivc; u' . . u)Vv;;.;c i-. r^ i uie case was t r a n s i e n t io u o b lah ( ourt of Appeals 
pursuant to the pour-over provisions of Title 78. (See Court of Appeals Docket at 2.) 
7 The Court of Appeals issued it decision which states in relevant part as follows: 
Because we conclude the trial court erred v\,;oii u lick: the accord and satisfaction 
unenforceable for lack of consideration and because we conclude the agreement was not 
founded upon a mutual mistake of fact, w e reverse and remand for further action 
consistent with this opinion. 
A corv of the Utah Court of Appeals opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit "5 " 
6. The foregoing decision makes it clear that the Court of Appeals was remanding 
On November 20, 1995, Horbach filed with the Utah Supreme Court, a petition for 
Docket at On that same day the Supreme Court sent formal notice to the District Court that a 
petition loi a wni ,,; ccn.oia.* i . ^ i . . ^ . . i i^u ,^111 iue Supreme 1 nui A cu i incd copy of the 
foreLTo:nrr document was received at hearing as defendant 's Exhibit 6. The foregoing notice 
fi Dm 1:1 le Si lpreme C :)i ii 1:1: :) the Dist i ict Coi n: I:" < • as docketed b> tl le cle it: k oft! le Disti ict Coi n t c n 
November 27, 1995. 
I Becai ise 1 1 o\ en lbei 19, 1995 was a Sunday, tl le last a~, ioi i;i- liim-. ... L:U 
petition for writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court was November 20, 1995 pursuant to 
R~:e —u) *;i — • -all Rui^ ut Appellate Procedure. 
i i . At the time the Supreme C * -*.'* 4~. ••:":• i! . • tl,' wr, r* ' - <! ••. D-v 
providing that a petition for certiorari had been filed, the written opinion of the Court of Appeals 
lliiii] inn mm fi]tif| "> iih ihr 1 )istin I * 'i unit (! >i*;11i<i > i nimi 1 h n i ni ai i S ) 
*
 l
 = December 1, 2001, several days after the Supreme Court gave formal notice 
JJ u J , ,:\- ' , -. j .... , . *Vi^ ..o attempted to icinn in*, . au id on 
appeal to the District Court. (See District Court Docket, Exhibit 1 at 18.) 
. ^)rua;\ •*, / ' . . lUc Supreme Court gave forma, notice w, the District Court-
that it had granted Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari. Acertiiied cor- ffi * ^ > >* 
received at hearing as Defendant's Exhibit "7." 
beneficiary therein The foregoing deed of trust was thereafter recorded with the Salt Lake 
i niiiilv Recorder mi Mmv i I l^'fi ] rn|i\ n! the Imregoing Iced ol liustwasi eceived as 
defendant's Exhibit "8." 
-it the time the toregoing deed of trust was made and recorded, the Judgment 
made by the District Court and the formal notices made and received by the I Jta h Si ipi ei m • C o i n I: 
4 
concerning the is:-1.-"i^ ''•• • •* • • * ' • . ' • •» • • -.p^a^ . :.-;.^ \: 
on the District Court's docket. (District Court Docket at 9 and I i ) 
On May 30 ] 99 7 tl ic [ ] tal I Si ipr erne Coin t ISSIIL.: .I .»; ;ue;; opinion winch 
reversed the written opinion of the I. Jtah Court: of Appeals. A copy of the published decision was 
received at hearing as defendant's Exhibit<::" 9." 
1 ) On October I, 1997, the Utah Supreme Com! lrmittt il flie ivmnl on ;ip|v il In llir 
District Court. A certified copy of the remittitur from the Utah Supreme Court was received as 
defendant's Exh 





--' ' ;•- • VJC i \i.- reaue: a non-ji...:.c;a. sale was 
conducted by the trustee whereat the trustee sold the subject property to Chase Manhattan Bank. 
I"1:1)" l hi I icccinbc! iM, 2000 SLOII Lundberg executed a Trustee's deed to the buyer at 
the sale which was recorded at the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office
 t ^ 
copy (.; Vt'iK. J ^ u w as received as defendant's Exhibit "11" >, he deed expressly provides that the 
Trustee was convevina tin1 piopeilv wit In H it jiin- n^ t. n nit m \ numi', cxpir^ed m impl <l 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-••• . J . '.Lii .J parties pursuant u I u:h 
Code Ann. § 78-3-4 and § 78-33-1. 
V ein le is pi opei before ;r,-.. ; ;.i( ,i i j . . . . ICL * WUM O; : ^ Lake County pursuant, to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1 because the real property at issue is situate! in Snlt 1 akr (V-tnil" ' 
5 
I ) poi i the ei iti 3 of tl le J \ idgn i.ei it b\ 1:1: le Disti ict Coi 11 i: clerk ii 11:1 le matter of 
England v. Horbach, a judgment lien arose on all non-exempt real property of the judgment 
debtor located in Salt I ak:e Count} pi 11 si tat: it to I Jtal 1 Code A m 1 § ] 8 22 1 
;i 1995, Rule 'U> of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure stated, in relevant part, 
mat A\ .:ic L Jim u, Appeals, [tjne icmittitur of the court, shall issue ,nmediately after the 
expiration of the time for filimr -\ petition for writ of certiorari." 
24 Pursuant to Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a] petition for a 
\\iil niVnlinnifi m •>! In \]\i\\ \\\\\\ \\h- C\n[ of Ilk SupiYini ' Vi'iit: 1: ^ - aii •• > 
of the final decision by the Court, of Appeals." 
B 1 lie 22(a) of the I Jtal: 1 lit lies of Appellate Pi: ocedure sets the pi ocedure b> 1 \ hicli 
the 30 day period is to be calculated The Rule provides in relevant part, as follows: 
(a) Computation of time. In computing any period of time prescribed by these rules, by 
an order of the court, or by any app1' ^hle statv*-- 'u * "' of the act, event, or default 
which the designated period of time 1 be included. The last day of 
the period shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which 
event the period extends until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a. Sunday, or 
a legal holiday. 
.?,(* Based upon the foregoing, when the last day for filing a petition for certiorari falls 
on a Sunday, 1:^ ......; ^, .,.1/^ 0 ;, i,^ ^.-^.^ t.-.g Nk-aday pursuant to Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Accord Glad v. Glad, 567P.2d 160 (Utah ] 977). 
27. In the instant case, the 30th day for the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari was 
period was Monday, November 20, 1995. 
6 
of certiorari was filed on November 20, 1995. As a result, the petition for a writ of certiorari that 
was filed b] I loi ba cl 1 \ \ as tii i iel> filed witl lii i til: le 30 da) period in compliance \\itn i^^c _.-wi; *•: 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
„
 l
 I he certified copy of UK. docket of the Utah Supreme Court reflects that 
Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari w..^ jjr.mi ! K l! • «' '-: 
February 13, 1996. (Supreme Court Docket at 1.) I he certified cop\ oi the docket o! ihe 
^
 % w , - - . •• . . . . . : t . 
tor ceniorari had been granted on February 21, 1 <)<•),, (Distrut (Vuri i3ocket.ii 18 ) A certified 
:c certified dockets of the Utah Supreme Court and the Third District Court 
reflect that the petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court, on t chua ry 1 ? 1 n o ^ 
The certified docket of the District Court also reflects that notice was provid . * *l ! -
Court by the Supreme Court that the petition had been granted. The notice was placed on l tic 
District Court's docket on Febi i lai } 21 1996 
IC loan documents made by England including the deed of trust that was 
r e "-- :• ' \ •' , h * v " •. . \ a>>L . \ : : _ . i 
Bank to the judgment debtor was not made until May 25, 1996 which was more than two months 
after the Supreme Coui 11 lad granted Horbach's petition for certiorari. 
32. The Utah Supreme Court held in the matter of Hi irh ('* »(nrrv ":---- //rv lit w, u // ! ^ 
Association v. Foothills Water Company, 942 P„2d 305 OQOH and White v. State of Utah, that if 
7 
a final ji idgment has been nppealed llir appeal di\est:; I he hi il . il f jnnsdnlKMi and transfers 
jurisdiction to the appellate courts until the appellate proceedings terminate and the trial court 
re^cin : * • : : ' s • u ^ ^ - - ^
 ;.- ..«»: ... . not icg.i:ii JUI.:^: Jn-n ;o 
alter, amend or vacate its Judgment until after the I :ah ^ripvi "A.* t 'o* n had completed its 
appellate review oi :ne v.a^ e u;id returned jurisdiction to :nc i ^ m a < >>urt. 
33. As a result of theforesoin.'* fhe iud --lent made n\C vr ?" 5 -!< ! IA J ' 
remained valid and enforceable throuizh [tie appeal process because tin: trial court never regained 
jurisdiction i .^ ,: * - <'* ' ..* .-*. K< n i ••/•-, : - v \ > • 
Owners Association v. roothiits Water (7;., 942 P.2d 305 ll? .h l(»9f 
the Court of Appeals was remanded with instruction to the District CM in The foregoing 
..;) u^a>Aj i^.^sc- . . ..i . :..<j i..-.:.i:ic; -• ;»,!. AUlii, cr.cci w -. *i tiicr - uicr in connect Lh *.ui, ihe 
written opinion made by the Court of Appeals. However, because the appellate process had not 
been completed uic O^u iu Court did not regain jurisdiction to amend the Judgment with the 
remand and instructions given by the Ciuil i if \pp» aL in ils r ntten i ipninm I'heiefoie, 11 n. 
District Court lacked jurisdiction to alter or change the Judgment until the entire appellate 
Based upon the foregoing, the Judgment that was made and entered h\ uid<?c 
Fi ede, • .• tl le underlyii lg case i ei nained a valid judgment t ;. ;JU c, ..v 
throughout the appellate process. As a result thereof, the judgment lien, which was created 
8 
thereby, remained a valid jiid.gm.ent liei 11 ipoi 1 tl: le ji ldgi nent debtoi 's pi operty 1:1 :i rougl 101 it III le 
appellate process. 
E • :!:i 1 1 lad tl le ji iclgi nent 1 lad beei i ^  acated bj tl leDisti let Coui t, w hen a judgment 
is "reinstated1" as opposed to being renewed, the I :tah ^ipi i me Court has indicated that the 
original judgment . . •- ic\ uaiizeu ahu have u.v, wiuo k.-ice and effect as though the 
judgment were never set aside. See Hewitt v. General Tire and Rub; i •* ("V; ~ ~ •' ' 
J /. In addition, the loan doci if i lents idln | tfI• n flu' lni',1 drcd rmlr .unl i i tirespt nulim1 
trust deed that was recorded against England's property was made more than two months after 
*i-• *s>:M,^ ml.;" . . . - . . - •• . , _. .v j : _ nouce of such 
action had been recorded on the docket of the District Court A> ^ uoh, plaintiffs' argument that 
.-. •••• "•.• •.:• -;ch :; pel.uon :.,. certiorari was granted o\ ihe 
Supreme Court is not in harmony with the date the deed of trust was made or record-. : w . * '• a 
.. c L o-unty Recorder. 
38. Because plaintiffs' predecessoi piiit'liisnl tin >!ih|ni |imper1> 'il lln; nun |iidn:ul 
foreclosure sale in the year 2000, which was about three years after the Supreme Court reversed 
the decisit ."f- . - * -d* i1 . ,:i. . ..:...-.. .. 
predecessor purchased the property subject to and with constructive notice of the judgment lien 
fluff existed againsl lh<: piopetty LikviL the language of the trustee's deed, which was received 
9 
at hearing as defendant's Pxliilnl I I rNpiessly pi ON nlcs ih.if ilir M m , avarice was m,uk w ml In nil 
any covenant or warranty, express or implied". Therefore, the deed did not purport to convey the 
•!. p - M r " " y • ' • * ' • : , . ' , * . . i n s . 
J1 ' .*.,i^-: :.pon the foregoing, the Court concludes as a matter of law that defendant's 
;ua-HK A -. ... :.^:> p. :oi ity over piamm is interest in the property as a matter of law. 
40 ihe Court also concludes that it ^~r : : " <i <i ' "n-tl .!- -,:i! ,; r 
judgment with respect to this action so that either party may :i;omptly appeal. 
it \ K \ . ; ; . < - , > • 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court hereby 
UIH)l\Rlx AIlJUDtiHS AND DFCRHKS Hint: 
1. Defendant PFC's motion for declaratory relief is hereby granted; 
2. • i . .;L::V. :~.L >\\,\y^ ,ir. j ciUc, ^J l, y Judge Frederick in the 'matter of England v. 
Horbach, 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997) is hereby declared to be prior in Imir nnd iu»li1 i, ll„r ilir.l 
of trust that was made and. recorded after the Utah Supreme Court granted Horbach's petition for 
certiorari to review the decision of the I 't:ih ('* >un of Appeals; 
3. Defendant PFC's interest in the subject property is hereby declared to be prior in 
rmht a- * • ' ^\ i ,_: • ic pidLiUl.s or 
their successors in interest; 
" ' -ok's Dictionary also defines "reinstate" to mean,, "To place again in a former state or 
•ition; to restore <the judge reinstated the judgment that had been vacated>." Black's Law 
Liuionary at 1290 (7n ed.)(emphasis added). 
10 
4. Defendant PFC's ixiotioi i. to alter ai id a i i lei id tl le mernoi audi in: 1 decisioi 1 oft! li s 
Court dated December 10, 2001, is hereby granted, and the memorandum decision, which was 
b a s e , . . i . - c i : r- - :* . ;-CL,li . ; . > r^. . . O U J : : l l i e m d l u . O l iL/iglu'Ul V. 
Horbach, 944 P 2d VjO {[ Tmh 1997) had not been timely filed, is hereby vacated; 
5. ^ n. ja .^uvt relief heretofore made and entered by the Court, is hereby vacated. 
However, if plaintiffs timely appeal this Declarators Jiuf-p:; •' iUu- i .-i P? !- - i 
from enforcing its Judgment against the property until the appeal thereof has been concluded 
|n i n nli 11 flu if plaint nils pnst bond si iff incut In satisfy defendant \ Immanent in I ill I in mli : 
defendant is successful on appeal. 
6. This Declai atoi ) J i ldgi i ici it is cei tified final as to the i natters i ule upon pursuant 
to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Court having determined that there is no 
just reason for delay, and 
7. This Declaratory 3 \ ldgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and should U: 
entered by the Clerk of the Court there being no reason for further delay. 
DATED this d< i > of 
BY TI1L COURT 
HON. STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
District Court Judge 
624472 
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
Jeffrey D. Stevens, Esq. (8496) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; and MP 
VENTURES, L C , 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ; 
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION; ] 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his ] 
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff, ] 
Defendants. ) 
I MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
I TO MOTION TO ALTER AND/OR 
I AMEND MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 010910255PR 
I Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit the following memorandum in opposition to the 
Motion to Alter and/or Amend Memorandum Decision filed by defendant Principal 
Funding Corporation. 
BACKGROUND 
The sole issue raised by the facts in this case is whether the priority of Principal 
Funding's claimed judgment lien relates back to the date that the Horbach Judgment was 
originally entered or has a priority as of the date the judgment was reinstated by the 
Utah Supreme Court. This court heard oral argument on December 3, 2001 on plaintiffs7 
motion for a preliminary injunction. At that time, the parties submitted the matter to the 
court for a final determination based on the facts established by the record. The court 
took the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision dated December 
10, 2001 (attached as Exhibit "A" hereto). Defendant Principal Funding obviously does 
not like the outcome and, therefore, has moved to alter or amend the court's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S DECISION IS NOT BASED ON A MISTAKE OF FACT. 
Defendant asserts that the court's Memorandum Decision is based on a mistake of 
fact. The Memorandum Decision makes reference to the date the certiorari petition was 
docketed by the Utah Court of Appeals rather than the date it was filed in the Utah 
Supreme Court. That reference, however, is not the basis for the court's decision and is 
immaterial. 
On the first page of the Memorandum Decision, this court correctly notes that in 
1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provided that the remittitur of the 
Utah Court of Appeals "shall issue immediately after the expiration of the time for f i l ing a 
2 
petition for writ of certiorari." The court then recites the facts that the Utah Court of 
Appeals issued its decision on October 19, 1995 reversing the district court's order and 
remitted the case back to the District Court on November 22, 1995. The Memorandum 
Decision then notes that "on November 24, 1995, defendant filed a petition for certiorari 
in the Utah Supreme Court." The Utah Court of Appeals docket sheet (a copy of which 
is attached hereto marked Exhibit "B") indicates that the certiorari petition was docketed 
by the Utah Court of Appeals on November 24, 1995, although the petition was filed in 
the Utah Supreme Court on November 20, 1995. That distinction, however, is not the 
basis for this court's decision. 
The basis for this court's ruling is clearly stated on the second page of the 
Memorandum Decision: 
Based upon this sequence of events, defendant contends that after 
remittitur the District Court did not obtain proper jurisdiction and 
consequently could modify its judgment in accordance with the 
instructions of the Court of Appeals. However, defendant's petition for 
certiorari was only granted after the Court of Appeals sent the case back to 
the District Court and after the thirty day waiting period had expired. 
Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, it was defendant who was in a 
better position to protect itself in this matter since defendant could have 
requested a stay of execution of judgment pending its petition. 
Obviously, this court's decision is not based on the date that the certiorari petition was 
filed with the Utah Supreme Court or docketed with the Utah Court of Appeals. Rather, 
the basis for the decision was (1) the certiorari petition was not granted until after the 
Utah Court of Appeals had properly remitted the case to the district court, and (2) it was 
3 
the defendant who, as a matter of public policy, was in a position to seek an appropriate 
stay. The record confirms that the Utah Supreme Court did not grant the certiorari 
petition until February 13, 1996, several months after the matter had been properly 
remitted to the district court by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
II. BECAUSE A STAY WAS AVAILABLE UPON POSTING A SUPERSEDEAS BOND. 
THIS COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT, AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC 
POLICY. THE LIEN OF A REINSTATED IUDGMENT TAKES PRIORITY AS OF THE 
DATE OF REINSTATEMENT. 
In an effort to attack the public policy basis for this court's decision, defendant 
mis-states the court's ruling. Defendant incorrectly characterizes this court's ruling to say 
that the defendant was in a better position to protect itself because the loan against the 
property was made before the Utah Supreme Court granted its certiorari petition. fSee 
defendant's memorandum at 9.] This court made no such ruling, but adopted the 
rational that the defendant could have protected its judgment lien by obtaining a stay of 
the remittitur. 
Neither the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court 
nor the granting of the petition automatically stay the effect of the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision or the remittitur issued by the Utah Court of Appeals. A stay of remittitur 
pending'certiorari review could have been sought to stay the effect of the Utah Court of 
Appeals' decision and maintain the judgment lien. See Utah R. App. P. 36(b); State v. 
Palmer, 802 P.2d 748 (Utah App. 1990) ("Rule 36(b), Utah R. App. P., provides that a 
4 
stay of the remittitur may be granted pending application for [certiorari] review."). 
Because a stay was available upon posting a supersedeas bond, as a matter of public 
policy, the rationale adopted by courts in other jurisdictions holding that the lien of a 
reinstated judgment takes priority as of the date of reinstatement should also apply in 
Utah. See, e ^ , Bulmash v. Davis. 157 Cal.Rptr. 66, 597 P.2d 469, 472-73 (1979) 
(holding that if the creditor had requested a stay "he would have been allowed to retain 
his lien by filing an undertaking insuring that he would pay all costs and damages which 
the plaintiffs would sustain by reason of the lien in the event that the order of the court 
below were sustained in favor of plaintiffs."). 
III. THIS COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE JUDGMENT'S PRIORITY IS TO BE 
DETERMINED FROM THE DATE OF REINSTATEMENT AND DOES NOT RELATE 
BACK TO THE ORIGINAL IUDGMENT. 
Defendant's arguments that the court should reconsider its decision regarding the 
priority of the claimed judgment lien must be rejected. [See defendant's memorandum at 
10.] 
A. Renewal ludgment Does Not Relate Back. Defendant argues that the court's 
reference in its Memorandum Decision to Cox Corp. v. Vertin. 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 
1988), was erroneous. In Cox, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the lien of a 
renewal judgment would relate back to the date of the original judgment. Although the 
context of the Cox case was different than the instant case, the rationale of the court 
applies to the facts present here. The Cox court concluded that where a judgment 
5 
expires, "[t]he lien of a renewal judgment attaches only from the date of entry of the new 
judgment and does not relate back to the date of the original judgment or extend the 
•prior lien. . . ." ]d. at 939. The same principle applies here. Under Utah's judgment 
lien statute, the lien attaches against property of the judgment debtor "owned or acquired 
during the existence of the judgment. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(2). Because the 
Horbach Judgment was vacated, it ceased to exist and, under the statute, so did the lien. 
Under Cox, the lien's priority is the date of reinstatement. 
B. Trial Court jurisdiction. This court has already considered and rejected 
defendant's argument regarding the effect of the decision in Hi-Country Estates Home-
Owners Association v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (1996). In that case, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify a judgment 
where the Utah Court of Appeals prematurely remitted the case. That decision has no 
application in the instant case because (1) the Utah Court of Appeals vacated the 
Horbach Judgment at issue and, therefore, no modification needed to be made, and (2) 
the Remittitur was premature, but was properly issued after the period for f i l ing a 
certiorari petition had expired. Moreover, the Hi-Country court specifically noted that a 
certiorari petition does not itself stay the execution of the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision. In other words, there is no issue here about whether the district court regained 
jurisdiction over the case to make any modification to the Horbach Judgment. The court 
that had jurisdiction - the Utah Court of Appeals - specifically vacated the Judgment and 
6 
then properly remitted the case back to the district court. No further action needed to 
be taken by the district court to vacate the Horbach Judgment because that had already 
been done by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
C. Reinstatement Versus Renewal. Defendant's effort to make a distinction 
between a "reinstated" judgment as opposed to a "renewed" judgment makes no 
difference to the outcome of this case. [See defendant's memorandum at 12.] The 
language of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision was clear: the Horbach Judgment was 
vacated. The reinstatement of the Horbach Judgment did not revive the priority of the 
original judgment lien. That lien ceased to exist under the plain terms of Utah's 
judgment lien statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(2). The case cited by defendant, 
Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 302 P.2d 712 (Utah 1956), is inapposite. In that 
case, the issue was whether the reinstated judgment would bear interest from the date of 
the original order. The effect of the judgment lien statute and the priority of the 
judgment lien over the rights of third parties were not at issue in the case. 
D. Constructive Notice. Defendant argues that the vacated judgment was the 
equivalent of a lis pendens and those dealing with the subject property were charged 
with constructive notice of the pendency of the action. There is no authority, however, 
for the proposition that a vacated judgment provides constructive notice of an interest in 
real property. Under the judgment lien statute, a lien does not exist independently of 
the judgment and, therefore, ceased to exist when the Horbach Judgment was vacated. 
7 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 permits the recording of a lis pendens at the county 
recorder's office n[i]n any action affecting title to, or the right of possession of, real 
property. . . ." The underlying lawsuit here, however, did not concern title to or 
possession of the subject property and only a money judgment was ultimately entered in 
the case. If defendant's argument were accepted and the mere pendency of a lawsuit 
seeking a money judgment would provide constructive notice of a potential judgment 
lien against the real estate of the debtor, all property of anyone sued in a lawsuit would 
be rendered unmarketable. Such a result would give a potential judgment creditor a 
prejudgment writ of attachment against all of the potential judgment debtor's real 
property without the protection of a bond and without due process. Defendant's 
argument that those dealing with the subject property took with notice of the potential 
reinstatement of the judgment lien must, therefore, be rejected. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS AGREE THAT THE COURT SHOULD ENTER A FINAL 1UDGMENT. 
Plaintiffs agree that the court should enter a final decree so that this matter may 
proceed on appeal. There are no material facts in dispute and the court's decision 
resolved the only issue in the case. Plaintiffs have prepared and submit herewith 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a proposed Final Judgment for 
the court's consideration. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs submit that the defendant's Motion to Alter 
and/or Amend Memorandum Decision must be denied and that the court should enter 
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the proposed Final Judgment 
submitted herewith. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of January, 2002. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
RonalcTS/ Russell, Esq. V ( 
Attorneys/for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A I hereby certify that on the "JU day of January, 2002 a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ALTER AND/OR 
AMEND MEMORANDUM DECISION was mailed postage prepaid, to: 
Steven W. Call, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 500 




THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTME 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, and MP 
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PRINCIPLE FUNDING CORPORATION 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his capacity 




JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
P & 
This^matter came before the above entitled court on plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction. Having considered both of the parties' arguments as well as the relevant law, the Court 
enters the following ruling granting plaintiffs motion. 
In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure stated, in relevant part, that in 
the Court of Appeals, 
[t]he remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the expiration of 
the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari." 
The time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari was, and remains, thirty days from the entry of 
the Court of Appeals' decision. In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a 
decision reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on November 22, 1995, more 
than thirty days later, the Court of Appeals remitted the case back to the Distnct Court. Shortly 
thereafter, on November 24, 1995, defendant filed a petition for certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
"RYTTT-RTT ! T A M 
B ased upon this sequence of events, defendant contends that after remittitur the District Court 
did not obtain proper jurisdiction and consequently could modify its judgment in accordance with 
the instructions of the Court of Appeals. However, defendant's petition for certiorari was only 
granted after the Court of Appeals sent the case back to the District Court and after the thirty day 
waiting period had expired. Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, it was defendant who was in 
a better position to protect itself in this matter since defendant could have requested a stay of 
execution of judgment pending its petition. 
Thus, for purposes of priority, the relevant judgment's priority is to be detennined from the 
date of reinstatement and does noi relate back to the original judgment. Cox Corp, v Vertin 754 P.2d 
938 (Utah 1988) 
This is the final Order of this Court, no further Order is necessary. 
Dated this (& day of December, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION 
AND Aaron D. Kennard, IN HIS CAPACITY 
AS Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
JOINT 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
AND 
REQUEST FOR RULING 
AND ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
Case No. 010910255 
Hon. Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendant Principal Funding Corporation ("PFC") by and through its counsel, Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker, and Plaintiffs Chase Manhattan Bank and MP Ventures, L.C., by their 
counsel, Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, hereby submit this Joint Notice to Submit and 
Request for Ruling and Entry of Final Judgment to the Court. 
Unless the Court desires a hearing on defendant PFCs Motion to Alter and Amend 
Memorandum Decision or the orders proposed by the parties, the parties request that the Court 
make and enter its order of judgment at its earliest convenience. Time is of the essence on this 
matter because of the age of defendant PFCs judgment. 
Defendant PFCs relevant documents are as follows: 
1. Defendant PFCs Motion to Alter and/or Amend Memorandum Decision dated 
December 24, 2001; 
2. Defendant PFCs Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter and Amend 
Memorandum Decision dated December 24, 2001 and the exhibits referenced therein; 
3. Defendant PFCs Motion for Leave to Submit Proposed Order and Order 
Granting Leave to Submit Proposed Order dated January 7, 2002; and 
4. Defendant PFCs [proposed] Declaratory Judgment. 
The Plaintiffs' relevant documents are as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Alter and/or Amend 
Memorandum Decision dated January 7, 2002; 
2. Plaintiffs' proposed Final Judgment; 
3. Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law; and 
4. Plaintiffs' Objection to proposed Declaratory Judgment. 
The parties submit to the Court herewith one original and two copies of their respective 
proposed orders with pre-addressed envelopes for mailing to each party. The parties have also 
attached courtesy copies of the other documents and pleadings listed above. 
The parties both appreciate the Court's time in considering this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this JO day of NS^ ^ J - L 
* * % • 
2002. 
RAY, QUTNNEY & NEBEKER 
STEVEN W. CALL (A5260)x 
MICHAEL E. MAYFIELD (A8237) 
RAY, QUTNNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Telefax: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for defendant Principal Funding 
-A 
Respectfully submitted this cT -^flay of 
WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
RonaTd/G. Russell (4134) 
Jeffrey D. Stevens (8496) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; and MP 
VENTURES, L.C., 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiffs, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION; ) 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his ) Civil No. 010910255PR 
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff, ) Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendants. ) 
This matter came before the court for oral argument on December 3, 2001 on 
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Ronald G. Russell appeared on behalf of 
plaintiffs and Steven W. Call appeared on behalf of defendant Principal Funding 
Corporation. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties submitted the matter to 
the court for a final determination based on the facts established by the record. The 
court took the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision dated 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 3 1 2002 
By 
SALT LAKE COUNTY .. 
camth Deputy Clerk 
December 10, 2001. Based on the record herein, the matters submitted, and the 
arguments of counsel, the court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff MP Ventures, L.C. is the owner of certain real property located at 
2157 South Lincoln Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is more particularly described as 
follows: 
Lots 1 through 8, inclusive, of Block 3, Geneva Place, 
according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book C of Plats, at 
Page 90 of the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. 
Said property is hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property." 
2. On or about April 18, 1994, a Judgment on a counterclaim was entered 
against Lan C. England in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah in 
an action entitled Lan C. England v. Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No. 930901471CV 
(the "Horbach Judgment"). 
3. An appeal was taken from the Horbach Judgment and on October 19, 1995, 
the Utah Court of Appeals filed an Opinion reversing the Horbach Judgment which 
states, "we vacate the trial court's judgment based upon defendant's counterclaim. . . ." 
England v. Horbach, 905 P.2d 301, 303 n.1 (Utah App. 1995). The Utah Court of 
Appeals issued its Remittitur to the district court on November 22, 1995, which 
2 
Remittitur was docketed by the district court in Civil No. 930901471 CV on December 1, 
1995. 
4. On November 20, 1995, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court seeking review of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
petition for a writ of certiorari is shown as Entry No. 1 on the Utah Supreme Court's 
docket in case number 950506. 
5. On February 13, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court entered an order granting 
the petition for a writ of certiorari and, by letter dated February 14, 1996 addressed to 
the Third Judicial District Court, requested that the district court prepare and transmit the 
record to the Utah Supreme Court. 
6. On May 30, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion on the 
certiorari petition. That decision states, "The judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the trial court judgment reinstated." England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 
346 (Utah 1997). 
7. The Utah Supreme Court issued its Remittitur in case number 950506 on 
October 1, 1997. 
8. While the petition for certiorari was pending, Lan England borrowed 
$500,000 from Option One Mortgage Corporation secured by a Deed of Trust recorded 
against the Subject Property on May 31, 1996 as Entry No. 6371918, in Book 7412, at 
Page 2835 of the official records of the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder having Lan C. 
3 
England, as trustor, First American Title of Utah, as trustee, and Option One Mortgage 
Corporation, as beneficiary (the "Option One Trust Deed"). 
9. The Option One Trust Deed was foreclosed and on January 10, 2001, a 
Trustee's Deed was recorded at the office of the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder as 
Entry No. 7797085, in Book 8414, at Page 8416 naming Chase Manhattan Bank as 
grantee. 
10. Chase Manhattan Bank conveyed the Subject Property to Tim Linford. In 
turn, Tim Linford conveyed the Subject Property to MP Ventures, L.C. 
11. Principal Funding Corporation is the assignee of the Horbach Judgment and 
directed the Salt Lake County Sheriff to conduct a sheriffs execution sale of the Subject 
Property. 
12. Plaintiffs brought this action seeking an order and decree from the court 
declaring and decreeing that defendant Principal Funding Corporation does not hold a 
judgment lien against the Subject Property and seeking to enjoin the sheriffs sale. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
13. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(2), a judgment lien applies to the 
judgment debtor's property "owned or acquired during the existence of the 
4 
judgment . . . ." The lien does not exist independently of the judgment and attaches to 
the debtor's property only so long as the judgment exists. 
14. Because the judgment lien depends on the existence of the judgment, the 
lien of the Horbach Judgment ceased to exist when the judgment was vacated by the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
15. When the Utah Supreme Court later reinstated the Horbach Judgment, a 
judgment lien once again arose, but the relevant judgment's priority is to be determined 
from the date of reinstatement and does not relate back to the original judgment. See 
Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988). 
16. Defendant Principal Funding Corporation contends that after Remittitur from 
the Utah Court of Appeals, the district court did not obtain jurisdiction and consequently 
could not modify its judgment in accordance with the instructions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The version of Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in effect in 1 985, 
however, provided that "the remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the 
expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari." The time for filing a 
petition for writ of certiorari was, and remains, thirty days from the entry of the Utah 
Court of Appeals' decision. The Utah Court of Appeals properly issued its Remittitur 
within thirty days after the entry of its decision. 
1 7. The filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme 
Court did not automatically stay the effect of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision or the 
5 
Remittitur issued by the Utah Court of Appeals. A stay of the Remittitur pending 
certiorari review could have been sought to stay the effect of the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision and maintain a judgment lien. See Utah R. App. P. 36(b); State v. Palmer, 802 
P.2d 748 (Utah App. 1990). Because a stay was available upon posting a supersedeas 
bond, as a matter of public policy, the rationale adopted by courts in other jurisdictions 
holding that a reinstated judgment takes priority as of the date of reinstatement should 
also apply in Utah. 
18. Plaintiffs are entitled to the entry of judgment as prayed in the Amended 
Complaint, including a decree quieting title to the Subject Property and enjoining 
defendants from causing an execution sale of the Subject Property. 
DATED this day of January, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. of 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Steven W. Call, Esq. of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant Principal Funding Corporation 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A I hereby certify that on the JA&—day of December, 2001 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed 
postage prepaid, to: 
Steven W. Call, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RonalcMCJ. Russell, Esq 
7 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
Jeffrey D. Stevens, Esq. (8496) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; and MP ) 
VENTURES, L.C., ) 
) FINAL JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION; ) 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his ) Civil No. 01091O255PR 
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff, ) Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendants. ) 
The court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based 
thereon and the record in this matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants on 
Count I of the Amended Complaint. The court hereby declares that defendant Principal 
Funding Corporation does not hold a judgment lien against the following-described 
property (the "Subject Property") arising from the Judgment entered in the action entitled 
Lan C. England v. Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No. 930901471CV, in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah and the court hereby quiets title to the Subject 
Property in favor of plaintiff MP Ventures, L.C. and against defendant Principal Funding 
Corporation. The Subject Property is located in Salt Lake County, Utah and is more 
specifically described as follows: 
Lots 1 through 8, inclusive, of Block 3, Geneva Place, according 
to the official plat thereof, filed in Book C of Plats, at Page 90 of 
the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
(Tax identification number 16-20-136-006.) 
2. Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Principal 
Funding Corporation on Count II of the Amended Complaint and defendant Principal 
Funding Corporation is hereby enjoined and restrained from causing the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County to sell, attempt to sell, or to initiate any further proceedings to sell the 
Subject Property pursuant to execution proceedings arising from a Judgment entered in 
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah in an action entitled Lan C. 
England v. Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No. 930901471CV. 
3. Bond number 1162810 filed in this action by Old Republic Surety Company, 
as surety, dated November 26, 2001, is hereby released and discharged. 
2 
4. This judgment is a final order resolving all claims and causes of action in this 
case and is, therefore, entered as the Final Judgment. 
DATED this day of January, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. of 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Steven W. Call, Esq. of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant Principal Funding Corporation 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
4 
I hereby certify that on the ^M^day of December, 2001 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was mailed postage prepaid, to: 
Steven W. Call, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
4 
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Jeffrey D. Stevens, Esq. (8496) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; and MP 
VENTURES, L.C., 
) FINAL JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION; ) 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his ) Civil No. 010910255PR 
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff, ) Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendants. ) 
The court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based 
thereon and the record in this matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants on 
Count I of the Amended Compiaint. The court hereby declares that defendant Principal 
FILED SiSTBiCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 3 1 2002 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. _ T 
"Deputy Clerk Deputy l€ 
Funding Corporation does not hold a judgment lien against the following-described 
property (the "Subject Property") arising from the Judgment entered in the action entitled 
Lan C. England v. Eugene Horbach, et al.. Civil No. 930901471CV, in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah and the court hereby quiets title to the Subject 
Property in favor of plaintiff MP Ventures, L.C. and against defendant Principal Funding 
Corporation. The Subject Property is located in Salt Lake County, Utah and is more 
specifically described as follows: 
Lots 1 through 8, inclusive, of Block 3, Geneva Place, according 
to the official plat thereof, filed in Book C of Plats, at Page 90 of 
the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
(Tax identification number 16-20-136-006.) 
2. Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Principal 
Funding Corporation on Count II of the Amended Complaint and defendant Principal 
Funding Corporation is hereby enjoined and restrained from causing the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County to sell, attempt to sell, or to initiate any further proceedings to sell the 
Subject Property pursuant to execution proceedings arising from a Judgment entered in 
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah in an action entitled Lan C. 
England v. Eugene Horbach, et al.. Civil No. 930901471CV. 
3. Bond number 1162810 filed in this action by Old Republic Surety Company, 
as surety, dated November 26, 2001, is hereby released and discharged. 
2 
4. This judgment is a final order resolving all claims and causes of action in this 
case and is, therefore, entered as the Final Judgment. 
DATED this t>j day of January, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod' 
District Court Judge V ^ s ^ ^ * * ! ^ 
Ronald/G. Russell, Esq/ of 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Steven W. Call, Esq. of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant Principal Funding Corporation 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TTJE COPY 0 " 
AN CnGINAL DOCUMENT ON =!LE IN TH I 
TH'^Q D.S7RJCT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNJv 
STATE OF UTAh 
DATE \fo\/6'Z.(T$% 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^Hff-"day of December, 2001 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was mailed postage prepaid, to: 
Steven W. Call, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 500 





STEVEN W. CALL (A5260) '£ Y _____ 
MICHAEL E. MAYFIELD (A8237) W*"-T Y n F ^ ; ' 
RAY, QUTNNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801)532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for Principal Funding Corporation 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his capacity 
as Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 010910255 
Hon. Stephen L. Henriod 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that defendant Principal Funding Corporation, by and 
through its attorneys at Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, hereby appeals pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to the Utah Supreme Court and/or any other appellate 
court with jurisdiction over this appeal, from the final judgment made and entered in this action 
on January 31, 2002 by Stephen L. Henriod, judge for the Third District Court for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. The appeal is taken from the final judgment made by the district court 
and the findings of fact and conclusions of law made in connection therewith. The appeal also 
includes an appeal from defendant's motion to alter and amend judgment which was filed with 
the district court. 
DATED this 1-f^  day of March, 2002. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEVERW. CALL 
Attorneys for Principal Funding Corporation 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
t 
I hereby certify that on the y day of March, 2002, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appeal was served by hand delivery on the following: 
Ronald G. Russell 
Jeffrey D. Stevens 
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O.Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0019 
[Mil*** \Jlfl£^^rv^ 
635381 
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